| Clark, A. (2013). Expecting the world: Perception, prediction, and the origins of human knowledge. Journal of Philosophy, CX(9), 469–496. |
 
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 26/07/2018, 10:36 |
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| Clark presents another example of the two competing models of perception this time concerning speech recognition (quoting p.936 of Poeppel & Monahan):
"Representations constructed at earlier stages of processing feed immediately higher levels in a feedforward manner...this process proceeds incrementally until access to a ''lexical conceptual'' representation has been achieved. In speech recognition...this involves a conversion from acoustic features onto phonetic representations, phonetic representations onto phonological representations, and finally access of the lexical item based on its phonological structure.
[...]
(1) the extraction of (necessarily brief and coarse) cues in the input signal to elicit hypotheses, that while coarse, are sufficient to generate plausible guesses about classes of sounds (for example, plosives, fricatives, nasals, and approximants), and that permit subsequent refinement; (2) the actual synthesis of potential sequences consistent with the cues; and (3) a comparison operation between synthesized targets and the input signal delivered from the auditory analysis of the speech."
David Poeppel and Philip J. Monahan “Feedforward and feedback in speech perception: Revisiting analysis by synthesis”, Language and Cognitive Processes 26:7, (2011): 935-95. |
| Ellis, S. R. (1996). Presence of mind: A reaction to Thomas Sheridan's "further musings on the psychophysics of presence". Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 5(2), 247–259. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 26/07/2018, 10:46 |
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| "one could consider the normal functioning of the human sensory systems as the special case in which the detection of physical energy and the interpretation of patterned sensory impressions result in the perception of real objects in the surrounding physical environment. In this respect perception of the physical environment resolves to the case in which through a process of systematic doubt, it is impossible for an observer to refute the hypothesis that the apparent source of sensory stimulus is indeed its physical source." |
| "As more and more sources of sensory information and envrionmental control are available, the process of virtualization [...] can be more and more complete until the resulting impression is indistinguishable from physical reality" |
| Discussing how measurements of aspects of "a virtual environment display convince its users that they are present in a synthetic world" |
| In suggesting that interface performance in virtual environments can be improved by decreasing presence, Ellis suggests removing or controlling the realism of spatial information. |
| Slater, M. (2002). Presence and the sixth sense. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 11(4), 435–439. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/09/2018, 17:00 |
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Based on the notion that perception involves the selection from alternate hypotheses:
- Moment by moment, a selection mechanism organizes streams of sensory signals into an environmental gestalt. Sensory data relevant to other environmental gestalts are relegated to the background. The participant scan-senses the world according to the present gestalt.
- We “see” in our mind’s eye. Therefore, it is relatively easy to fool the “eye” into selecting the hypothesis that we are in the place depicted by a VE, notwithstanding the typical paucity of the VE compared to the real world. Hence, reported presence is high on the average.
- The hypothesis selection is not a once-and-for-all event. We continue to scan-sense the world in which we are present, repeatedly returning to and fixating on perceptually significant items, repeatedly testing the presence hypothesis. An anomaly associated with a perceptually significant item may lead to a break in presence: the reformation of sensory signals into another gestalt, presence in another environment.
- Anomalies in an environment are not equal in their significance: some will induce a break in presence, and others won’t. For example, in the depiction of a virtual human, an anomaly in overall body shape is likely to be far less significant than the shape and movements around the eyes and mouth.
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