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Barfield, W., Zeltzer, D., Sheridan, T. B., & Slater, M. (1995). Presence and performance within virtual environments. In W. Barfield & T. A. Furness III (Eds), Virtual Environments and Advanced Interface Design (pp. 473–513). New York: Oxford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 7/6/20, 9:01 AM
"An important point to emphasize is that it is necessary for attentional resources to be directed to stimulus information before the sense of presence can occur."
Marco, E. J., Hinkley, L. B. N., Hill, S. S., & Nagarajan, S. S. (2011). Sensory processing in autism: A review of neurophysiologic findings. Pediatric Research, 69(5 Pt 2), 48R–54R.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 3/29/20, 6:04 PM
"Many of the atypical perceptual experiences reported in those with ASD are believed to be due to an inability to properly filter or process simultaneous channels of visual, auditory and tactile inputs"
"Functionally, an individual must be able to select certain sensory inputs for enhanced processing while either filtering out or suppressing others."
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2014). Phenomenology of perception. D. A. Landes, Trans. New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1945).   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 1/8/24, 7:05 AM
Using the sight of men through a window swaddled in coats and hats: "Once vision has been defined in the empiricist manner as the possession of a quality inscribed upon the body by the stimulus, the slightest illusion, since it invests the object with properties it does not have on my retina, suffices to establish that perception is a judgment. . . . Perception becomes an "interpretation" of the signs that sensibility provides in accordance with bodily stimuli . . . [judgment] itself becomes a mere "factor" of perception charged with the task of providing what is not provided by the body"
Using the example of the Necker cube. "Even if I know that it can be seen in two ways, the figure sometimes refuses to change structure, and my knowledge must wait for its intuitive realization. Here again it must be concluded that judgment is not perceiving."
Criticising the empiricist view of attention . . . "empiricism deduces the concept of attention from the "constancy hypothesis," that is, from the priority of the objective world. Even if what we perceive does not correspond to the objective properties of the stimulus, the constancy hypothesis requires the assumption that the "normal sensations" are already there. They must, then, go by unnoticed, and "attention" will the the function that reveals them, like a spotlight illuminating preexisting objects hidden in the shadows. Thus, the act of attention creates nothing, and nothing less than a natural miracle . . . can make spring forth precisely these perceptions or these ideas that are capable of responding to the questions I ask myself. Since the act of "Bemerken," or of "taking notice," is not the efficient cause of the ideas to which it gives rise, it is the same throughout all acts of attention, just as the spotlight's beam is the same regardless of the landscape it illuminates. Attention, then, is a general and unconditioned power in the sense that it can at any moment indifferently cast its light upon any of the contents of consciousness."
Niedenthal, P. M. (2007). Embodying emotion. Science, 316, 1002–1005.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 1/26/11, 1:57 AM
"Through the interconnections of the populations of neurons that were active during the original experience, a partial multimodal reenactment of the experience is produced. Critical for such an account, one reason that only parts of the original neural states are reactivated is that attention is selectively focused on the aspects of the experience that are the most salient and important for the individual. [...] Because emotions are salient and functional, this aspect of experience will certainly be preserved."
Slater, M., & Steed, A. (2000). A virtual presence counter. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 9(5), 413–434.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 9/11/18, 5:17 PM
"We can think of presence as a selector among environments to which to respond, which operates dynamically from moment to moment [...] A fundamental proposal of this paper is that the set of stimuli of the present environment forms an overall gestalt, providing a consistent believable world in itself."
Witmer, B. G., & Singer, M. J. (1998). Measuring presence in virtual environments: A presence questionnaire. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(3), 225–240.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 9/11/18, 5:16 PM
"experiencing presence [...] requires the ability to focus on one meaningfully coherent set of stimuli (in the VE) to the exclusion of unrelated stimuli (in the physical location) [...] Though novel aspects of the VE may attract some attention, presence depends less on their novelty than on how well they are connected within the entire VE stimulus set."