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Herrera, G., Jordan, R., & Vera, L. (2006). Agency and presence: A common dependence on subjectivity? Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(5), 539–552.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 14/08/2020, 15:35
"Agency, then, is a regulating variable or, if preferred, one of the components that correlates with (and perhaps determines) the level and type of presence obtained."
Their definition of agency is "the exercise of a capacity for first person experience [that includes] information-processing and control [and] self-knowledge that is available to agents and to agents alone."

"The perceptions we receive from our senses have a very important role in the configuration of the sense of being there as they keep us connected with reality at every moment. Relevant here is the concept of affordances as noted by Zahorik et al. (1998) in the context of artificial environments. Affordances, as Gibson suggested (Gibson & Walker, 1984), define the opportunities for perception and action offered by the environment in the context of the individual’s capacities: they are things that one perceives directly (without the need of a mental representation process)."

(Zahorik & Jenison 1998).



Zahorik, P., & Jenison, R. L. (1998). Presence as being-in-the-world. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(1), 78–89.

"it is through inter-subjectivity that we are enabled to take a subjective stance and thus have a sense of presence."

 

Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 20/07/2021, 11:22

Discussing Libet's (1985) experiment. While we prefer to believe that we have willed our hand to rise, our intention, there is a precursor in the subconscious, the readiness potential, that can be measured using EEG and that precedes the hand movement and the reported time at which subjects noted their intention to lift the hand. The conclusion is that intention (and thus free will?) is manufactured after the event. See also (Rosenberg 2018, p.99).



Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Rosenberg, A. (2018). How history gets things wrong: The neuroscience of our addiction to stories. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
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