| Affordance. (2004-2006). Wikipedia, Retrieved March 20, 2006, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance |
 
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/05/2006, 12:45 |
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| "... property of an object, or a feature of the immediate environment, that indicates how to interface with that object or feature" |
| Gibson originally introduced it as an objective term referring to all action possibilities that are possible and within the capabilities of the subject. Donald Norman refined this in 1988 to a subjective perceived affordance that includes definitions of what is likely to happen based upon the subject's experiences, beliefs etc. |
| A perceived affordance (according to the field of ecological cognition) leads the subject to derive a plan to act upon that affordance. Unless cognitive dissonance occurs (using the object in ways other than suggested by the affordances), that plan will be acted upon. |
| Flach, J. M., & Holden, J. G. (1998). The reality of experience: Gibson's way. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(1), 90–95. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:21 |
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| Re Gibson, "action takes precedence. The experience depends more on what can be "done" than on the quality of visual or acoustic images." |
| "in the design of experiences in virtual environments the constraints on action take precedence over the constraints on perception." |
| "the reality of experience (i.e. presence or immersion)." |
| Kress, G. (2003). Literacy in the new media age. London: Routledge. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/08/2006, 12:37 |
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| "The affective affordances of sound are entirely different to those of sight or those of touch; sound is more immediately tangibly felt in the body than is sight, but certainly differently felt." |
| Kromand, D. 2008, October 22, Sound and the diegesis in survival-horror games. Paper presented at Audio Mostly 2008, Piteå, Sweden. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 24/11/2008, 11:12 |
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| The lack of a barrier between diegetic/nondiegetic sounds "purposefully hinders an efficient transfer of affordance". |
| Sanders, J. T. (1993). Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, and the materiality of meaning. Man and World, 26, 287–302. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 13/12/2023, 07:54 |
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| "The concept of "affordances" can be similarly useful in contexts other than visual perception. It is clear that Gibson understands them to be the key to all modes of perception, and it would be difficult to see why he should be wrong in this if his thesis concerning vision were to be granted. That is, if "affordances" are what are perceived by visual systems (or, to put the matter in a way that some might prefer, if the language of "affordances" is the one most apt for explaining vision), it is hard to see why any of the other modes of perception should be different. Indeed, the spirit of the "ecological approach" is such that it is hard to see why vision should be singled out for any but analytic purposes. Surely it is extraordinarily rare for visual perception to be isolated in real experience." |
| Discussing Merleau-Ponty's and Gibson's work in the context of the doctrine of the materiality of meaning. That is, meaning, or significance, is to be found, or is something that exists, out in the world where that world is external to self. Thus, Gibson's affordances are things already in the world and, using Merleau-Ponty's ideas, significance is already found in the world through our most basic encounters with it. |
| Schott, G., & Kambouri, M. (2003). Moving between the spectral and material plane: Interactivity in social play with computer games. Convergence, 9(3), 41–55. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 20/10/2006, 12:07 |
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| The authors note that those new to a game may use its elements in different ways to the expert. |
| von Uexküll, J. (1992). A stroll through the worlds of animals and men: A picture book of invisible worlds. Semiotica, 89(4), 319–391. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 31/10/2023, 18:13 |
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| "I had taken a young, very intelligent and agile Negro with me from the heart of Africa to Dar-es-Salaam. The only thing which he lacked was a knowledge of European tools. When I bid him climb a short ladder, he asked me: 'How am I to do that, I see nothing but rods and holes?' As soon as another Negro had shown him how to climb the ladder, he could do it easily. From then on, the perceptually given 'rods and holes' held a climbing tone for him, and he recognized them everywhere as a ladder. The receptor image of rods and holes had been supplemented by the effector image of his own action; through this it had acquired a new meaning. The new meaning manifested itself as a new attribute, as a functional or effector tone." |
| "According to information I have received concerning the sound perception of night moths, it makes no difference whether the sound to which the animals are adjusted be the sound manifestation of a bat or one produced by rubbing a glass stopper — the effect is always the same. Night moths which, owing to their light coloring, are easily visible, fly away upon perceiving a high tone, while species which have protective coloration alight in response to the same tone. The same sensory cue has the opposite effect in their case. It is striking how the two opposite kinds of action are governed by a plan. There can be no question of discrimination or purposiveness, since no moth or butterfly has ever seen the color of its own skin. The plan revealed in this instance appears even more admirable when we learn that the artful microscopic structure of the night moth's hearing organ exists solely for this one high tone of the bat. To all else, these moths are totally deaf." |
| Wilhelmsson, U. (2001). Enacting the point of being: Computer games, interaction and film theory. Unpublished thesis PhD, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 19/06/2008, 10:46 |
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| "Sounds also have affordances. They reveal something about the objects producing the sound. To exemplify, we might perceive sounds as ”dense” or ”light” suggesting that there are qualities that constrains or permits locomotion. A ”dense” sound might be conceptualized and understood as ”a wall of sound”. We can not walk through walls if they do not have openings, and openings afford locomotion as Gibson shows. What I mean is that a sound that we understand as ”dense” does not afford locomotion in the same way as a ”light” sound. When creating sound-scapes either as stand-alones or to merge with images, this is important to notice. One might create a ”big” and ”massive” sound that have some ”openings” in it. It also the case that a ”dense” sound might be so powerful that it is unpleasant to get any closer to it. That is to say, it does not afford locomotion in the direction of the sound source." |
| Zhang, J. Categorization of affordances. Retrieved March 20, 2006, from http://acad88.sahs.uth. ... /hi6301/affordance.html |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 20/03/2006, 16:30 |
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| "Affordances provided by the environment are what it offers, what it provides, what it furnishes, and what it invites" |
| "The "values" and "meanings" of things in the environment can be directly perceived. "Values" and "meanings" are external to the perceiver" |
| "Affordances are relative to animals. They can only be measured in ecology, but not in physics" |
| "An affordance is an invariant" |
| "Affordances are holistic. What we perceive when we look at objects are their affordances, not their dimensions and properties" |
| "An affordance implies complementarity of the perceiver and the environment. It is neither an objective property nor a subjective property, and at the same time it is both. It cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective" |
| "External representations belong to the environment; and internal representations belong to the organism" |
Zhang applies Gibson's system of affordances to the theory of distributed representation:
a) The external representational space is specified by the environment's information and structures.
b) The internal representational space is specified by the organism's physical structures and biological, perceptual and cognitive mechanisms and faculties.
c) The affordance space is the distributed representational space specified by external and internal representational space.
d) Both internal and external representational spaces can be defined by constraints and allowable actions.
e) If the two spaces are defined by constraints then the affordance space is defined as the disjunction (i.e. sum) of all constraints.
f) If the two spaces are defined by actions, the affordance space is the conjunction (i.e. actions common across both spaces) of these actions.
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| Gibson's original system of affordances while not denying the importance of memory in the construction of affordances, ignored the concept or possibility of internal representation. |
