| Evans, D. (2001). Emotion: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
 
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 28/05/2011, 07:52 |
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| Remembering is never precise because items in memory are not recorded in their fine details. They are filed under keywords; these are extrcted and "educated guesswork" fills in the blanks. "It is more like reconstrcuting an antique pot from a few broken shards than replaying an old movie" (p.80). |
| Riddoch, M. 2012, September 9–14, On the non-cochlearity of the sounds themselves. Paper presented at International Computer Music Conference, Ljubljana. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/09/2020, 21:36 |
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Riddoch proposes three types of non-cochlear sound:
- Synaesthetic -- the perception of sound via stimulation of another sense.
- Infrasonic sound -- sound waves below 20Hz can be detected by the skin and the chest cavity resonates at 80Hz and below. Riddoch also points to the example of profoundly deaf (from birth) percussionist Evelyn Glennie who maintains that hearing is a specialized form of touch (Glennie 1993).
- Auditory imagination -- including memory, imagination, hallucination, dreaming which all excite the auditory cortex.
Glennie, E. (1993). Hearing essay. Retrieved April 28, 2014, from https://www.evelyn.co.uk/hearing-essay/ |
| Szabó Gendler, T. (2010). Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/10/2023, 06:42 |
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Imaginary scenarios allow us to make judgments about the imaginary case, which features are essential etc. which can be applied to the actual case.
This is supposed to be the rationale for using such scenarios but the author thinks such methodology unreliable. |
An essay about the reliability of judgments derived from imaginary scenarios and thought experiments.
The conclusion is that judgments are often not reliable because the derivation of such judgments proceeds from the framing of the scenario. i.e. the telling of the story affects the outcome. |
Discussing pretense. Children's games of pretense exhibit two features.
Quarantining: "events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects only within that pretense-episode".
Spilling pretend tea from a teapot will not really wet the table.
Mirroring: "features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues".
Tipping the teapot will make the table wet within the pretense-episode.
The exception to quarantining is 'contagion'; the exception to mirroring is 'disparity'.
'contagion' may be 'affective transmission' (child scared of the dark because of imagined monsters) or 'cognitive transmission' (child playing at bird-watching may ascribe bird-like features to partically seen animal -- dog behind hedge).
'disparity' -- imaginary content in its difference to believed content may be 'incomplete' or 'incoherent'. |
| Successful imagination may be incomplete or incoherent -- exhibit disparity. If incomplete, even in pretense, some features may be unspecified or unspecifiable. If incoherent, some features are logically or conceptually incompatible. The illusion that the pretense is complete and coherent comes "from imaginative reliance on a picture that treats imagining as just like belief, only off-line, and from a picture of prop-based pretense that treats principles of generation as complete, uniform mappings from one realm to another." (p.150). |
| In some cases we recognize that deviance from fact-established concept is not intended for export from the storyworld -- export is not the intent of the author. In others, "because we recognize that there are instances of actual moral disagreement" (p.200), it is unclear to us if the author intended them to be exported or not. Hence imaginative resistance. |
