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Clark, A. (2013). Expecting the world: Perception, prediction, and the origins of human knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, CX(9), 469–496.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 26/07/2018, 10:36
Clark presents two alternate models of perception:

"What happens when, after a brief chat with a colleague, I re-enter my office and visually perceive the hot, steaming, red cup of coffee that I left waiting on my desk? One possibility is that my brain receives a swathe of visual signals (imagine, for simplicity, an array of activated pixels) that specify a number of elementary features such as lines, edges, and color patches. Those elementary features are then progressively accumulated and (where appropriate) bound together, yielding shapes and specifying relations. At some point, these complex shapes and relations activate bodies of stored knowledge, turning the flow of sensation into world-revealing perception: the seeing of coffee, steam, and cup, with the steaming bound to the coffee, the color red to the cup, and so on.

[...]

As I re-enter my office my brain already commands a complex set of coffee-involving expectations. Glancing at my desk sets off a chain of visual processing in which current bottom-up signals are met by a stream of downwards predictions concerning the anticipated states of various neuronal groups along the appropriate visual pathway. In essence, a multi-layer downwards cascade is attempting to "guess" the present states of all the key neuronal populations responding to the present state of the visual world. There ensues a rapid exchange (a dance between multiple top-down and bottom-up signals) in which incorrect guesses yield error signals which propagate forward, and are used to extract better guesses. When top-down guessing adequately accounts for the incoming signal, the visual scene is perceived. As this process unfolds, top-down processing is trying to generate the incoming sensory signal for itself. When and only when this succeeds, and a match is established, do we get to experience (veridically or otherwise) a meaningful visual scene."

 

Prediction-based models that Clark espouses "learn to construct the sensory signal by combining probabilistic representations of hidden causes operating at many different spatial and temporal scales [...] they must match the incoming sensory signal by constructing the signal from combinations of hidden causes (latent variables). The so-called 'transparency' of perception emerges as a natural consequence of such a process when it is conditioned by an embodied agent's lifestyle-specific capacities to act and to choose. We seem to see dogs, cats, chasings, pursuits, captures [...] because these feature among the interesting, nested, structures of distal causes that matter for human choice and action."
The top-down, predictive model "puts together the most likely set of causes whose interaction would yield (hence explain) the present input."
Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 4(2), 503–522.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/06/2023, 14:37
"Take the idea of telepresence, for instance, which was strange and new when described by Howard Rheingold back in 1991."
"Interfaces in standard VR can be viewed as modes of coupling with the (virtual) environment that transform an already existing sensed-embodiment. To put this another way, in the original context presence is assumed (perhaps as produced by unconscious neural mechanisms) and then, through an interactive interface, presence is "projected" into a virtual world."
As an example of presentational virtualism: "But in dreams, our sense of presence assuming we have such     can only be explained by the "projections" of the brain. In essence, Revonsuo is arguing that, as presence can be experienced in the absence of dynamic world coupling, such coupling cannot be necessary for (the experience of) presence. His conclusion is that being-in-the-world, and the experience of presence even in normal configurations, is virtual."
"In its unelaborated form, presentational virtualism faces several traditional problems. First, the position is internalist to an extent that appears to put us radically out of touch with the world, in familiar ways. For those acquainted with the history of the philosophy of perception, it is hard to resist seeing this kind of virtualism as an old, discredited theory of perception — the indirect theory — in modern technological guise. On this picture, virtualism is advocating that: (1) when we are dreaming there is no further reality beyond the virtual, dreamed reality for our experiences to be of, so they are of the virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute that virtual world; and therefore, in the same way, (2) when we are not dreaming, our experiences are not of a further, external world to which we have no access, but are again of virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute a virtual world (those created by the neural "interface", which is the same, after all as the "interface" in operation during dreaming) that we merely take to be an actual world."
"The key components of the sophisticated presentationalist view are crucially disanalogous with what is going on in the use of virtual reality technology. When we use such technology, we exercise the very same perceptual processes when we are wearing the VR gear as when we are not."
"VR technology parasitizes the pre-existing, biologically endowed (in our case) sensory capacities of an autonomous subject to create an experience of a virtual world, a world whose virtuality is defined relative to the actuality of the world made available by the preexisting sensory system."
"the virtualist is asking us to simultaneously employ the VR metaphor and ignore an essential, ineliminable feature
of the source (the use of VR technology by a pre-existing subject) while doing so. For this reason the metaphor (at least in its presentational virtualist form) fails in its attempt to portray a coherent, alternative conception of mind and experience."
Enactive virtualism (after Noë description of perceptual presence): "when we perceive an object, we are only really (occurrently) sensorially in touch with a small part of what we perceive or see, but nevertheless the whole object is perceptually (but virtually) present to us."
"How is sensory contact actualized in such a way that perceptual experience is generated?
      This actualization process happens, in all versions of Noë's theory, through acting. Put slightly differently, and in the terminology that Noë favors, perceptual content is given through occurrent deployment of our mastery of sensorimotor dependencies (originally contingencies [...]; that is, very roughly, the way that sensory information follows or frustrates our expectations that arises out of our mastery of sensorimotor flow. Perceptual presence on this analysis arises because of the mastery of dependencies we acquire as we move around and interact with objects. Perceptual presence for Noë is to be explained, like perceptual content itself, from our mastery of the laws of sensorimotor dependence."
"For Noë, perception is actional or enactive but is also in a certain sense projected. What we experience is not what is simply given in our occurrent sensorimotor contact but what is somehow generated in that contact. Perceptual content is generated because we are constantly in touch with the world."
"presentational virtualism holds that that the content of our experiences is virtual and perception is, in an important sense, similar to hallucination because it is ultimately internal perceptual vehicles that we perceive rather than the external worldly objects they represent. In contrast, enactive representationalism sees us as being in deep contact with the world, but at the "price" of conceiving of our representational systems as partly composed by the world. We have seen that the former trades on di±culties with the metaphor of virtuality itself while the latter tends to commit us to problematic views: either the Grand Illusion or the idea that external world contributes to perceptual content independently of our sensory contact with it."
Forrester, M. A. (2007). Auditory perception and sound as event: Theorising sound imagery in psychology.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/01/2017, 14:25
Sounds "have the potential to make people 'feel again' sensations from the distant past"
Ihde, D. (2007). Listening and voice: Phenomenologies of sound. 2nd ed. Albany (NY): State University of New York Press. (Original work published 1976).   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 12/12/2023, 16:38
In Heideggerian terms, Ihde describes the auditory horizon as the point at which sounds are given over into the present. Sound is a giving and listening is what "lets come into presence the unbidden giving of sound."
Pasnau, R. (1999). What is sound? The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(196), 309–324.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/01/2024, 06:22
"in a body making a sound, that sound is only potential; the sound is made actual in the medium".
Scruton, R. (2009). Sounds as secondary objects and pure events. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds), Sounds & Perception (pp. 50–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 07/02/2014, 14:10
To Scruton, sound's independence from the physical world leads to a coherence (grouping, streaming) that is a 'virtual causality'. It bears no relation to the process by which sounds are formed.
Szabó Gendler, T. (2010). Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/10/2023, 06:42
"...by presenting context in a suitably concrete or abstract way, thought experiments may recruit representational schemas that were previously inactive. As a result, they may evoke responses that run counter to those evoked by alternative presentations of relevantly similar content."
Reasoning (according to Steven Sloman's Two Systems) involves two systems: Associative and Rule-based. The first (System 1) operates on similarity, contiguity, is automatic, uses generalization, soft constraints and is exemplified by intuition, imagination, fantasy, creativity etc.

Rule-based reasoning (System 2) uses symbol manipulation, derives knowledge from language, culture and formal systems, uses hard constraints, can operate on concrete, general and abstract concepts and is exemplified by explanation, deliberation, verification, formal analysis, strategic memory.

Division into two systems may be simplisitic but there is certainly not just one system used for reasoning.
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