| Brewer, W. F. (1986). What is autobiographical memory? In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 25–49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
 
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 14/07/2020, 08:37 |
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"I intend to argue that the self is composed of an experiencing ego, a self-schema, and an associated set of personal memories and autobiographical facts.
Ego. By ego I mean the conscious experiencing entity that is the focus of our phenomenal experience. The ego is the aspect of a person that experiences things from the "inside." The ego is the conscious aspect of the mind that moves through space and time. It is the memory for the ego's moment-to-moment experience that we call personal memories.
Self-schema. The self-schema is the cognitive structure that contains generic knowledge about the self. In the same way that individuals have knowledge about the solar system or knowledge about Walter Cronkite, individuals have knowledge about themselves. This knowledge is presumably organized into unconscious mental structures that interact with incoming information about the self (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Rumelhart, 1980). Some of the information that goes into making up the self-schema is private and available only to the self; other information is public and available to an observer. The self-schema must be one of the richer knowledge structures in an individual's long-term memory; hence, once it has developed, it probably changes only slowly, thus providing consistency to the self over time.
Self. The self is the complex mental structure that includes the ego, the self-schema, and portions of long-term memory related to the ego-self (e.g., personal memories, generic personal memories, and autobiographical facts).
Individual. The individual is the larger entity that includes the self, the de-personalized (nonself) aspects of the mind, and the body. Thus, it is the individual who has depersonalized knowledge about biology (e.g., a robin has wings) and who possesses cognitive skills (e.g., can carry out long division), motor skills (e.g., can ride a bicycle), and rote skills (e.g., can recite Lincoln's Gettysburg Address)."
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| Chertoff, D. B., Schatz, S. L., McDaniel, R., & Bowers, C. A. (2008). Improving presence theory through experiential design. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 17(4), 405–413. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/09/2018, 16:27 |
Mat. 10/10
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| "Current virtual environments are primarily conceptualized as information technologies, while they should instead be considered "knowledge technologies"." |
| "presence is an emergent factor due to the interaction of many components [...] it is a result that is greater than the sum of its parts." |
Proposes 5 dimensions to presence (dimensions come from experience design theories):
- sensory – sensory input and perceptions (VR: hardware and software)
- cognitive – mental engagement (VR: task engagement [motivation, meaningfulness, continuity])
- affective – emotional state (VR: emotions in VR mimic emotions in same RW scenario?)
- active – personal connection, incorporation into personal narrative (VR: empathy, avatar identification etc.)
- relational – social aspects (VR: co-experience and collaborative experience of VR)
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| Friedman, D., Brogni, A., Guger, C., Antley, A., Steed, A., & Slater, M. (2006). Sharing and analyzing data from presence experiments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(5), 599–610. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 16:52 |
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| "We regard presence as a successful substitution of real sensory data by articifially generated sensory data. By a successful substitution we mean that the participant acts upon these artificially generated stimuli as if they came from the real world. By acting, we mean that we expect the participant’s response to be similar to the response in the real world on many levels, ranging from unconscious automatic responses through deliberate volitional behavior, up to the subjective feeling of being there." |
| Herrera, G., Jordan, R., & Vera, L. (2006). Agency and presence: A common dependence on subjectivity? Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(5), 539–552. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 14/08/2020, 15:35 |
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"Presence, then, can be considered to be a conceptualization for virtual environments of the conscious awareness of self, as both agent and experiencer, which characterizes the experiencing self of natural environments (i.e., using Brewer’s conceptualization)." (Brewer 1986)
Brewer, W. F. (1986). What is autobiographical memory? In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 25–49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
| IJsselsteijn, W., & Riva, G. (2003). Being there: The experience of presence in mediated environments. In G. Riva, F. Davide & W. A. IJsselsteijn (Eds), Being There: Concepts, Effects and Measurements of User Presence in Synthetic Environments Vol. 5, (pp. 3–16). Amsterdam: IOS Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 13/02/2019, 17:04 |
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| "Characteristics of the medium can be subdivided into media form and media content variables. Both of these are known to have a significant impact on the individual's sense of presence such that, depending on the levels of appropriate, rich, consistent, and captivating sensory stimulation, varying levels of presence can be produced." |
| Merleau-Ponty, M. (2014). Phenomenology of perception. D. A. Landes, Trans. New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1945). |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/01/2024, 07:05 |
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| Merleau-Ponty defines the field of presence as "the originary experience where time and its dimensions appear in person without any intervening distance and with an ultimate evidentness." |
| Prior, A. N. (1972). The notion of the present. In J. T. Fraser, F. C. Haber & G. H. Müller (Eds), The Study of Time: Proceedings of the First Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time Oberwolfach (Black Forest) --- West Germany (pp. 320–323). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 16/03/2023, 16:10 |
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| For Prior, the present and the real are the same concept: "the present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular species of unreality, namely the past and the future." |
| "the presentness of an event is just the event" and, regarding a lecture, "its pastness is its present pastness, so that although [the] lecture isn't now present and isn't real, isn't a fact, nevertheless its pastness, its having taken place, is a present fact, is a reality, and will be one as long as time shall last." |
| Prior deals with an objection the special theory of relativity might have to his conception of present and reality with the example of a pulsating celestial body where we know observed pulsations actually happened a long time ago:
"We have just observed one of these pulsations, and as the body is a very distant one, we know that the pulsation we are observing happened some time ago. We now consider the pulsation immediately after the one we are observing, and we ask whether this next pulsation, although we won't of course observe it for a while, is in fact going on right now, or is really still to come, or has occurred already. On the view of presentness which I have been suggesting, this is always a sensible question. At least if there are to be any further pulsation at all, then either the body is pulsating, or it is not the case but will be the case that it is pulsating or it is not the case but has been the case that it is pulsating. The difference between pulsating — really and actually pulsating — and merely having pulsated or being about to pulsate, is as clear and comprehensible a difference as any that we can think of, being but one facet of the great gulf that separates the real from the unreal, what is from what is not. Just this, however, is what the special theory of relativity appears to deny. If the distant body is having its nth pulsation as we perceive it having its n-1th — is pulsating, and not merely has been or will be pulsating — then the nth pulsation and the perception of the n-1th are simultaneous; not just simultaneous from such and such a point of view or in such and such a frame of reference, but simultaneous. And according to the special theory of relativity, such "absolute" simultaneity is in many cases just not to be had.
One possible reaction to this situation, which to my mind is perfectly respectable though it isn't very fashionable, is to insist that all that physics has shown to be true or likely is that in some cases we can never know, we can never physically find out, whether something is actually happening or merely has happened or will happen." |
| Prior makes the case that the natural sciences have expunged tenses and that their language is a tenseless one, without a conception of past, present, or future; rather events might be earlier or later than other events. "Whether the events are the case or merely have been or will be, is of no concern to the scientist, so he uses a language in which the the difference between being and having been abd being about to be is inexpressible." |
| Sas, C., & O'Hare, G. (2003). The presence equation: An investigation into cognitive factors underlying presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 12(5), 523–537. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/09/2018, 16:41 |
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"Presence is a psychological phenomenon, through which one’s cognitive processes are oriented toward another world, either technologically–mediated or imaginary, to such an extent that he or she experiences mentally the state of being (there), similar to one in the physical reality, together with an imperceptible sliding of focus of consciousness to the proximal stimulus located in that other world."
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| Schafer, D. M., Carbonara, C. P., & Popova, L. (2011). Spatial presence and perceived reality as predictors of motion-based video game enjoyment. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 20(6), 591–619. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/10/2018, 12:03 |
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Presence is defined in visual/spatial terms only: "Presence is the perception of virtual objects and environments "as actual objects in either sensory or nonsensory ways" (Lee, 2004, p.44). Presence is a multidimensional construct, and spatial presence is one of its dimensions. Spatial presence refers to the sense of being there, actually being present in the virtual environment." (Lee 2004)
Lee, K. M. (2004). Presence, explicated. Communication Theory, 14(1), 27–50. |
| Schubert, T., Friedmann, F., & Regenbrecht, H. (2001). The experience of presence: Factor analytic insights. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 10(3), 266–281. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/07/2020, 08:57 |
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Noting Slater and Wilbur's (Slater & Wilbur 1997; Bystrom, Barfield, & Hendrix 1999) and others' equation between immersive properties and sense of immersion: "It would be misleading, however, to assume a one-to-one relationship between immersion and presence. One must take into account the cognitive processes leading from stimuli perception to presence. Cognitive processes mediate the impact of immersion on the development of presence [...] Stimuli from a VE are only the raw material for the mind that constructs a mental picture of a surrounding world"
Bystrom, K.-E., Barfield, W., & Hendrix, C. (1999). A conceptual model of the sense of presence in virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 8(2), 241–244.
Slater, M., & Wilbur, S. (1997). A framework for immersive virtual environments (FIVE): Speculations on the role of presence in virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 6(6), 603–616. |
| "Consider the following possibility: you mentally represented a VE in terms of what you, with your body, can do in it. Is it possible that presence then depends on which actions you consider possible in the VE?" |
| "The sense of presence is a conscious experience. We propose that a presence experience (the sense of presence) results from the interpretation of the mental model of the VE, which is the outcome of the cognitive processes. We become consciously present as an effect of interpreting our own mental construct [...] two cognitive processes are involved in the emergence of presence: construction of a mental model and attention allocation. Conscious presence experiences should reflect these two processes: presence should involve awareness of possible action patterns and the awareness of the attention allocation necessary to construct it. Therefore, the sense of presence should involve at least two components: the sense that we are located in and act from within the VE, and the sense that we are concentrating on the VE and ignoring the real environment." |
| Slater, M. (2002). Presence and the sixth sense. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 11(4), 435–439. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/09/2018, 17:00 |
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Based on the notion that perception involves the selection from alternate hypotheses:
- Moment by moment, a selection mechanism organizes streams of sensory signals into an environmental gestalt. Sensory data relevant to other environmental gestalts are relegated to the background. The participant scan-senses the world according to the present gestalt.
- We “see” in our mind’s eye. Therefore, it is relatively easy to fool the “eye” into selecting the hypothesis that we are in the place depicted by a VE, notwithstanding the typical paucity of the VE compared to the real world. Hence, reported presence is high on the average.
- The hypothesis selection is not a once-and-for-all event. We continue to scan-sense the world in which we are present, repeatedly returning to and fixating on perceptually significant items, repeatedly testing the presence hypothesis. An anomaly associated with a perceptually significant item may lead to a break in presence: the reformation of sensory signals into another gestalt, presence in another environment.
- Anomalies in an environment are not equal in their significance: some will induce a break in presence, and others won’t. For example, in the depiction of a virtual human, an anomaly in overall body shape is likely to be far less significant than the shape and movements around the eyes and mouth.
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| Slater, M. (2003). A note on presence terminology. Presence Connect, 3(3). |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/08/2023, 13:58 |
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| "Presence arises from an appropriate conjunction of the human perceptual and motor system and immersion. Presence is a response. Separate from presence are aspects of an experience such as involvement, interest and emotion. These are to do with the content of the experience. Presence is the form." |
| "One way to induce presence is to increase realism" |
| Slater, M., & Garau, M. (2007). The use of questionnaire data in presence studies: Do not seriously likert. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 16(4), 447–456. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/09/2018, 15:23 |
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| "Presence in our current work is the extent to which participants respond to virtual sensory data as if it were real, where response ranges from unconscious physiological responses, through behavioral responses, through to feelings, emotions and thought" |
| Welch, R. B., Blackmon, T. T., Liu, A., Mellors, B. A., & Stark, L. W. (1996). The effects of pictorial realism, delay of visual feedback, and observer interactivity on the subjective sense of presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 5(3), 263–273. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/09/2018, 18:28 |
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"Heeter (1992) has argued for three different kinds of presence: environmental, social, and individual. We believe, howeverm that it is more parsinomnious to view presence as a singel (albeit multidimensional) entity that is influenced by many different variables, all of which can be neatly categorized by Heeter's tripartite system." (Heeter 1992).
Heeter, C. (1992). Being there: The subjective experience of presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(2), 262–271. |
