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Bouchard, S., St-Jacques, J., Robillard, G., & Renaud, P. (2008). Anxiety increases the feeling of presence in virtual reality. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 17(4), 376–391.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 14/08/2020, 15:36
Not only external factors but also "psychological states and appraisal patterns of users might also affect presence."
Evans, D. (2001). Emotion: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 28/05/2011, 07:52
"...fear is probably one of the first meotions to have ever evolved."

All animals descended from the first vertebrates have the capacity for fear.
Two pathways related to fear in the brain. The shorter leads to quicker responses but can be wrong -- e.g. false fire alarms. The second is longer and slower, passsing through the sensory cortex allowing us to consider the risk and to cut off the initial fear response if the danger is not real.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/12/2023, 12:24
"As we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest 'how one is'. In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'. [...] "as Dasien falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses."
"Only something which is in the the state-of-mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that which is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openess to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind.""
Szabó Gendler, T. (2010). Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/10/2023, 06:42
Discussing the work of Walton. Walton denied that fictional emotions were real, actual emotions. For example, the object of the emotion must exist (be non-fictional) otherwise these 'quasi-emotions' do not lead to motivation and action. "Fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all" (Walton, Kendall. (1990). Mimesis as Make-believe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp.201-202).

To this SG responds by saying emotions are genuine, and non-fictional, when we review past events (death of a relative) or imagine future events (stock market crash) and neither of these require the object of the emotion to be present.
WIKINDX 6.8.2 | Total resources: 1301 | Username: -- | Bibliography: WIKINDX Master Bibliography | Style: American Psychological Association (APA)