| Carter, P. (2004). Ambiguous traces, mishearing, and auditory space. In V. Erlmann (Ed.), Hearing Cultures: Essays on Sound Listening and Modernity (pp. 43–63). Oxford: Berg. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 12/20/07, 5:14 PM |
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| "Auditory space is durational, but it lacks music's (and writing's) commitment to linear development. Without a sense of ending, it is not located between silences." |
| Erlmann, V. (2000). Reason and resonance: A history of modern aurality. New York: Zone Books. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/27/14, 9:46 AM |
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| "ample evidence of the fact that the sense of time is of fundamental importance to humans' sense of self". Erlmann relates this to Freud's Zauderrhythmus (vacillating rhythm) that governs the "proper interaction of consciousness and unconsciousness" -- thus perception is subject to "a "periodic" motion that wards off or at least slows down the "haste" of excessive excitations." According to Freud, this "apparatus not only sustains the organism and enlarges the domain of the ego by allowing us to step back from the urge to respond to each and every stimulus, it also determines our concept of time. Our entire time consciousness is based on the breaks that occur in the interplay between consciousness and the unconscious." |
| Gumbrecht, H. U. (2004). Production of presence: What meaning cannot convey. Stanford: Stanford University Press. |
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| Argues that, because presence-cultures have the body as a self-referent, "space, that is, that dimension that constitutes itself around bodies, must be the primordial dimension in which the relationship between different humans and the things of the world are being negotiated. Time, in contrast, is the primordial dimension for any meaning culture, because there seems to be an unavoidable relationship between consciousness and temporality [...] Above all, however, time is the primordial dimension of any meaning culture, because it takes time to carry out those transformative actions through which meaning cultures define the relationship between humans and the world." |
| Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 12/4/20, 9:49 AM |
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| "The ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, makes it intelligible that space is independent of time; but on the other hand, this same temporality also makes intelligible Dasein's 'dependence' on space—a 'dependence' which manifests itself in the well-known phenomenon that both Dasein's interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and through by 'spatial representations'. |
| Lindley, C. A. (2005). The semiotics of time structure in ludic space as a foundation for analysis and design. Game Studies, 5(1). Retrieved March 22, 2006, from http://www.gamestudies.org/0501/lindley/ |
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Defines three temporal semiotic levels in games:
1. Simulation: the functional characteristics of the game. time frames, quantization, ticks per cycles etc. At the level of the game design(er).
2. Ludic or Game: patterns of player movements, player engagement with the game rules. Turns, tournaments etc. At the level of the player.
3. Narrative: Based upon the three-act restorative structure. Often, especially in action games, the second act (conflict) is the most extended with the first act (beginning) and third act (resolution) often being limited to cut scenes, FMV, display of final scores etc. |
| Markosian, N. (2004). A defense of presentism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1, 47–82. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 3/9/23, 8:12 AM |
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| Objects that are not present, are unreal. |
| Martin, R. L., Thrift, N. J., & Bennett, R. J. (Eds). (1978). Towards the dynamic analysis of spatial systems. London: Pion. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 8/1/06, 3:05 PM |
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| "...spatial systems are inherently unstable, prone to fluctuation and oscillation, to discontinuous shifts in behaviour and structure, and to adaptation and evolution from within" |
| Miller, R. B. (1968). Response time in man-computer conversational transactions. Proceedings of the AFIPS Fall Joint Computer Conference, 33, 267–277. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 12/8/20, 9:42 AM |
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| Beyond 100msecs, users will recognize a delay between action and response. NB this is not the same as saying two stimuli within 100msecs of each other will be perceived as instantaneous as the user-initiated action affects judgements and expectations of instantaneousness. |
| Parkes, D. N., & Thrift, N. J. (1980). Times, spaces, and places A chronogeographic perspective. New York: John Wiley & Sons. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 6/30/06, 12:54 PM |
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| "Locational spaces and times are outside the individual, experiential spaces and times are constructed from inside the individual" |
| Discussing the work of ecologists in the 1940s and 1950s, the authors state: "Rhythm, tempo, and timing became not simply additional attributes to the spatial characteristics of human ecology; rather with space they were jointly responsible for the maintenance of a living community" |
Rhythm: recurrence of fluctuations and movement. Timing here can be universal time (i.e. metric), life time or social time (the latter two being paratimes).
Tempo: the number of events that occur in each unit of time.
Timing: synchronization of rhythms. |
Define three basic types of time:
Universe time or standard time. Can be recorded by clocks and calendars and so is metric.
Life time. A paratime composed of biological time (life spans etc.) and psychological time that provides a 'sense of time' (e.g. past, present, future).
Social time. Derives from group use and knowledge of temporal features such as frequency, duration and sequence of socially relevant objects and events. Social time is also a paratime. |
| Prior, A. N. (1972). The notion of the present. In J. T. Fraser, F. C. Haber & G. H. Müller (Eds), The Study of Time: Proceedings of the First Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time Oberwolfach (Black Forest) --- West Germany (pp. 320–323). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 3/16/23, 4:10 PM |
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| For Prior, the present and the real are the same concept: "the present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular species of unreality, namely the past and the future." |
| "the presentness of an event is just the event" and, regarding a lecture, "its pastness is its present pastness, so that although [the] lecture isn't now present and isn't real, isn't a fact, nevertheless its pastness, its having taken place, is a present fact, is a reality, and will be one as long as time shall last." |
| Prior deals with an objection the special theory of relativity might have to his conception of present and reality with the example of a pulsating celestial body where we know observed pulsations actually happened a long time ago:
"We have just observed one of these pulsations, and as the body is a very distant one, we know that the pulsation we are observing happened some time ago. We now consider the pulsation immediately after the one we are observing, and we ask whether this next pulsation, although we won't of course observe it for a while, is in fact going on right now, or is really still to come, or has occurred already. On the view of presentness which I have been suggesting, this is always a sensible question. At least if there are to be any further pulsation at all, then either the body is pulsating, or it is not the case but will be the case that it is pulsating or it is not the case but has been the case that it is pulsating. The difference between pulsating — really and actually pulsating — and merely having pulsated or being about to pulsate, is as clear and comprehensible a difference as any that we can think of, being but one facet of the great gulf that separates the real from the unreal, what is from what is not. Just this, however, is what the special theory of relativity appears to deny. If the distant body is having its nth pulsation as we perceive it having its n-1th — is pulsating, and not merely has been or will be pulsating — then the nth pulsation and the perception of the n-1th are simultaneous; not just simultaneous from such and such a point of view or in such and such a frame of reference, but simultaneous. And according to the special theory of relativity, such "absolute" simultaneity is in many cases just not to be had.
One possible reaction to this situation, which to my mind is perfectly respectable though it isn't very fashionable, is to insist that all that physics has shown to be true or likely is that in some cases we can never know, we can never physically find out, whether something is actually happening or merely has happened or will happen." |
| Prior makes the case that the natural sciences have expunged tenses and that their language is a tenseless one, without a conception of past, present, or future; rather events might be earlier or later than other events. "Whether the events are the case or merely have been or will be, is of no concern to the scientist, so he uses a language in which the the difference between being and having been abd being about to be is inexpressible." |
| Saint Augustine. (2002). The confessions of St Augustine. E. B. Pusey, Trans. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published 401). |
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| "What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past are. Nor is it properly said, "there be three times, past, present, and to come": yet perchance it might be properly said, "there be three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future." For these three do exist in some sort, in the soul, but otherwhere do I not see them; present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation. If thus we be permitted to speak, I see three times, and I confess there are three." |
| Schafer, R. M. (1994). The soundscape: Our sonic environment and the tuning of the world. Rochester Vt: Destiny Books. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 2/14/14, 4:44 PM |
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| Quotes Stockhausen as stating that "the time of memory [is] the crucial time between eight- and sixteen-second-long events." (Cott, Jonathan. Stockhausen: Conversations with the Composer. LONDON 1974. pp30--31) |
| Discusses Innes' (1972/1950) proposition that solid durable [written] media emphasizes time while those that are light and less durable emphasize space and suggests that sound falls into the latter category. "...the true character of sound in shaping societies is in its spatial spread ... the real paradox is that although sounds are pronounced in time, they are also erased by time." (p.162).
Innes, H. A. (1972). Empire and communication. 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (Original work published 1950). |
| Points out that the church bell became a marker of time. |
| Schafer claims that early societies had fewer flat line sounds. Any increase in these sounds came with the Industrial Revolution. For Schafer, discrete sounds have a biological life (they're born, they live, they die) and provide a sense of duration to the listener marking the passage of time. Flat line sounds are 'suprabiological' with no sense of time implied. |
| Time (2005). In Oxford English Dictionary Online Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 3/6/06, 11:02 AM |
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| "the indefinite continued progress of existence and events in the past, present, and future, regarded as a whole" |
| Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 7/20/21, 11:22 AM |
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| Detailing a set of experiments by Libet helping to explain how our brain builds a consciousness of the present and the time delay involved.
- Stimulating the brain directly, an electrical impulse must be applied for at least 500 milliseconds to produce a perception (see, for example Libet 1985). Shorter impulses had no effect neither did increasing the intensity (with shorter times). Sensation can be detected by the brain within 500msecs but the subject is not consciously aware of it (e.g. we can react 'instinctively').
- Stimulate the skin then, 200 milliseconds after, stimulate the brain – the skin stimulation is not perceived but is masked by the brain stimulation. The brain edits past events to give an impression of the 'present'.
- Stimulate the brain then, 200 milliseconds later, stimulate the skin. Brian stimulus is perceived after about 500msecs but the skin stimulus is perceived as being before the brain stimulus. A temporal reordering: "There is no guarantee that the order in which we perceive events actually corresponds to the order of their occurrence" (Westerhoff 2011, p.100).
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
| Wolf, M. J. P. (2001). Time in the video game. In M. J. P. Wolf (Ed.), The Medium of the Video Game (pp. 78–91). Austin: University of Texas Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 2/14/06, 11:28 AM |
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Talking of time indicators in film: "...grain, hiss and flicker are nondiegetic indicators of time passing. ... Since video games usually do not have the same nondiegetic indicators of passing time ... other forms of ambience are sometimes added to scenes to emphasize the potential for movement and keep the image feeling "live"."
Gives an example of ambient sound (wind) in Myst. As this movement (he's referring more to other time indicators such as fan blades etc. but I include sound 'movement' like wind) is repeated (i.e. looping sound samples), this is a form of cyclical as opposed to linear time. |
