| Blesser, B., & Salter, L.-R. (2007). Spaces speak, are you listening? Experiencing aural architecture. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. |
 
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/10/2023, 15:11 |
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A discussion on auditory spatial awareness. Conclusions, based mainly on case studies of blind people:
- Auditory spatial awareness is a skill that must be learnt and is difficult to learn.
- Different aural cultures have different abilities and there is no one sensitivity to aural space; rather a group of independent sensory skills (some more aware of spatial volumes, others more aware of objects in that space).
- Controlled experiments showing humans have give auditory spatial awareness should be treated with care as they are artificial and, in testing one spatial factor, usually remove other potentially confusing factors.
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| Erlmann, V. (2000). Reason and resonance: A history of modern aurality. New York: Zone Books. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/02/2024, 08:01 |
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Summarizing some of von Helmholtz's work c.1856 (On the Sensations of Tone: a sound (Klang) comprises several partials (Ton) thus perception, which is accomplished without reflection, is the act of fusing the sensation of several partials into one sound. Perceptions are thus the means by which we are aware of external objects whilst sensations allow us to become conscious of ourselves. "[P]erception is not based on conscious awareness and knowledge of the external world, but on a largely unconscious act" (p.237). cf Humphrey's (2000) reference to Thomas Reid's (1785) assertion that sensation presupposes a sentient being and no more but perception is an acknowledgement of something external to that being.
Humphrey, N. (2000). The privatization of sensation. In C. Hayes & L. Huber (Eds), The Evolution of Cognition (pp. 241–252). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. |
| Re Helmholtz's assertion that perception is unconscious, he suggests that conscious analysis of the Klang into Ton constituents would be disturbing. Thus, according to Helmholtz, as Erlmann puts it: "Hearing is repression." (p.257) |
| Merleau-Ponty, M. (2014). Phenomenology of perception. D. A. Landes, Trans. New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1945). |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/01/2024, 07:05 |
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| Uses Gestalt theory to state that a figure on a background, "the most basic sensible given we can have," is the fundamental definition of perception as phenomenon. This means that a truly homogenenous area cannot be perceived because this "pure impression" offers nothing to perceive. "An isolated perceptual given [the homogeneous area] is inconceivable, so long as we perform the mental experiment of trying to perceive it. Yet in the world there are isolated objects or a physical void." |
| Note that, according to Merleau-Ponty, a sensation is not a sensible. A sensible is prior to sensation and a quality of the object (what would be known as a proper sensible or a secondary quality [common and primary sensibles are combinations of sensations—shape, dimension, etc.—from secondary sensibles]). Thus red and green are not sensations but sensibles. |
| Merleau-Ponty states that "every sensation belongs to a field" (224) and gives the example of a visual field as comprised of a system of 'visible beings' that are a 'gift of nature' requiring no effort on the part of the beholder (224). A sense "is a thought subjugated to a certain field" (225). |
| A few pages on the relationship between senses and spatiality. |
| Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 20/07/2021, 11:22 |
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Discussing Libet's (1985) experiment. While we prefer to believe that we have willed our hand to rise, our intention, there is a precursor in the subconscious, the readiness potential, that can be measured using EEG and that precedes the hand movement and the reported time at which subjects noted their intention to lift the hand. The conclusion is that intention (and thus free will?) is manufactured after the event. See also (Rosenberg 2018, p.99).
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Rosenberg, A. (2018). How history gets things wrong: The neuroscience of our addiction to stories. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. |
Detailing a set of experiments by Libet helping to explain how our brain builds a consciousness of the present and the time delay involved.
- Stimulating the brain directly, an electrical impulse must be applied for at least 500 milliseconds to produce a perception (see, for example Libet 1985). Shorter impulses had no effect neither did increasing the intensity (with shorter times). Sensation can be detected by the brain within 500msecs but the subject is not consciously aware of it (e.g. we can react 'instinctively').
- Stimulate the skin then, 200 milliseconds after, stimulate the brain – the skin stimulation is not perceived but is masked by the brain stimulation. The brain edits past events to give an impression of the 'present'.
- Stimulate the brain then, 200 milliseconds later, stimulate the skin. Brian stimulus is perceived after about 500msecs but the skin stimulus is perceived as being before the brain stimulus. A temporal reordering: "There is no guarantee that the order in which we perceive events actually corresponds to the order of their occurrence" (Westerhoff 2011, p.100).
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
