| Anzieu, D. (1989). The skin ego: A psychoanalytical approach to the self. C. Turner, Trans. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 3/26/21, 10:24 AM |
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| The Self is "a pre-individual psychical cavity possessing a rudimentary unity and identity." |
| Citing number of studies of babies, these "suggest that mental capacities operate first on acoustic material [the suggestion] that the differentiations of gestures and mimicry [...] are at the root of social communication and mental representation, comes to seem improbable. It appears that feedback loops with the environment are formed much earlier in the baby. These are audio-phonological in nature" |
| "the Self forms as a sound envelope through the experience of a bath of sounds [...] This sound-bath prefigures the Skin Ego with its double face, one half turned towards the outer world, the other towards the inner, since the sound envelope is composed of sounds emitted either by the baby or the environment. The combination of these sounds therefore produces (a) a common space-volume permitting bilateral exchange [...] (b) a first (spatio-auditory) image of one's own body" |
| Brewer, W. F. (1986). What is autobiographical memory. In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 25–49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 7/14/20, 8:37 AM |
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"I intend to argue that the self is composed of an experiencing ego, a self-schema, and an associated set of personal memories and autobiographical facts.
Ego. By ego I mean the conscious experiencing entity that is the focus of our phenomenal experience. The ego is the aspect of a person that experiences things from the "inside." The ego is the conscious aspect of the mind that moves through space and time. It is the memory for the ego's moment-to-moment experience that we call personal memories.
Self-schema. The self-schema is the cognitive structure that contains generic knowledge about the self. In the same way that individuals have knowledge about the solar system or knowledge about Walter Cronkite, individuals have knowledge about themselves. This knowledge is presumably organized into unconscious mental structures that interact with incoming information about the self (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Rumelhart, 1980). Some of the information that goes into making up the self-schema is private and available only to the self; other information is public and available to an observer. The self-schema must be one of the richer knowledge structures in an individual's long-term memory; hence, once it has developed, it probably changes only slowly, thus providing consistency to the self over time.
Self. The self is the complex mental structure that includes the ego, the self-schema, and portions of long-term memory related to the ego-self (e.g., personal memories, generic personal memories, and autobiographical facts).
Individual. The individual is the larger entity that includes the self, the de-personalized (nonself) aspects of the mind, and the body. Thus, it is the individual who has depersonalized knowledge about biology (e.g., a robin has wings) and who possesses cognitive skills (e.g., can carry out long division), motor skills (e.g., can ride a bicycle), and rote skills (e.g., can recite Lincoln's Gettysburg Address)."
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| Connor, S. (2004). Sound and the self. In M. M. Smith (Ed.), Hearing History (pp. 54–66). Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 1/22/20, 6:13 AM |
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| In the context of the invention and reception of the telephone which led to "perhaps the most important distinguishing feature of auditory experience, namely its capacity to disintegrate and reconfigure space." |
| "Since traversal and transference are in the nature of sound, it also becomes the privileged figure of sensory interchange." |
| Damasio, A. (2006). Descartes' error. Revised ed. London: Vintage. (Original work published 1994). |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 5/11/12, 9:04 AM |
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| "the self is a repeatedly reconstructed biological state" |
| The outside world, the environment, is represented in the mind through the modifications it leads to in the body. The environment is represented "by modifying the primordial representations of the body proper whenever an interaction between organism and environment takes place." [...] The mind does this because it evolved to "ensure body survival as effectively as possible" |
| Erlmann, V. (2000). Reason and resonance: A history of modern aurality. New York: Zone Books. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/27/14, 9:46 AM |
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| Adapting Foucault's author function, "one might say that the listener is not simply the recipient of an indefinite number of significations that fill his or her hearing, nor does he or she come after the work. Rather, the listener is a function that fixes these meanings with the goal of circumscribing and prescribing the auditory ways in which individuals acknowledge themselves as subjects." |
| "ample evidence of the fact that the sense of time is of fundamental importance to humans' sense of self". Erlmann relates this to Freud's Zauderrhythmus (vacillating rhythm) that governs the "proper interaction of consciousness and unconsciousness" -- thus perception is subject to "a "periodic" motion that wards off or at least slows down the "haste" of excessive excitations." According to Freud, this "apparatus not only sustains the organism and enlarges the domain of the ego by allowing us to step back from the urge to respond to each and every stimulus, it also determines our concept of time. Our entire time consciousness is based on the breaks that occur in the interplay between consciousness and the unconscious." |
| Heeter, C. (1992). Being there: The subjective experience of presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(2), 262–271. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 9/11/18, 5:20 PM |
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| Personal presence is subjective and "is a measure of the extent to which and the reasons why you feel like you are in a virtual world." |
| "Social presence refers to the extent to which other beings (living or synthetic) also exist in the world and appear to react to you." |
| "[The virtual world responds like the natural world] and in a way that differentiates self from world. You move and the world stays still." |
| Ihde, D. (2007). Listening and voice: Phenomenologies of sound. 2nd ed. Albany (NY): State University of New York Press. (Original work published 1976). |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 1/22/20, 8:19 AM |
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| In Heideggerian terms, Ihde describes the auditory horizon as the point at which sounds are given over into the present. Sound is a giving and listening is what "lets come into presence the unbidden giving of sound." |
| What is present, our central focus on our self, is always inside or contained within horizons. |
| "My "self" is a correlate of the World, and its way of being-in that World is a way filled with voice and language. |
| Waterworth, J. A., & Waterworth, E. L. (2014). Distributed embodiment: Real presence in virtual bodies. In M. Grimshaw (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality (pp. 589–601). New York: Oxford University Press. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 9/11/18, 5:16 PM |
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| "being present in an external environment has its roots in the animal feeling of something happening outside the self rather than from within. In other words, the sense of presence distinguishes self from nonself [...] Presence arises from active awareness of our embodiment in a present world around us." |
| Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 7/20/21, 11:22 AM |
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| Discussing Libet's (1985) experiment. While we prefer to believe that we have willed our hand to rise, our intention, there is a precursor in the subconscious, the readiness potential, that can be measured using EEG and that precedes the hand movement and the reported time at which subjects noted their intention to lift the hand. The conclusion is that intention (and thus free will?) is manufactured after the event. See also (Rosenberg 2018, p.99).
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Rosenberg, A. (2018). How history gets things wrong: The neuroscience of our addiction to stories. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. |
| "The different information coming in from our senses, visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory sensations are processed in different regions of the brain. They have to travel different distances [...] and arrive at different times. The processing speed for different kinds of sensory information varies; visual stimuli take longer to process than other stimuli. (The difference is about 40 milliseconds. [...]) On the other hand, light travels much faster than sound. Putting together these different speeds means that sights and sounds from about 10 metres away are available to consciousness at about the same time; for everything closer or further away information about its sight or sound arrives at different times. In these cases, the apparent simultaneity of, for example, hearing a voice and seeing the speaker's lips move has to be constructed by our brain." |
| Detailing a set of experiments by Libet helping to explain how our brain builds a consciousness of the present and the time delay involved.
- Stimulating the brain directly, an electrical impulse must be applied for at least 500 milliseconds to produce a perception (see, for example Libet 1985). Shorter impulses had no effect neither did increasing the intensity (with shorter times). Sensation can be detected by the brain within 500msecs but the subject is not consciously aware of it (e.g. we can react 'instinctively').
- Stimulate the skin then, 200 milliseconds after, stimulate the brain – the skin stimulation is not perceived but is masked by the brain stimulation. The brain edits past events to give an impression of the 'present'.
- Stimulate the brain then, 200 milliseconds later, stimulate the skin. Brian stimulus is perceived after about 500msecs but the skin stimulus is perceived as being before the brain stimulus. A temporal reordering: "There is no guarantee that the order in which we perceive events actually corresponds to the order of their occurrence" (Westerhoff 2011, p.100).
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| Zahorik, P., & Jenison, R. L. (1998). Presence as being-in-the-world. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(1), 78–89. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 9/11/18, 5:15 PM |
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| Relating Gibson to presence, "the perception of self-existence is completely determined by physical stimulation. To the extent that successful action is supported, perceptions of self-existence are veridical [cf 'throwness'] Hence, presence is tied to action in the environment." |
