| Fontaine, G. (1992). The experience of a sense of presence in intercultural and international encounters. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(4), 482–490. |
 
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| Two major differences between flow and presence: "(1) flow involves a narrow focus on a limited range of task characteristics, whereas presence involves a broader awareness of the task ecology; and (2) flow is associated with feelings of control whereas presence has been associated with novel ecologies involving a lack of predictability that makes feelings of control difficult." |
| Freeman, J., Avons, S. E., Meddis, R., Pearson, D. E., & IJsselsteijn, W. (2000). Using behavioral realism to estimate presence: A study of the utility of postural responses to motion stimuli. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 9(2), 149–164. |
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| "in the normal waking state, we are continually aware of our place in the surrounding environment. Direct sensory information confirming our location is always available and is continually updated. Thus, under normal circumstances, one's current location is a universal feature of awareness, rather than a quality that varies continuously over time. The subjective evaluation of presence requires graded ratings of a sensation that is typically invariant, and observers' lack of experience of rating presence is one possible explanation of the difficulty in providing stable ratings [...] A second, related issue is that there are no verbal descriptors of degrees of presence, because to date there has been no need to communicate such feelings [...] A third concern is that asking subjects to rate presence involves a conflict between sensation and knowledge. Observers know that they are currently in the test situation, and can remember how they got there [...] this conflict between sensation and knowledge is inherent in the measurement of presence [...] A final issue [...] is that the notion of presence is inextricably bound up with attentional factors. The extent to which an observer feels par of an environment may depend not only on the quality and extent of sensory information, but on the interest evoked by the displayed scene." |
| Fried, M. (1980). Absorption and theatricality: Painting and beholder in the age of Diderot. Berkeley: University of California Press. |
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| Discussing a painting by Jean-Baptiste Le Prince, Diderot states that it "puts you in the scene" but, rather than merely being an observer of the pastoral setting and musical absorption depicted in the painting, Diderot feels compelled to take part in and extend the action: "I shall go and sit next to the boy; and when night draws near, all three of us together will accompany the good old man to his hut". (Translation by Fried.) |
| Of paintings by Claude-Joseph Vernet, where Diderot imagines himself wandering through and extending the depicted landscape and activities: "Who knows how long I spent in that state of enchantment?" (translated by Fried). |
| According to Diderot, one forgets one's presence in front of the painting: one is in the painting and "that is the strongest magic of art" (translated by Fried). |
| Diderot's views call for an obliteration of the beholder's presence in front of the painting and the transportation of "the beholder's physical presence" to within the painting. Beholder and painting become "a closed and self-sufficient system". |
| Friedman, D., Brogni, A., Guger, C., Antley, A., Steed, A., & Slater, M. (2006). Sharing and analyzing data from presence experiments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(5), 599–610. |
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| "We regard presence as a successful substitution of real sensory data by articifially generated sensory data. By a successful substitution we mean that the participant acts upon these artificially generated stimuli as if they came from the real world. By acting, we mean that we expect the participant’s response to be similar to the response in the real world on many levels, ranging from unconscious automatic responses through deliberate volitional behavior, up to the subjective feeling of being there." |
| Garcia, J. M. 2006, October 11–12, From heartland values to killing prostitutes: An overview of sound in the video game Grand Theft Auto Liberty City Stories. Paper presented at Audio Mostly 2006, Piteå, Sweden. |
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| "In the most immersing environments reminders of the structural level of the game are gone and the player can concentrate on the game-world level." |
| Gilbert, S. B. (2016). Perceived realism of virtual environments depends on authenticity. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 25(4), 322–324. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/05/2021, 09:53 |
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| "While the perception of a virtual environment (VE) is usually described in terms of its level of immersion and users’ sense of presence, the construct of authenticity might be more useful. The authenticity of a VE depends on whether the affordances and simulations chosen in its implementation support (1) users’ expectations based on their Bayesian priors for regularities in the real world and (2) the users’ intentions in the VE . . . the term ‘‘authenticity’’ refers to whether the virtual environment provides the experience expected by the user, both consciously and unconsciously." |
"A VE with higher immersion, so the argument goes, should lead to higher fidelity, and generate a greater sense of presence, the subjective experience felt by the user. But if I put you in a highly immersive environment and give you badly designed content to experience, will you perceive the VE as realistic and experience presence? Probably not. What’s missing from this dichotomy of immersion (objective, system-focused) and presence (subjective, user-focused) is a computational theory about the extent to which the VE reflects the expected regularities of world that it is attempting to represent—its authenticity. Authenticity draws on two streams of thought: expectations and motivations."
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"Authenticity’s second stream of thought comes from art historians and archaeologists who think carefully about the past, and who often seek to establish whether artifacts found in the present are authentic. While establishing an artifact’s date and place of origin might be a matter of objective fact, Lovata (2007) argues that these facts are simply nominal authenticity, and that a richer, more complex sense of authenticity is context dependent, and depends on the motivations of the observer."
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"I suggest that immersion is the system-based factor that influences presence, and that authenticity is the human-based factor that influences presence"
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| Gilkey, R. H., & Weisenberger, J. M. (1995). The sense of presence for the suddenly deafened adult: Implications for virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 4(4), 357–363. |
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| "The problem of implementing a virtual environment in toto is intractable at present." |
| Harvey, M. A., & Sanchez-Vives, M. V. (2005). The binding problem in presence research. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 14(5), 616–621. |
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| Explaining why virtual environments are capable of facilitating presence despite lacking sensory modalities, it is not absence of one modality or another but rather incongruity between them that will break presence. The brain can fill in missing sensory data. In a virtual world displaying a rose, "it should be less disruptive for the rose to have no smell than the wrong smell." |
| Heeter, C. (1992). Being there: The subjective experience of presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(2), 262–271. |
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| Personal presence is subjective and "is a measure of the extent to which and the reasons why you feel like you are in a virtual world." |
| "Social presence refers to the extent to which other beings (living or synthetic) also exist in the world and appear to react to you." |
| "Environmental presence refers to the extent to which the environment itself appears to know that you are there and to react to you [sic]." |
| "[The virtual world responds like the natural world] and in a way that differentiates self from world. You move and the world stays still." |
| Suggests that different tasks in VR might require more or less sensory fidelity (compared to real world sensory environments) in order to attain a sense of presence. |
Familiarity and experience with the virtual world might increase the sense of presence. Conversely (Heeter does not note the contradiction), familiarity breeds contempt as expectations rise and previously adequate presence experiences later suffer in light of new technological capability. cf Uncanny Wall (Tinwell, Grimshaw, & Williams 2011).
Tinwell, A., Grimshaw, M., & Williams, A. (2011). The Uncanny Wall. International Journal of Arts and Technology, 4(3), 326–341. |
| Heeter proposes a "social construction of virtual reality" following philosophers' discussion of the social constrution of reality. |
| Although many real worlds do not respond to you, as if acknowledging your presence, the lack of response in VR might limit presence (cf environmental presence). |
| "When you walk into a room in the real world, it does not verbally or musically greet you or start raining." |
| Different genders, ages etc. might have different criteria for presence. Equally, humans have preferred sensory channels and so this channel might be preferred for attaining presence: "Is one person's experience of presence in a virtual world the same as another's?" |
| Heeter, C. (2016). A meditation on meditation and embodied presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 25(2), 175–183. |
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"Interoceptive awareness is a prerequisite for embodied presence . . . The interoceptive pathway and the DMN are competing neural pathways. They are not active at the same time . . . Interoceptive awareness refers to sensitivity to and awareness of physical sensations such as tempera- ture, pain, touch, and sensing from internal gastrointes- tinal, respiratory, cardiovascular, and urogenital systems."
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"Closing the eyes activates interoception. . . closing eyes some of the time enhanced interoceptive awareness and when eyes re-opened, the virtual world felt different. More vivid . . . Closing the eyes animates our somatosensory systems including touch, proprioception (vibration and position), pain, and temperature (Jao et al., 2013). Closing the eyes also activates olfaction (smell) and gustatory systems (taste), even in the absence of olfactory or gustatory stimuli (Wiesmann et al., 2006). Closing the eyes activates our interoception network (used for processing the internal state) that includes imagination and memory (Xu et al., 2014). Opening the eyes is associated with stronger ‘‘local ef- ficiency’’ in specific regions of the brain and an increase in specialized information processing. But this comes at a cost. Opening the eyes suppresses interoception. Opening the eyes reduces the synchronicity, global effi- ciency, and integrated connections across visual, somatic, and auditory sensory systems (Jao et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2014). Opening the eyes suppresses imagination, mem- ory, and perception of internal states."
Jao, T., Ve ́rtes, P. E., Alexander-Bloch, A. F., Tang, I.-N., Yu, Y.-C., Chen, J.-H., & Bullmore, E. T. (2013). Volitional eyes opening perturbs brain dynamics and functional con- nectivity regardless of light input. NeuroImage, 69, 21–34.
Wiesmann, M., Kopietz, R., Albrecht, J., Linn, J., Reime, U., Kara, E., . . . Stephan, T. (2006). Eye closure in darkness ani- mates olfactory and gustatory cortical areas. NeuroImage, 32(1), 293–300.
Xu, P., Huang, R., Wang, J., Van Dam, N. T., Xie, T., Dong, Z., . . . Luo, Y. (2014). Different topological organization of human brain functional networks with eyes open versus eyes closed. NeuroImage, 90, 246–255.
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| Held, R. M., & Durlach, N. I. (1992). Telepresence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 109–112. |
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Sensory factors contributing to telepresence:
- high resolution and large field of view
- transparent display system and lack of artifacts signalling display existence
- consistency of information – sensations must describe same objective world and be consistent with what has been learned about the 'normal world'
Motor factors should allow "for a wide3 range of sensorimotor interactions." |
| For telepresence, the most important factor is the degree of correlation between actions of the remote robot displayed back to the operator and the operator's movements triggering those actions. Correlation is lessened (and telepresence correspondingly) with time delays, internal noise, and distortions between movements/intentions of operator and actions of robot. |
| Hendrix, C., & Barfield, W. (1996). Presence within virtual environments as a function of visual display parameters. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 5(3), 274–289. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:19 |
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| Collating as ego-presence virtual presence and telepresence because they both imply presence within an environment other than the one the user is physically situated in (the former environment computer-generated, the latter a remote physical environment). |
| Discussing means of measuring presence – can be objective or subjective measurements and the former are mainly based around tasks. |
| Hendrix, C., & Barfield, W. (1996). The sense of presence within auditory virtual environments. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 5(3), 290–301. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/07/2018, 08:52 |
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| Auditory elements of virtual environments can be more susceptible to non-externalization than other elements such as visual, tactile etc. and this weakens presence. |
Following Loomis, the authors describe the phenomenal world as the one we are perceptually aware of whereas the physical world is one that is inferred by observation and reasoning (Loomis 1992).
Loomis, J. M. (1992). Distal attribution and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 113–119. |
| Herrera, G., Jordan, R., & Vera, L. (2006). Agency and presence: A common dependence on subjectivity? Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(5), 539–552. |
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"Presence, then, can be considered to be a conceptualization for virtual environments of the conscious awareness of self, as both agent and experiencer, which characterizes the experiencing self of natural environments (i.e., using Brewer’s conceptualization)." (Brewer 1986)
Brewer, W. F. (1986). What is autobiographical memory? In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 25–49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
| "Agency, then, is a regulating variable or, if preferred, one of the components that correlates with (and perhaps determines) the level and type of presence obtained." |
| Their definition of agency is "the exercise of a capacity for first person experience [that includes] information-processing and control [and] self-knowledge that is available to agents and to agents alone." |
"The perceptions we receive from our senses have a very important role in the configuration of the sense of being there as they keep us connected with reality at every moment. Relevant here is the concept of affordances as noted by Zahorik et al. (1998) in the context of artificial environments. Affordances, as Gibson suggested (Gibson & Walker, 1984), define the opportunities for perception and action offered by the environment in the context of the individual’s capacities: they are things that one perceives directly (without the need of a mental representation process)." (Zahorik & Jenison 1998).
Zahorik, P., & Jenison, R. L. (1998). Presence as being-in-the-world. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(1), 78–89. |
"it is through inter-subjectivity that we are enabled to take a subjective stance and thus have a sense of presence."
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| IJsselsteijn, W. A., Freeman, J., & de Ridder, H. (2001). Presence: Where are we? Cyberpsychology & Behavior, 4(2), 179–182. |
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| Presence is "an illusory shift in point of view" |
| The illusion of "being there" in a virtual environment is enhanced by "more accurate reproductions and/or simulations of reality." |
| Jennett, C. I. (2010). Is game immersion just another form of selective attention? An empirical investigation of real world dissociation in computer game immersion. Unpublished thesis PhD, University College London, United Kingdom. |
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| 'one could argue that “Tetris” is still an immersive experience, as attested by its immense popularity' |
| Jørgensen, K. 2006, October 11–12, On the functional aspects of computer game audio. Paper presented at Audio Mostly 2006, Piteå, Sweden. |
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| "...gamers now expect realistic audo samples to be used in games, and critically, the use of such sounds will make the audio world more immersive and thus, [sic] effective." |
| Kearney, P. R., & Pivec, M. 2007, June 13–15, Immersed and how? That is the question. Unpublished paper presented at Game in' Action, Sweden. |
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| Immersion provides the motivation, or flow, required for the player to be repeatedly engaged with the game. |
Based on previous work by Sweetser and Wyeth, the authors created a game analysis matrix with a scoring system relating to immersion among other factors:
- The player should become less aware of their surroundings while playing
- The player should become less self-aware and less worried about everyday life
- The player should experience an altered sense of time
- The player should feel emotionally involved in the game or committed to it through time and effort invested in the game.
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| The authors cite evidence that the more immersive the game, the less the eye movement and blink rate and that absorption of information is increased with less eye movement. |
| Kilteni, K., Groten, R., & Slater, M. (2012). The sense of embodiment in virtual reality. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 21(4), 373–387. |
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| Definition of sense of embodiment: "SoE toward a body B is the sense that emerges when B’s properties are processed as if they were the properties of one’s own biological body." |
| Laurel, B. (1993). Computers as theatre. New York: Addison-Wesley. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/05/2008, 10:25 |
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| "[t]ight linkage between visual, kinaesthetic, and auditory modalities is the key to the sense of immersion that is created by many computer games, simulations and virtual-reality systems" |
