| Szabó Gendler, T. (2010). Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
 
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/10/2023, 06:42 |
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An alief can actually occur when a cluster of dispositions to entertain such aliefs are activated (occurrent alief). A dispositional alief is the propensity for an occurrent alief to take place were the right conditions or external stimulus to occur.
A subject alieves with representational-affective-behavioural content. S alieves R-A-B. SG terms this a four-place relation: "[subject], dog-shit, disgusting, refuse-to-eat" (p.262). SG suggest it can also be, and might be better, described as two-place: "S (occurrently) alieves R when S's R-related associations are activated and thereby rendered cognitively, affectively, and
behaviorally salient" (p.265). |
| Aliefs tend to reveal themselves to us precisely when they are discordant with beliefs. |
Alief differs from belief thus:
1. Belief and imagination are propositional.
2. belief and imagination involve acceptance.
3. Alief may be activated non-consciously.
4. Alief may be activated at will.
5. I believe that P and imagine that non-P "violates no norms" (p.271). I believe that P and alieve that non-P -- "something is amiss" (p.271). Norms of cognitive-behavioural coherence are violated.
6. Belief is reality-sensitive, imagination is reality-insensitive. Alief is neither. |
| Gives examples of various media, including computer games, that exploit "our tendency to respond to merely apparent stimuli in habitual ways" (p.303). |
