| Blesser, B., & Salter, L.-R. (2007). Spaces speak, are you listening? Experiencing aural architecture. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. |
 
|
| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/10/2023, 15:11 |
|
| "Hemispherical specialization implies that various substrates are only partially aware of what other substrates are experiencing. In fact, what we think of as the unity of consciousness is not unified at all—it just appears that way." |
| Merleau-Ponty, M. (2014). Phenomenology of perception. D. A. Landes, Trans. New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1945). |
|
| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/01/2024, 07:05 |
|
| "the body and consciousness are not mutually limiting, they can only be parallel." |
| "Consciousness is being toward the thing through the intermediary of the body. A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its "world"" |
| "A truth against the background of absurdity, and an absurdity that the teleology of consciousness presumes to be able to convert into a truth, this is the originary phenomenon. To say that, in consciousness, appearance and reality are one, or to say that they are separated, is to render impossible the consciousness of anything, even its appearance." |
| Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. |
|
| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 24/05/2023, 14:17 |
|
| "Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it [...] the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism [...] fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism." |
| "I have chosen bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience there at all. Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid (though it certainly could be raised with other species)." |
| "The fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own. It would be fine if someone were to develop concepts and a theory that enabled us to think about those things; but such an understanding may be permanently denied to us by the limits of our nature. And to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance." |
| "Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task" |
| "My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts [...] But one might also believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever—simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type." |
| Footnote 10 has this: "[W]hen I look at the "Mona Lisa," my visual experience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone looking into my brain." |
| "the status of physicalism is similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher. We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might be true" |
| "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it." |
| Revonsuo, A. (2009). Inner presence: Consciousness as a biological phenomenon. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/03/2020, 11:12 |
|
| "To be conscious is to have the sense of presence in a world. The most central concept of the world-simulation metaphor of consciousness is undoubtedly that of presence or virtual presence. To have contents of consciousness is to have patterns of phenomenal experience present." |
| "the notion of presence treats phenomenality as the mark of the mental, and the pure existence of patterns of phenomenal feaures constitutes their presence. Phenomenality as bare presence is nonrelational and self-contained rather than relational and object-directed." |
