| Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide. Articificial Intelligence, 149, 91–130. |
 
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/02/2011, 07:55 |
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Cognitivism derives from the Cartesian world view (that sensing and acting in the world does not require thinking -- the mind is separate from the body and this is what separates man and animals; man is capable of higher-level reasoning and abstraction).
Cognitivism -- thinking is a manipulation of abstract symbols according to explicit rules. Three elements to cognitivism: representation, formalism and transformation. Representation requires symbols pertaining to "specific features or states of affairs", but it is the form of the symbol (not its meaning) "that is the basis of its rule-based transformation." |
| Anderson critiques the AI framework 'sense-model-plan-act' (SMPA) as being insufficiently dynamic and not taking account of relevance. SMPA depends upon modelling an explicit representation of the world. How can one model for every potential situation and how does one decide which situations are relevant enough to be modelled as representations for future use? |
Anderson notes some critiques of embodied cognition including its disregard for representation. He paraphrases David Kirsh's list of situations where representation is required in order to act (including future planning, use of conceptualization and creative activities that are "stimulus free").
Anderson suggests a hybrid model should be sought. |
| Evans, D. (2001). Emotion: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 28/05/2011, 07:52 |
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| If consciousness depends on the capacity for subjective feelings and subjective feeling depend on the form of body one has, computer programs will always lack consciousness if they remain virtual. Hence 'evolutionary robotics' and 'embodied programs'. |
| Loomis, J. M. (1992). Distal attribution and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 113–119. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:19 |
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| There is a phenomenal world that can be divided into 'self' and 'nonself' – the physical self is closely tied to the phenomenal self but not necessarily (e.g. phantom limbs).
Distal attribution is the process of identifying sensory experience with a phenomenally external space or the nonself. This identification (and thus distal attribution) results when afference (sensory input) is "lawfully related" to efference (motorsensory actions) – e.g. I do something and the sensory feedback I get accords with that action.
Loomis hypothesizes that "attribution to self occurs when afference and efference are completely unrelated or independent." |
| In arguing that distal attribution re telepresence is most clearly felt when the operators have become skilled with the equipment, Loomis suggests that with regard to a lawful relationship between efference and afference, the operator must be able to model this relationship. This 'linkage' becomes transparent with experience and this leads to the externalization of the distal environment. |
| Riddoch, M. 2012, September 9–14, On the non-cochlearity of the sounds themselves. Paper presented at International Computer Music Conference, Ljubljana. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/09/2020, 21:36 |
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Riddoch proposes three types of non-cochlear sound:
- Synaesthetic -- the perception of sound via stimulation of another sense.
- Infrasonic sound -- sound waves below 20Hz can be detected by the skin and the chest cavity resonates at 80Hz and below. Riddoch also points to the example of profoundly deaf (from birth) percussionist Evelyn Glennie who maintains that hearing is a specialized form of touch (Glennie 1993).
- Auditory imagination -- including memory, imagination, hallucination, dreaming which all excite the auditory cortex.
Glennie, E. (1993). Hearing essay. Retrieved April 28, 2014, from https://www.evelyn.co.uk/hearing-essay/ |
| Szabó Gendler, T. (2010). Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/10/2023, 06:42 |
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An essay about the reliability of judgments derived from imaginary scenarios and thought experiments.
The conclusion is that judgments are often not reliable because the derivation of such judgments proceeds from the framing of the scenario. i.e. the telling of the story affects the outcome. |
| Successful imagination may be incomplete or incoherent -- exhibit disparity. If incomplete, even in pretense, some features may be unspecified or unspecifiable. If incoherent, some features are logically or conceptually incompatible. The illusion that the pretense is complete and coherent comes "from imaginative reliance on a picture that treats imagining as just like belief, only off-line, and from a picture of prop-based pretense that treats principles of generation as complete, uniform mappings from one realm to another." (p.150). |
