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Szabó Gendler, T. (2010). Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/21/23, 6:42 AM
"...imaginative content is taken to be governed by the same sort of restrictions that govern believed content" -- mirroring in pretense-episodes.
Belief is a "receptive attitude whereas pretense is a productive attitude". In the former, the person responds "to something in the world itself" whereas, in the latter, the person projects "something onto the world".
"imagination is distinct from belief on the one hand and from mere supposition on te other. It is this which explains both our general capacity to imagine morally deviant situations and our general unwillingness to do so."
Dealing with imaginative contagion: "cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have."
"A paradigmatic alief is a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated--consciously or non-consciously--by features of the subject's internal or ambient environment. Aliefs may be either occurrent or dispositional."

Examples SG gives include refusing to eat fudge shaped like dog faeces (even though you believe it to be be perfectly delicious), fear of walking on glass over a dangerous drop (even though you believe the glass to be safe), refusal to wear the shirt of someone you hate (even though, freshly laundered, you believe it to be clean).

Alief is often, (not always) discordant with belief.
"if alief drives behavior in belief-discordant cases, it is likely that it drives behavior in belief-concordant cases as well. Belief plays an inportant role in the ultimate regulation of behavior. But it plays a far smaller role in moment-by-moment management than philosophical tradition has tended to stress."
"Beliefs change in response to changes in evidence; aliefs change in responses to changes in habit. If new evidence won't cause you to change your behavior in response to an apparent stimulus, then your reaction is due to alief rather than belief."
"The assumption that behavior invariably indicates belief arises from aliefs that are mistaken for beliefs."
"Aliefs activate behavioral propensities. So (in conjunction with desire) do beliefs (and their teleofunctional analogues)."

Sometimes these propensities coincide (norm-concordant aliefs may govern the behavioural tendencies); sometimes they are at odds with each other (norm-discordant aliefs govern the behaviour).