| Bouchard, S., St-Jacques, J., Robillard, G., & Renaud, P. (2008). Anxiety increases the feeling of presence in virtual reality. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 17(4), 376–391. |
 
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 14/08/2020, 15:36 |
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| Suggest that there is a limit to the linear equation between increasing sophistication of immersive technology/level of realism and development of presence. |
| Evans, D. (2001). Emotion: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 28/05/2011, 07:52 |
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| A continuum betwee basic, innnate emotions and learned emotions. Fear and anger, for examplem very innate and very basic. Romantic love, as an emotion: unclear whether basic or learned. Some claim it is a Mediaeval invention but others find evidence for it in texts such as the Old Testament. It's also been observed in non-Western societies.. However, emotions such as romantic love can be "played out slightly differently in different cultures" (p.19). |
| Possibly a third category of emotions -- 'higher cognitive emtotions' e.g. love. It is universal and innate (to a degree) but typically grows slowly (unlike fear and anger). Such emotions are associated with the neocortex rather than in the subcortical strucutres of the brain. The neocortex supports high level complex cognition such as logical analysis. Emotions derived here may be "influenced by conscious thoughts and this in turn is probably what allows higher cognitive emotions to be more culturally variable than the basic emotions" (p.20). |
Other higher cognitive emotions might be jealousy, envy, pride, embarrassment, shame, guilt as well as love.
All of these are fundamentally social unlike basic emotions. "Some basic emotions can also be co-opted for the social functions that typify higher cognitive emotions." (p.21). e.g. disgust at a rotting body's smell (non-social function keeps you away from disease) or disgust at incest or paedophilia (social function). |
| Internal response lead to particular courses of action, external emotional expression allows others to learn from our experience. |
| Internal feelings and external expressions must be taken into account in a consideration of the evolution of emotions. |
The higher cognitive emotions, guilt, love, revenge etc., "seem to exhibit a kind of 'global rationality' that saves pure reason from itself" (p.36).
Robert Frank says that such emotions, which evolved later than the basic emotions, are related to commitment issues. e.g. facial expressions of guilt demonstrate untrustworthiness -- if you can be trusted, others are more happy to work with you. Signs of love demonstrate commitment to another. A reputation for revenge means you will be less likely to be a victim. |
Moods (e.g. happiness) are long-term and increase our susceptibility to emotions (e.g. joy). Equally, a mood such as happiness may protect us from distress.
Moods are background states. |
| Stories provide emotional satisfaction by providing social information. Yet the information is false Perhaps they work by providing information about the narrator -- his/her intelligence. |
| Subjective feeling that is the basis for consciousness is "the essence of true emotion" (p.116) and consciousness is arrived at through embodiment (which leads to subjective feeling). Will robots feel differently to themselves than humans observe their behaviours (and thus inferred) feelings to be? Will they experience the same emotions or the same mix of emotions? If not, could there be empathy between robot and human (p.119)? |
| Niedenthal, P. M. (2007). Embodying emotion. Science, 316, 1002–1005. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 26/01/2011, 01:57 |
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| Three types of learning: conditioned (directly experienced); observational (vicarious experience); and instructed (described in language). Emotional processes supporting these types share important similarities lending support to theories of emotional model reenactment. |
| Sloboda, J. A., & Juslin, P. N. (2002). Psychological perspectives on music and emotion. In P. N. Juslin & J. A. Sloboda (Eds), Music and Emotion: Theory and Research (pp. 71–104). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 2001). |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/11/2010, 03:55 |
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| Description of vitality affects that are human feelings or qualities related to intensity, shape, contour and movement but that are not emotions themselves. They can occur concurrently with emotions or in their absence and are common to all types of expression. |
| Szabó Gendler, T. (2010). Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/10/2023, 06:42 |
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Discussing the work of Walton. Walton denied that fictional emotions were real, actual emotions. For example, the object of the emotion must exist (be non-fictional) otherwise these 'quasi-emotions' do not lead to motivation and action. "Fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all" (Walton, Kendall. (1990). Mimesis as Make-believe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp.201-202).
To this SG responds by saying emotions are genuine, and non-fictional, when we review past events (death of a relative) or imagine future events (stock market crash) and neither of these require the object of the emotion to be present. |
