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Anzieu, D. (1989). The skin ego: A psychoanalytical approach to the self. C. Turner, Trans. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 5/18/23, 7:18 AM
The Self is "a pre-individual psychical cavity possessing a rudimentary unity and identity."
Citing number of studies of babies, these "suggest that mental capacities operate first on acoustic material [the suggestion] that the differentiations of gestures and mimicry [...] are at the root of social communication and mental representation, comes to seem improbable. It appears that feedback loops with the environment are formed much earlier in the baby. These are audio-phonological in nature"
"the Self forms as a sound envelope through the experience of a bath of sounds [...] This sound-bath prefigures the Skin Ego with its double face, one half turned towards the outer world, the other towards the inner, since the sound envelope is composed of sounds emitted either by the baby or the environment. The combination of these sounds therefore produces (a) a common space-volume permitting bilateral exchange [...] (b) a first (spatio-auditory) image of one's own body"
Gumbrecht, H. U. (2004). Production of presence: What meaning cannot convey. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/8/23, 7:46 AM
"Cartesian cogito made the ontology of human existence depend exclusively on the movements of the human mind."
Argues that, because presence-cultures have the body as a self-referent, "space, that is, that dimension that constitutes itself around bodies, must be the primordial dimension in which the relationship between different humans and the things of the world are being negotiated. Time, in contrast, is the primordial dimension for any meaning culture, because there seems to be an unavoidable relationship between consciousness and temporality [...] Above all, however, time is the primordial dimension of any meaning culture, because it takes time to carry out those transformative actions through which meaning cultures define the relationship between humans and the world."
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 12/11/23, 12:24 PM
"For the environment is a structure which even biology as a positive science can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ. Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived of as a structure of Dasein."
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 5/24/23, 2:17 PM
"Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it [...] the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism [...] fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism."
"I have chosen bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience there at all. Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid (though it certainly could be raised with other species)."
"Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task"
"The fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own. It would be fine if someone were to develop concepts and a theory that enabled us to think about those things; but such an understanding may be permanently denied to us by the limits of our nature. And to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance."
"My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts [...] But one might also believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever—simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type."
Footnote 10 has this: "[W]hen I look at the "Mona Lisa," my visual experience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone looking into my brain."
"the status of physicalism is similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher. We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might be true"
"it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it."
Reeve, C. (2000). Presence in virtual theater. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 9(2), 209–213.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 8/2/18, 1:20 PM
"Actors come with the ability to imagine, role play, communicate, and create a shared environment"
"Presence in virtual theater is reliant on three key relationships. The actor-avatar relationshipe represents the psychological link between the actor and his self-representation in the world. For this to be effective, there must be transparency between the actor's natural action/reaction and the movements of the avatar. The relation of actor to space creates an increasingly familiar environment and allows the actor to orient himself. Finally, the actor-actor relationship generates a group dynamic that adds personality to avatars abd promoites communal and individual ownership of the world that simultaneously engages users."
Revonsuo, A. (2009). Inner presence: Consciousness as a biological phenomenon. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 3/4/20, 11:12 AM
"The phenomenal level [...] simulates external reality by going  into organized experiential states, providing the brain with virtual presence in the world through the simulated environment in which this presence seems to take place."