Sound Research WIKINDX

List Resources

Displaying 61 - 80  of 96 (Bibliography: WIKINDX Master Bibliography)
Parameters
Order by

Ascending
Descending
Use all checked: 
Use all displayed: 
Use all in list: 
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 24/05/2023, 14:17
"Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it [...] the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism [...] fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."
"I have chosen bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience there at all. Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid (though it certainly could be raised with other species)."
"Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task"
"The fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own. It would be fine if someone were to develop concepts and a theory that enabled us to think about those things; but such an understanding may be permanently denied to us by the limits of our nature. And to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance."
"My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts [...] But one might also believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever—simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type."
Footnote 10 has this: "[W]hen I look at the "Mona Lisa," my visual experience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone looking into my brain."
"the status of physicalism is similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher. We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might be true"
"it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it."
Presence defined. (2000). Retrieved February 13, 2019, from https://ispr.info/about-presence-2/about-presence/   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 13/02/2019, 08:52
"Presence (a shortened version of the term “telepresence”) is a psychological state or subjective perception in which even though part or all of an individual’s current experience is generated by and/or filtered through human-made technology, part or all of the individual’s perception fails to accurately acknowledge the role of the technology in the experience. Except in the most extreme cases, the individual can indicate correctly that s/he is using the technology, but at *some level* and to *some degree*, her/his perceptions overlook that knowledge and objects, events, entities, and environments are perceived as if the technology was not involved in the experience. Experience is defined as a person’s observation of and/or interaction with objects, entities, and/or events in her/his environment; perception, the result of perceiving, is defined as a meaningful interpretation of experience."
Prior, A. N. (1972). The notion of the present. In J. T. Fraser, F. C. Haber & G. H. Müller (Eds), The Study of Time: Proceedings of the First Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time Oberwolfach (Black Forest) --- West Germany (pp. 320–323). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 16/03/2023, 16:10
For Prior, the present and the real are the same concept: "the present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular species of unreality, namely the past and the future."
"the presentness of an event is just the event" and, regarding a lecture, "its pastness is its present pastness, so that although [the] lecture isn't now present and isn't real, isn't a fact, nevertheless its pastness, its having taken place, is a present fact, is a reality, and will be one as long as time shall last."
Prior deals with an objection the special theory of relativity might have to his conception of present and reality with the example of a pulsating celestial body where we know observed pulsations actually happened a long time ago:

"We have just observed one of these pulsations, and as the body is a very distant one, we know that the pulsation we are observing happened some time ago. We now consider the pulsation immediately after the one we are observing, and we ask whether this next pulsation, although we won't of course observe it for a while, is in fact going on right now, or is really still to come, or has occurred already. On the view of presentness which I have been suggesting, this is always a sensible question. At least if there are to be any further pulsation at all, then either the body is pulsating, or it is not the case but will be the case that it is pulsating or it is not the case but has been the case that it is pulsating. The difference between pulsating — really and actually pulsating — and merely having pulsated or being about to pulsate, is as clear and comprehensible a difference as any that we can think of, being but one facet of the great gulf that separates the real from the unreal, what is from what is not. Just this, however, is what the special theory of relativity appears to deny. If the distant body is having its nth pulsation as we perceive it having its n-1th — is pulsating, and not merely has been or will be pulsating — then the nth pulsation and the perception of the n-1th are simultaneous; not just simultaneous from such and such a point of view or in such and such a frame of reference, but simultaneous. And according to the special theory of relativity, such "absolute" simultaneity is in many cases just not to be had.

One possible reaction to this situation, which to my mind is perfectly respectable though it isn't very fashionable, is to insist that all that physics has shown to be true or likely is that in some cases we can never know, we can never physically find out, whether something is actually happening or merely has happened or will happen."

Prior makes the case that the natural sciences have expunged tenses and that their language is a tenseless one, without a conception of past, present, or future; rather events might be earlier or later than other events. "Whether the events are the case or merely have been or will be, is of no concern to the scientist, so he uses a language in which the the difference between being and having been abd being about to be is inexpressible."
Ramsdell, D. A. (1978). The psychology of the hard-of-hearing and the deafened adult. In H. Davis & S. R. Silverman (Eds), Hearing and Deafness 4th ed. (pp. 499–510). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/09/2020, 12:36
Defines three levels of hearing of which the primitive level comprises ambient noises that "maintain our feeling of being part of a living world and contribute to our own sense of being alive. We are not conscious of the important role that these background sounds play in our comfortable merging of ourselves with the life around us because we are not aware that we hear them. [The] deaf person [...] only knows that he feels as if the world were dead."
"This primitive function of hearing relates us to a world that is constantly in change, but it relates us to it in such a way that we are not conscious of the relationship or of the feeling it establishes of being part of the environment."
There is an environmental pattern indicating change and continuing activity and there is constant change and activity in the human body too: "We have then two patterns of change always in motion, the pattern of environmental change in the world around us and the pattern of change in the human body. By far the most efficient and indispensable mechanism for "coupling" the constant activity of the human organism to nature's activity is the primitive function of hearing."
"We live in an environment in different degrees of security, and since the security is never complete, we must maintain a readiness to react, to withdraw, or to approach as need arises. The primitive function of hearing maintains this readiness to react by keeping us constantly informed of events about us that do not make enough noise to challenge our attention."
The coupling of environmental activity to human body activity "establishes an unconscious feeling of aliveness in us [as] demonstrated by the overwhelming feeling of deadness in the deafened."
Reeve, C. (2000). Presence in virtual theater. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 9(2), 209–213.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 02/08/2018, 13:20
"Actors come with the ability to imagine, role play, communicate, and create a shared environment"
"Presence in virtual theater is reliant on three key relationships. The actor-avatar relationshipe represents the psychological link between the actor and his self-representation in the world. For this to be effective, there must be transparency between the actor's natural action/reaction and the movements of the avatar. The relation of actor to space creates an increasingly familiar environment and allows the actor to orient himself. Finally, the actor-actor relationship generates a group dynamic that adds personality to avatars abd promoites communal and individual ownership of the world that simultaneously engages users."
Rettie, R. 2004, October 13–15, Using Goffman's frameworks to explain presence and reality. Paper presented at Presence 2004, Valencia.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/09/2018, 15:34

"presence is engrossing involvement in a spatial frame"

Revonsuo, A. (2009). Inner presence: Consciousness as a biological phenomenon. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/03/2020, 11:12
Re VR systems: "Full immersion or presence is the you-are-there experience [...] The "sense of presence" seems to be just another way to capture the fact that a perceptual object or scene ceases to be a representation of the real thing and becomes a fully transparent surrogate of it."
"for a VR system to produce "full immersion" is for it to modulate the phenomenal level in a way that produces a fully convincing "self-in-the-world" experience. Satisfaction of these requirements, or creating full immersion, reveals how much and what kind of information must be fed into the brain through the sensory systems to create a flawless, gapless world simulation at the phenomenal level. The most important modalities for immersion are vision, movement, and touch, and their coherent interplay."
"To be conscious is to have the sense of presence in a world. The most central concept of the world-simulation metaphor of consciousness is undoubtedly that of presence or virtual presence. To have contents of consciousness is to have patterns of phenomenal experience present."
"the notion of presence treats phenomenality as the mark of the mental, and the pure existence of patterns of phenomenal feaures constitutes their presence. Phenomenality as bare presence is nonrelational and self-contained rather than relational and object-directed."
"The phenomenal level [...] simulates external reality by going  into organized experiential states, providing the brain with virtual presence in the world through the simulated environment in which this presence seems to take place."
"In the philosophy of presence, consciousness is an organized whole of transparent surrogates or virtual objects that are immediately present for us in the here-and-now of subjective experience. The organized system of transparent surrogates is what constitutes inner presence. Individual virtual objects are parts of our being; we are not externally related to virtual objects, but, rather, our subjectivity is constituted by them."
Ribbens, W., & Malliet, S. (2010). Perceived digital game realism: A quantitative exploration of its structure. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 19(6), 585–600.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/10/2018, 13:57
"whether a media text is perceived as realistic [...] is important because research suggests that user perceptions can be better predictors of behavioral outcomes than the features of the medium itself"
Has a different take on authenticity than might be expected – one that is subjective rather than objective (i.e. the shotgun in Terminator is not objectively authentic but might be subjectively perceived as authentic).
"rule-based characteristics of an electronic game count as better contributors to its overall reality impression than its audiovisual characteristics. The three most important factors [...] were simulational realism, freedom of choice, and character involvement. Graphical aspects such as perceptual pervasiveness or narrative aspects such as authenticity accounted for a substantially smaller amount of the explained variance."
Robinett, W. (1992). Synthetic experience: A proposed taxonomy. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(2), 229–247.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/07/2018, 13:02
"Microteleoperation replaces the human-scale anthropomorphic robot of ordinary teleoperation with a microscope and micromanipulator, so as to give the operator the sense of presence and ability to act in the microscopic environment."

Discussing Zeltzer's (1992) AIP model, Robinett claims his display type dimension of his synthetic experience taxonomy maps most closely to Zeltzer's presence dimension. This is because presence in this case refers directly to the number of sensory channels available and to the sensory fidelity delivered (cf Slater's (2003) later use of immersion for this form of presence).



Slater, M. (2003). A note on presence terminology. Presence Connect, 3(3).
Zeltzer, D. (1992). Autonomy, interaction, and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 127–132.
Rosenberg, A. (2018). How history gets things wrong: The neuroscience of our addiction to stories. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/06/2020, 17:29

The seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke suggested that we have free will in willing our arms to raise – think, I will raise my arm and then it raises and so there is causation. This was disagreed with by David Hume – as Rosenberg states, all you notice is "the feeling of deciding to raise your arm, and then slightly later, your arm going up" (p.99).

See (Libet 1985).

In the 1980s, it was shown through neuroscience techniques that the decision to raise the limb occurs after the brain signal to raise it and before that signal reaches the arm (p.100).



Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Sas, C., & O'Hare, G. (2003). The presence equation: An investigation into cognitive factors underlying presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 12(5), 523–537.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/09/2018, 16:41

"Presence is a psychological phenomenon, through which one’s cognitive processes are oriented toward another world, either technologically–mediated or imaginary, to such an extent that he or she experiences mentally the state of being (there), similar to one in the physical reality, together with an imperceptible sliding of focus of consciousness to the proximal stimulus located in that other world."

Schafer, D. M., Carbonara, C. P., & Popova, L. (2011). Spatial presence and perceived reality as predictors of motion-based video game enjoyment. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 20(6), 591–619.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/10/2018, 12:03

Presence is defined in visual/spatial terms only: "Presence is the perception of virtual objects and environments "as actual objects in either sensory or nonsensory ways" (Lee, 2004, p.44). Presence is a multidimensional construct, and spatial presence is one of its dimensions. Spatial presence refers to the sense of being there, actually being present in the virtual environment."

(Lee 2004)



Lee, K. M. (2004). Presence, explicated. Communication Theory, 14(1), 27–50.
Interactivity is the starting point in the chain of variable relationships "which then proceeds to influence perceived reality and presence. Perceived reality then also predicts presence, which in turn leads to enjoyment."

 

Schloerb, D. W. (1995). A quantitative measure of telepresence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 4(1), 64–80.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:18
Presence requires objective interaction and not necessarily the difficult to measure vague feeling: "A person is objectively present in a remote environment where the person is not physically present, if there is some type of causal interaction between the person and the environment [...] The degree of objective presence may be defined based on the probability that a given task is completed successfully [...] Different types of objective presence may be defined based on what task is specified"
"An important category of objective presence is the case where the specified task is for a person to perceive that he or she is physically present in a given environment [...] This is subjective presence [...] The degree of subjective presence is defined to be the probability that a person perceives that he or she is physically present in the given environment."
Telepresence is defined as "a person is objectively present in a real environment that is physically separate from the person in space."
"Virtual presence corresponds to telepresence where the teleoperator and the remote environment are simulated inside a computer."
"Physical presence is defined here as the existence of an object in some particular region of space and time [...] Physical telepresence is impossible by definition: a person cannot be physically present in an environment that is physically separate from the person in space."
Schubert, T., Friedmann, F., & Regenbrecht, H. (2001). The experience of presence: Factor analytic insights. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 10(3), 266–281.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/07/2020, 08:57

Noting Slater and Wilbur's (Slater & Wilbur 1997; Bystrom, Barfield, & Hendrix 1999) and others' equation between immersive properties and sense of immersion: "It would be misleading, however, to assume a one-to-one relationship between immersion and presence. One must take into account the cognitive processes leading from stimuli perception to presence. Cognitive processes mediate the impact of immersion on the development of presence [...] Stimuli from a VE are only the raw material for the mind that constructs a mental picture of a surrounding world"



Bystrom, K.-E., Barfield, W., & Hendrix, C. (1999). A conceptual model of the sense of presence in virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 8(2), 241–244.
Slater, M., & Wilbur, S. (1997). A framework for immersive virtual environments (FIVE): Speculations on the role of presence in virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 6(6), 603–616.
"Consider the following possibility: you mentally represented a VE in terms of what you, with your body, can do in it. Is it possible that presence then depends on which actions you consider possible in the VE?"
"The sense of presence is a conscious experience. We propose that a presence experience (the sense of presence) results from the interpretation of the mental model of the VE, which is the outcome of the cognitive processes. We become consciously present as an effect of interpreting our own mental construct [...] two cognitive processes are involved in the emergence of presence: construction of a mental model and attention allocation. Conscious presence experiences should reflect these two processes: presence should involve awareness of possible action patterns and the awareness of the attention allocation necessary to construct it. Therefore, the sense of presence should involve at least two components: the sense that we are located in and act from within the VE, and the sense that we are concentrating on the VE and ignoring the real environment."
Sheridan, T. B. (1992). Defining our terms. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(2), 272–274.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/07/2018, 12:26
While a teleoperator is a machine operated at a distance by a human, telepresence, is the feeling the human of being "physically present at the remote site. This can be a matter of degree [...] In a loose sense, telepresence, may be achieved through artistry without high technology, for example, by clever storytelling. In this sense it is synonymous with virtual presence [...] but it seems best to retain telepresence to refer to sense of presence in actual environments (including prerecording and later reproduction of a display of an actual environment"
Virtual presence, virtual environment, virtual reality, artificial reality. Sheridan views these as synonymous (although admitting that one is the experience and each of the others are what is experienced). Virtual presence differs to telepresence in that the environment in which one is present is generated by a computer.
"In some ideal sense, and with sufficiently good technology, a person would not be able to distinguish between actual presence, telepresence, and virtual presence."
Sheridan, T. B. (1992). Musings on telepresence and virtual presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 120–127.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:17
"given sufficiently high-fidelity display, a mental attitude of willing acceptance, and a modicum of motor "participation" [...] the human operator experiences "telepresence" (sense of being physically present with virtual object(s) at the remote teleoperator site) or "virtual presence" (sense of being physically present with visual, auditory, or force displays generated by a computer)."
At time of writing, Sheridan states that the latest technologies driving presence are video and graphics technologies, 'head-coupled displays', devices such as data gloves and body suits, 'cutaneous stimulation devices' and 'high-bandwidth, multi-degree-of-freedom force feedback.'
"is sense of "presence" simply a concomitant benign phenomenon, or even a distraction? Or is the quality of "presence" the critical psychological indicator of physical stimulus sufficiency?"
Skalski, P., & Whitbred, R. (2010). Image versus sound: A comparison of formal feature effects on presence and video game enjoyment. PsychNology Journal, 8(1), 67–84.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 13/02/2019, 09:17
"A very clear pattern emerged in this study—surround sound had a much more pronounced effect on player presence and enjoyment than two-channel sound or image quality. The only dimension of presence not affected was social realism"
Slater, M. (1999). Measuring presence: A response to the Witmer and Singer presence questionnaire. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 8(5), 560–565.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 02/08/2018, 11:46
"People working in the area of presence are trying to map out an equation. On the left-hand side is the presence response. On the right-hand side are the components of system immersion."
Suggests that it is possible to keep presence constant (this assumes a sliding scale of presence as per Slater's writings) while enhancing one system function/modality at the expense of another according to the requirements of cost. e.g. audio devices are too expensive so let's use more graphics devices. Slater acknowledges that the equation allowing this is yet to be found.
Slater, M. (2002). Presence and the sixth sense. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 11(4), 435–439.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/09/2018, 17:00
Based on the notion that perception involves the selection from alternate hypotheses:
  • Moment by moment, a selection mechanism organizes streams of sensory signals into an environmental gestalt. Sensory data relevant to other environmental gestalts are relegated to the background. The participant scan-senses the world according to the present gestalt.
  • We “see” in our mind’s eye. Therefore, it is relatively easy to fool the “eye” into selecting the hypothesis that we are in the place depicted by a VE, notwithstanding the typical paucity of the VE compared to the real world. Hence, reported presence is high on the average.
  • The hypothesis selection is not a once-and-for-all event. We continue to scan-sense the world in which we are present, repeatedly returning to and fixating on perceptually significant items, repeatedly testing the presence hypothesis. An anomaly associated with a perceptually significant item may lead to a break in presence: the reformation of sensory signals into another gestalt, presence in another environment.
  • Anomalies in an environment are not equal in their significance: some will induce a break in presence, and others won’t. For example, in the depiction of a virtual human, an anomaly in overall body shape is likely to be far less significant than the shape and movements around the eyes and mouth.
 
Slater, M. (2003). A note on presence terminology. Presence Connect, 3(3).   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/08/2023, 13:58
An objective description of the physics of sensory stimuli in a virtual environment might allow for them to be described as more or less immersive depending on the preservation of "fidelity in relation to their equivalent real-world sensory modalities [while] [p]resence is a human reaction to immersion."
"Presence is about form, the extent to which the unification of simulated sensory data and perceptual processing produces a coherent 'place' that you are 'in' and in which there may be the potential for you to act."
"Presence arises from an appropriate conjunction of the human perceptual and motor system and immersion. Presence is a response. Separate from presence are aspects of an experience such as involvement, interest and emotion. These are to do with the content of the experience. Presence is the form."
"One way to induce presence is to increase realism"
1 - 20  |  21 - 40  |  41 - 60  |  61 - 80  |  81 - 96
WIKINDX 6.8.2 | Total resources: 1301 | Username: -- | Bibliography: WIKINDX Master Bibliography | Style: American Psychological Association (APA)