| Ellis, S. R. (1996). Presence of mind: A reaction to Thomas Sheridan's "further musings on the psychophysics of presence". Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 5(2), 247–259. |
 
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| "A clear meaning for virtual as used in this paper may be based on a more general concept: virtualization, which can be considered the process by which a viewer interprets patterned sensory impressions to represent objects in an environment other than that from which the impressions physically originate." |
| "one could consider the normal functioning of the human sensory systems as the special case in which the detection of physical energy and the interpretation of patterned sensory impressions result in the perception of real objects in the surrounding physical environment. In this respect perception of the physical environment resolves to the case in which through a process of systematic doubt, it is impossible for an observer to refute the hypothesis that the apparent source of sensory stimulus is indeed its physical source." |
| "As more and more sources of sensory information and envrionmental control are available, the process of virtualization [...] can be more and more complete until the resulting impression is indistinguishable from physical reality" |
| Discussing how measurements of aspects of "a virtual environment display convince its users that they are present in a synthetic world" |
| In suggesting that interface performance in virtual environments can be improved by decreasing presence, Ellis suggests removing or controlling the realism of spatial information. |
| Flach, J. M., & Holden, J. G. (1998). The reality of experience: Gibson's way. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(1), 90–95. |
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| Re Gibson, "action takes precedence. The experience depends more on what can be "done" than on the quality of visual or acoustic images." |
| "in the design of experiences in virtual environments the constraints on action take precedence over the constraints on perception." |
| "the reality of experience (i.e. presence or immersion)." |
| Fontaine, G. (1992). The experience of a sense of presence in intercultural and international encounters. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(4), 482–490. |
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| Two major differences between flow and presence: "(1) flow involves a narrow focus on a limited range of task characteristics, whereas presence involves a broader awareness of the task ecology; and (2) flow is associated with feelings of control whereas presence has been associated with novel ecologies involving a lack of predictability that makes feelings of control difficult." |
| Freeman, J., Avons, S. E., Meddis, R., Pearson, D. E., & IJsselsteijn, W. (2000). Using behavioral realism to estimate presence: A study of the utility of postural responses to motion stimuli. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 9(2), 149–164. |
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| "in the normal waking state, we are continually aware of our place in the surrounding environment. Direct sensory information confirming our location is always available and is continually updated. Thus, under normal circumstances, one's current location is a universal feature of awareness, rather than a quality that varies continuously over time. The subjective evaluation of presence requires graded ratings of a sensation that is typically invariant, and observers' lack of experience of rating presence is one possible explanation of the difficulty in providing stable ratings [...] A second, related issue is that there are no verbal descriptors of degrees of presence, because to date there has been no need to communicate such feelings [...] A third concern is that asking subjects to rate presence involves a conflict between sensation and knowledge. Observers know that they are currently in the test situation, and can remember how they got there [...] this conflict between sensation and knowledge is inherent in the measurement of presence [...] A final issue [...] is that the notion of presence is inextricably bound up with attentional factors. The extent to which an observer feels par of an environment may depend not only on the quality and extent of sensory information, but on the interest evoked by the displayed scene." |
| Friedman, D., Brogni, A., Guger, C., Antley, A., Steed, A., & Slater, M. (2006). Sharing and analyzing data from presence experiments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(5), 599–610. |
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| "We regard presence as a successful substitution of real sensory data by articifially generated sensory data. By a successful substitution we mean that the participant acts upon these artificially generated stimuli as if they came from the real world. By acting, we mean that we expect the participant’s response to be similar to the response in the real world on many levels, ranging from unconscious automatic responses through deliberate volitional behavior, up to the subjective feeling of being there." |
| Gilbert, S. B. (2016). Perceived realism of virtual environments depends on authenticity. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 25(4), 322–324. |
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| "While the perception of a virtual environment (VE) is usually described in terms of its level of immersion and users’ sense of presence, the construct of authenticity might be more useful. The authenticity of a VE depends on whether the affordances and simulations chosen in its implementation support (1) users’ expectations based on their Bayesian priors for regularities in the real world and (2) the users’ intentions in the VE . . . the term ‘‘authenticity’’ refers to whether the virtual environment provides the experience expected by the user, both consciously and unconsciously." |
"A VE with higher immersion, so the argument goes, should lead to higher fidelity, and generate a greater sense of presence, the subjective experience felt by the user. But if I put you in a highly immersive environment and give you badly designed content to experience, will you perceive the VE as realistic and experience presence? Probably not. What’s missing from this dichotomy of immersion (objective, system-focused) and presence (subjective, user-focused) is a computational theory about the extent to which the VE reflects the expected regularities of world that it is attempting to represent—its authenticity. Authenticity draws on two streams of thought: expectations and motivations."
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"Authenticity’s second stream of thought comes from art historians and archaeologists who think carefully about the past, and who often seek to establish whether artifacts found in the present are authentic. While establishing an artifact’s date and place of origin might be a matter of objective fact, Lovata (2007) argues that these facts are simply nominal authenticity, and that a richer, more complex sense of authenticity is context dependent, and depends on the motivations of the observer."
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"I suggest that immersion is the system-based factor that influences presence, and that authenticity is the human-based factor that influences presence"
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| Gilkey, R. H., & Weisenberger, J. M. (1995). The sense of presence for the suddenly deafened adult: Implications for virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 4(4), 357–363. |
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| "The problem of implementing a virtual environment in toto is intractable at present." |
| Gillon, B. (2011-2023). Logic in classical Indian philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 3, 2023, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-india/. |
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Consider the following argument:
| THESIS: |
Sound is eternal |
| REASON: |
because it is audible. |
| SIMILARITY EXAMPLE: |
Whatever is audible is eternal. |
This syllogism, rejected as a bad syllogism by Dignāga, was put forth by a school of Brahmanical thinkers who held, for doctrinal reasons, that sound is eternal. To maintain this claim in the face of observation to the contrary, these thinkers maintained instead that what is transitory is the revelation of sound, not sound itself. According to them, in other words, sound is constantly present, but we hear it only when its presence is revealed. |
| Gumbrecht, H. U. (2004). Production of presence: What meaning cannot convey. Stanford: Stanford University Press. |
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| "What this book ultimately argues for is a relation to the things of the world that could oscillate between presence effects and meaning effects. Presence effects, however, exclusively appeal to the senses." |
| Gumbrecht states: "What is "present" to us (very much in the sense of the Latin form prae-esse) is in front of us, in reach of and tangible for our bodies." |
| "Cartesian cogito made the ontology of human existence depend exclusively on the movements of the human mind." |
| "For the assumption that the phenomena have their inherent meanings woud not yet change on the threshold between medieval and early modern culture (interpretation would not be understood, broadly, as an attribution rather than as an identification of meaning until the nineteenth century)." |
| Gumbrecht gives an example of medieval (in this case Catholic) conception of presence in the Eucharist: Christ's body and blood are present in the bread and the wine, they "become tangible as substances in the "forms" of bread and wine" (p.28).
Such thinking derives from the Aristotelian concept of the sign. Whereas today's semiotics views a sign as comprised of signifier and signified (i.e. material surface and a depth that is meaning), this concept comprises a substance ("that which is present because it demands a space" (p.29)) and a form ("that through which the substance becomes perceptible" (p.29)). "There is no "immaterial" meaning detached from a "material signifier"" (p.29). Thus, bread and wine were easily conceived of as the forms making the substance (of Christ) present and perceptible.
Protestant theology changed this into the concept of an "evocation of Christ's body and blood as "meanings"" (p.29). That is, the bread and wine were not actually body and blood but rather meant or signified the body and blood.
Gumbrecht connects this change in the concept of signs to the emergence of historicity – "in modern understanding, signs at least potentially leave the substances that they evoke at a temporal and spatial distance" (p.30). |
| Equates his concept of presence with Heidegger's concept of Being. |
| Argues that, because presence-cultures have the body as a self-referent, "space, that is, that dimension that constitutes itself around bodies, must be the primordial dimension in which the relationship between different humans and the things of the world are being negotiated. Time, in contrast, is the primordial dimension for any meaning culture, because there seems to be an unavoidable relationship between consciousness and temporality [...] Above all, however, time is the primordial dimension of any meaning culture, because it takes time to carry out those transformative actions through which meaning cultures define the relationship between humans and the world." |
| Harvey, M. A., & Sanchez-Vives, M. V. (2005). The binding problem in presence research. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 14(5), 616–621. |
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| Explaining why virtual environments are capable of facilitating presence despite lacking sensory modalities, it is not absence of one modality or another but rather incongruity between them that will break presence. The brain can fill in missing sensory data. In a virtual world displaying a rose, "it should be less disruptive for the rose to have no smell than the wrong smell." |
| Heeter, C. (1992). Being there: The subjective experience of presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(2), 262–271. |
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| Personal presence is subjective and "is a measure of the extent to which and the reasons why you feel like you are in a virtual world." |
| "Social presence refers to the extent to which other beings (living or synthetic) also exist in the world and appear to react to you." |
| "Environmental presence refers to the extent to which the environment itself appears to know that you are there and to react to you [sic]." |
| "[The virtual world responds like the natural world] and in a way that differentiates self from world. You move and the world stays still." |
| Suggests that different tasks in VR might require more or less sensory fidelity (compared to real world sensory environments) in order to attain a sense of presence. |
Familiarity and experience with the virtual world might increase the sense of presence. Conversely (Heeter does not note the contradiction), familiarity breeds contempt as expectations rise and previously adequate presence experiences later suffer in light of new technological capability. cf Uncanny Wall (Tinwell, Grimshaw, & Williams 2011).
Tinwell, A., Grimshaw, M., & Williams, A. (2011). The Uncanny Wall. International Journal of Arts and Technology, 4(3), 326–341. |
| Heeter proposes a "social construction of virtual reality" following philosophers' discussion of the social constrution of reality. |
| Although many real worlds do not respond to you, as if acknowledging your presence, the lack of response in VR might limit presence (cf environmental presence). |
| "When you walk into a room in the real world, it does not verbally or musically greet you or start raining." |
| Different genders, ages etc. might have different criteria for presence. Equally, humans have preferred sensory channels and so this channel might be preferred for attaining presence: "Is one person's experience of presence in a virtual world the same as another's?" |
| Heeter, C. (2016). A meditation on meditation and embodied presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 25(2), 175–183. |
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"To be human is to be embodied, to exist in a sea of bodily sensations far vaster than our limited attentional spotlight can attend to. Bodily sensations are the substrate of all experience. Even our emotions and thoughts are experienced in and by the body. And yet, most of the time, most of us focus on something other these present- moment sensations. Most of the time, we are not present. How people structure their attention ‘‘determines what will or will not appear in consciousness’’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Embodied presence occurs when our mind integrates attention to embodied feelings with other present-moment bodily sensations to produce a heightened awareness of the moment and of the sensory self. However, the major theories of presence (social presence, copresence, self-presence, hyper presence, and external presence) all define presence as an illusion about the virtual-ness of a virtual experience (Schultze, 2010). Their approach implies that we are always present when there is no virtuality. In this essay, I will argue that 1) regardless of virtuality, we are almost never present; 2) embodied presence is an attentional orientation that is learned and practiced; and 3) the design of virtual experiences can facilitate embodied presence."
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"embodied presence is an attentional orientation that is learned and practice"
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"the normal human condition is to not be present."
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"Interoceptive awareness is a prerequisite for embodied presence . . . The interoceptive pathway and the DMN are competing neural pathways. They are not active at the same time . . . Interoceptive awareness refers to sensitivity to and awareness of physical sensations such as tempera- ture, pain, touch, and sensing from internal gastrointes- tinal, respiratory, cardiovascular, and urogenital systems."
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"Closing the eyes activates interoception. . . closing eyes some of the time enhanced interoceptive awareness and when eyes re-opened, the virtual world felt different. More vivid . . . Closing the eyes animates our somatosensory systems including touch, proprioception (vibration and position), pain, and temperature (Jao et al., 2013). Closing the eyes also activates olfaction (smell) and gustatory systems (taste), even in the absence of olfactory or gustatory stimuli (Wiesmann et al., 2006). Closing the eyes activates our interoception network (used for processing the internal state) that includes imagination and memory (Xu et al., 2014). Opening the eyes is associated with stronger ‘‘local ef- ficiency’’ in specific regions of the brain and an increase in specialized information processing. But this comes at a cost. Opening the eyes suppresses interoception. Opening the eyes reduces the synchronicity, global effi- ciency, and integrated connections across visual, somatic, and auditory sensory systems (Jao et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2014). Opening the eyes suppresses imagination, mem- ory, and perception of internal states."
Jao, T., Ve ́rtes, P. E., Alexander-Bloch, A. F., Tang, I.-N., Yu, Y.-C., Chen, J.-H., & Bullmore, E. T. (2013). Volitional eyes opening perturbs brain dynamics and functional con- nectivity regardless of light input. NeuroImage, 69, 21–34.
Wiesmann, M., Kopietz, R., Albrecht, J., Linn, J., Reime, U., Kara, E., . . . Stephan, T. (2006). Eye closure in darkness ani- mates olfactory and gustatory cortical areas. NeuroImage, 32(1), 293–300.
Xu, P., Huang, R., Wang, J., Van Dam, N. T., Xie, T., Dong, Z., . . . Luo, Y. (2014). Different topological organization of human brain functional networks with eyes open versus eyes closed. NeuroImage, 90, 246–255.
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| Heidegger, M. (2022). On the essence of language and the question of art. A. Knowles, Trans. Cambridge: Polity. |
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| Heidegger uses the concept of presencing which means making present—in its concern for the world, Dasein makes beings present. This is somewhat similar to my concept of other-presence but Heidegger cannot escape the primacy of sight, viz. "the inception ['the emergence of the ungrounded presencing'], which returns back to itself each time, must only leave behding presencing and establish visibility (ίδέα) as the sign of the essence of truth." |
| Heidegger, M. (1977). The question concerning technology and other essays. W. Lovitt, Trans. New York & London: Garland Publishing. |
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| "But we do not yet hear, we whose hearing and seeing are perishing through radio and film under the rule of technology." |
| Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell. |
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| "Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naïvely, the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter." |
| "Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time–the 'Present'." |
| "knowing is not present-at-hand. In any case, it is not externally ascertainable as, let us say, bodily properties are." |
| "For the environment is a structure which even biology as a positive science can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ. Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived of as a structure of Dasein." |
| "With the radio, for example, Dasein has so expanded its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the 'world'—a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized." |
| "We use the expression "deseverance" in a signification which is both active and transitive. It stands for a constitutive state of Dasein's Being—a state with regard to which removing something in the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factical mode. "De-severing amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bring it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is." |
| "Seeing and hearing are distance-senses [...] not because they are far-reaching, but because it is in them that Dasein as deseverent dwells." |
| "by 'Reality' we understand a Being with the character of Dasein." |
| "Only something which is in the the state-of-mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that which is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openess to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind."" |
| "Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself to having entities within-the-world "matter" to it in such a way which its moods have outlined in advance." |
| "Hence only Dasein can can be meaningful or meaningless. That is to say, its own Being and the entities disclosed within its Being can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-understanding [...] all entities whose kind of Being is of a character other than Dasein's must be conceived of as unmeaning, essentially devoid of any meaning at all [...] And only that which is unmeaning can be absurd." |
| "Ambiguity not only affects the way we avail ourselves of what is accessible for use and enjoyment, and the way we manage it; ambiguity has already established itself in the understanding as a potentialy-for-Being, and in the way Dasein projects itself and presents itself with possibilities." |
| Heidegger spends a few lines discussing the primacy of vision or 'seeing.' He follows Augustine and Aristotle in equating the verb 'to see' with 'to understand' and cognition – 'I see what you mean,' for example. He quotes Aristotle: "The care for seeing is essential to man's Being" (215) – "cognition was conceived [by the ancient Greeks] in terms of 'the desire to see'." |
| "As we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest 'how one is'. In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'. [...] "as Dasien falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses." |
| "Corresponding to the the inauthentic future (awaiting), there is a special way of Being-alongside the things wtih which one concerns oneself. This was of Being-alongside is the Present—the "waiting-towards" [...] To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a Present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the Situation. In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest, concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That Present which is held in authentic temporality and thus which is authentic itself, we call the "moment of vision". |
| The moment of vision is a phenomenon which in principle can not be clarified in terms of the "now" [dem Jetzt]. The "now" is a temporal phenomenon which belongs to time as within-time-ness"; the "now" 'in which' something arises, passes away, or is present-at-hand. 'In the moment of vision' nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us to encounter for the first time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand." |
| "In contradiction to the moment of vision as the authentic Present, we call the inauthentic Present "making present". Formally understood, every Present is one which makes present. When we use the expression "making present" without adding anything further, we always have in mind the inauthentic kind, which is irresolute and does not have the character of a moment of vision. Making-present will become clear only in the light of the temporal Interpretation of falling into the 'world' of one's concern; such falling has its existential meaning in making present. But in so far as the potentiality-for-Being which is projected by inauthentic understanding is projected in terms of things with which one can be concerned, this means that such understanding temporalizes itself in terms of making present. The moment of vision, however, temporalizes itself in quite the opposite manner—in terms of the authentic future." |
| "The ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, makes it intelligible that space is independent of time; but on the other hand, this same temporality also makes intelligible Dasein's 'dependence' on space—a 'dependence' which manifests itself in the well-known phenomenon that both Dasein's interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and through by 'spatial representations'. |
| "And because, further, the ordinary understanding of Being understands 'Being' as presence-at-hand without further differentiation, the Being of the world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present-at-hand which comes along, has presence, and then disappears." |
| "With the inconsistency of the they-self Dasein makes present its 'today'. In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. The "they" evades choice. Blind for possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the 'actual' that is left over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that is present-at-hand. Lost in the making present of the "today", it understands the 'past' in terms of the 'Present'." |
| Held, R. M., & Durlach, N. I. (1992). Telepresence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 109–112. |
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Sensory factors contributing to telepresence:
- high resolution and large field of view
- transparent display system and lack of artifacts signalling display existence
- consistency of information – sensations must describe same objective world and be consistent with what has been learned about the 'normal world'
Motor factors should allow "for a wide3 range of sensorimotor interactions." |
| For telepresence, the most important factor is the degree of correlation between actions of the remote robot displayed back to the operator and the operator's movements triggering those actions. Correlation is lessened (and telepresence correspondingly) with time delays, internal noise, and distortions between movements/intentions of operator and actions of robot. |
| Hendrix, C., & Barfield, W. (1996). Presence within virtual environments as a function of visual display parameters. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 5(3), 274–289. |
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| Collating as ego-presence virtual presence and telepresence because they both imply presence within an environment other than the one the user is physically situated in (the former environment computer-generated, the latter a remote physical environment). |
| Discussing means of measuring presence – can be objective or subjective measurements and the former are mainly based around tasks. |
| Hendrix, C., & Barfield, W. (1996). The sense of presence within auditory virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 5(3), 290–301. |
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| Auditory elements of virtual environments can be more susceptible to non-externalization than other elements such as visual, tactile etc. and this weakens presence. |
Following Loomis, the authors describe the phenomenal world as the one we are perceptually aware of whereas the physical world is one that is inferred by observation and reasoning (Loomis 1992).
Loomis, J. M. (1992). Distal attribution and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 113–119. |
| Herrera, G., Jordan, R., & Vera, L. (2006). Agency and presence: A common dependence on subjectivity? Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(5), 539–552. |
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"Presence, then, can be considered to be a conceptualization for virtual environments of the conscious awareness of self, as both agent and experiencer, which characterizes the experiencing self of natural environments (i.e., using Brewer’s conceptualization)." (Brewer 1986)
Brewer, W. F. (1986). What is autobiographical memory? In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 25–49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
| "Agency, then, is a regulating variable or, if preferred, one of the components that correlates with (and perhaps determines) the level and type of presence obtained." |
| Their definition of agency is "the exercise of a capacity for first person experience [that includes] information-processing and control [and] self-knowledge that is available to agents and to agents alone." |
"The perceptions we receive from our senses have a very important role in the configuration of the sense of being there as they keep us connected with reality at every moment. Relevant here is the concept of affordances as noted by Zahorik et al. (1998) in the context of artificial environments. Affordances, as Gibson suggested (Gibson & Walker, 1984), define the opportunities for perception and action offered by the environment in the context of the individual’s capacities: they are things that one perceives directly (without the need of a mental representation process)." (Zahorik & Jenison 1998).
Zahorik, P., & Jenison, R. L. (1998). Presence as being-in-the-world. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(1), 78–89. |
"it is through inter-subjectivity that we are enabled to take a subjective stance and thus have a sense of presence."
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| Ihde, D. (2007). Listening and voice: Phenomenologies of sound. 2nd ed. Albany (NY): State University of New York Press. (Original work published 1976). |
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"[A]s a presence [...] the sound whiles away in the temporal presencing that is essential to it." |
| "Presence is situated within its horizons" |
| In describing visual depth and horizonal perspective, Ihde says the latter has "a constant ratio of present to hidden, of visible to invisible" and that, auditorily, "this hidden depth is silence" |
| What is present, our central focus on our self, is always inside or contained within horizons. |
| "My "self" is a correlate of the World, and its way of being-in that World is a way filled with voice and language. |
