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Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (2005). The culture industry: Enlightenment as mass deception. Retrieved August 28, 2019, from https://www.marxists.or ... 44/culture-industry.htm   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 29/08/2019, 15:09
"The blindness and dumbness of the data to which positivism reduces the world pass over into language itself"
"Real life is becoming indistinguishable from the movies. The sound film, far surpassing the theatre of illusion, leaves no room for imagination or reflection on the part of the audience, who is unable to respond within the structure of the film, yet deviate from its precise detail without losing the thread of the story; hence the film forces its victims to equate it directly with reality."
Byrne, R. M. J. (2007). The rational imagination: How people create alternatives to reality. Cambridge: The MIT Press. (Original work published 2005).   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/08/2011, 04:49
The similarities in imaginative scenarios suggest "that there are "joints" in reality, junctures that attract everyone's attention."
"people tend to change unusual events to make them more normal."
Campbell, D. T. (1974). Evolutionary epistemology. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper Vol. XIV Book 1, (pp. 413–463). La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/11/2018, 13:15
"Perceived solidity is not illusory for its ordinary uses: what it diagnoses is one of the "surfaces" modern physics also describes. But when reified as exclusive, when creating expectations of opaqueness and impermeability to all types of probes, it becomes illusory."
"Biological theories of evolution [...] are profoundly committed to an organism-environment dualism, which when extended into the evolution of sense organ, perceptual and learning functions, becomes a dualism of an organism's knowledge of the environment versus the environment itself."
Chion, M. (1994). Audio-vision: Sound on screen. C. Gorbman, Trans. New York: Columbia University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 07/06/2021, 08:48
"Of two war reports that come back from a very real war, the one in which the image is shaky and rough, with uneven focus and other "mistakes," will seem more true than the one with impeccable framing, perfect visibility, and imperceptible grain. In much the same way for sound, the impression of realism is often tied to a feeling of discomfort, of an uneven signal, of interference and microphone noise, etc."
Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 4(2), 503–522.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/06/2023, 14:37
"Take the idea of telepresence, for instance, which was strange and new when described by Howard Rheingold back in 1991."
"Interfaces in standard VR can be viewed as modes of coupling with the (virtual) environment that transform an already existing sensed-embodiment. To put this another way, in the original context presence is assumed (perhaps as produced by unconscious neural mechanisms) and then, through an interactive interface, presence is "projected" into a virtual world."
As an example of presentational virtualism: "But in dreams, our sense of presence assuming we have such     can only be explained by the "projections" of the brain. In essence, Revonsuo is arguing that, as presence can be experienced in the absence of dynamic world coupling, such coupling cannot be necessary for (the experience of) presence. His conclusion is that being-in-the-world, and the experience of presence even in normal configurations, is virtual."
"In its unelaborated form, presentational virtualism faces several traditional problems. First, the position is internalist to an extent that appears to put us radically out of touch with the world, in familiar ways. For those acquainted with the history of the philosophy of perception, it is hard to resist seeing this kind of virtualism as an old, discredited theory of perception — the indirect theory — in modern technological guise. On this picture, virtualism is advocating that: (1) when we are dreaming there is no further reality beyond the virtual, dreamed reality for our experiences to be of, so they are of the virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute that virtual world; and therefore, in the same way, (2) when we are not dreaming, our experiences are not of a further, external world to which we have no access, but are again of virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute a virtual world (those created by the neural "interface", which is the same, after all as the "interface" in operation during dreaming) that we merely take to be an actual world."
"The key components of the sophisticated presentationalist view are crucially disanalogous with what is going on in the use of virtual reality technology. When we use such technology, we exercise the very same perceptual processes when we are wearing the VR gear as when we are not."
"VR technology parasitizes the pre-existing, biologically endowed (in our case) sensory capacities of an autonomous subject to create an experience of a virtual world, a world whose virtuality is defined relative to the actuality of the world made available by the preexisting sensory system."
"the virtualist is asking us to simultaneously employ the VR metaphor and ignore an essential, ineliminable feature
of the source (the use of VR technology by a pre-existing subject) while doing so. For this reason the metaphor (at least in its presentational virtualist form) fails in its attempt to portray a coherent, alternative conception of mind and experience."
Enactive virtualism (after Noë description of perceptual presence): "when we perceive an object, we are only really (occurrently) sensorially in touch with a small part of what we perceive or see, but nevertheless the whole object is perceptually (but virtually) present to us."
"How is sensory contact actualized in such a way that perceptual experience is generated?
      This actualization process happens, in all versions of Noë's theory, through acting. Put slightly differently, and in the terminology that Noë favors, perceptual content is given through occurrent deployment of our mastery of sensorimotor dependencies (originally contingencies [...]; that is, very roughly, the way that sensory information follows or frustrates our expectations that arises out of our mastery of sensorimotor flow. Perceptual presence on this analysis arises because of the mastery of dependencies we acquire as we move around and interact with objects. Perceptual presence for Noë is to be explained, like perceptual content itself, from our mastery of the laws of sensorimotor dependence."
"For Noë, perception is actional or enactive but is also in a certain sense projected. What we experience is not what is simply given in our occurrent sensorimotor contact but what is somehow generated in that contact. Perceptual content is generated because we are constantly in touch with the world."
"presentational virtualism holds that that the content of our experiences is virtual and perception is, in an important sense, similar to hallucination because it is ultimately internal perceptual vehicles that we perceive rather than the external worldly objects they represent. In contrast, enactive representationalism sees us as being in deep contact with the world, but at the "price" of conceiving of our representational systems as partly composed by the world. We have seen that the former trades on di±culties with the metaphor of virtuality itself while the latter tends to commit us to problematic views: either the Grand Illusion or the idea that external world contributes to perceptual content independently of our sensory contact with it."
Crawford, C. (1997). The art of computer game design. Retrieved January 28, 2008, from http://www.vancouver.ws ... ame-book/Coverpage.html   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 29/01/2008, 11:26
"...a game is a closed formal system that subjectively represents a subset of reality."
Damasio, A. (2006). Descartes' error. Revised ed. London: Vintage. (Original work published 1994).   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/05/2012, 09:04
"We do not know, and it is improbable that we will ever know, what "absolute" reality is like."
Dick, P. K. (1978). How to build a universe that doesn't fall apart two days later. Retrieved January 6, 2008, from http://deoxy.org/pkd_how2build.htm   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/01/2008, 08:25
"Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away."
Doane, M. A. (1980). Ideology and the practice of sound editing and mixing. In T. de Lauretis & S. Heath (Eds), The Cinematic Apparatus (pp. 47–56). London: Macmillan.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/06/2023, 14:41
"The ineffable, intangible quality of sound requires that it be placed on the side of the emotional or the intuitive. If the ideology of the visible demands that the spectator understand the image as a truthful representation of reality, the ideology of the audible demands that there exist simultaneously a different truth and another order of reality for the subject to grasp."
Ekman, I. 2005, Meaningful noise: Understanding sound effects in computer games. Paper presented at Digital Arts and Cultures, Kopenhagen.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 14/10/2008, 01:21
To be diegetic, game sound must be considered real in the context of the story.
A game sound that is a diegetic referent, references or signifies something real inside the game.
Eliot, T. S. (1936). Burnt Norton. In Four Quartets.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 28/03/2020, 08:24
"human kind
Cannot bear very much reality."
Erlmann, V. (2000). Reason and resonance: A history of modern aurality. New York: Zone Books.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/02/2024, 08:01
Summarizing from Ernst Mach's (1838 - 1916) unpublished diaries, "physics, physiology, and psychology are part of a single field of knowledge in which "reality" is but a conglomeration of "sensational elements".
Evans, D. (2001). Emotion: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 28/05/2011, 07:52
Remembering is never precise because items in memory are not recorded in their fine details. They are filed under keywords; these are extrcted and "educated guesswork" fills in the blanks. "It is more like reconstrcuting an antique pot from a few broken shards than replaying an old movie" (p.80).
If consciousness depends on the capacity for subjective feelings and subjective feeling depend on the form of body one has, computer programs will always lack consciousness if they remain virtual. Hence 'evolutionary robotics' and 'embodied programs'.
Flach, J. M., & Holden, J. G. (1998). The reality of experience: Gibson's way. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(1), 90–95.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:21
Re Gibson, "action takes precedence. The experience depends more on what can be "done" than on the quality of visual or acoustic images."
"in the design of experiences in virtual environments the constraints on action take precedence over the constraints on perception."
"the reality of experience (i.e. presence or immersion)."
Ihde, D. (2007). Listening and voice: Phenomenologies of sound. 2nd ed. Albany (NY): State University of New York Press. (Original work published 1976).   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 12/12/2023, 16:38
In Heideggerian terms, Ihde describes the auditory horizon as the point at which sounds are given over into the present. Sound is a giving and listening is what "lets come into presence the unbidden giving of sound."
In describing visual depth and horizonal perspective, Ihde says the latter has "a constant ratio of present to hidden, of visible to invisible" and that, auditorily, "this hidden depth is silence"
Kracauer, S. (1960). Dialogue and sound. Retrieved February 19, 2020, from https://ifsstech.files. ... siegfried_kracauer1.pdf   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/09/2021, 10:23
"...localizable sounds do not as a rule touch off conceptual reasoning, language-bound thought; rather, they share with unidentifiable noises the quality of bringing the material aspects of reality into focus."
Lee, K. M. (2004). Presence, explicated. Communication Theory, 14(1), 27–50.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/07/2021, 07:58
 "The term actual simply means that something can potentially be experienced by human sensory systems without using technology. It does not require the existence of something independent of human mentality; instead, it requires only the possibility of experiencing something without using any human-made technology. Therefore, the categorization of objects according to virtual and actual criteria is not concerned with the validity of rationalistic assumption that the subjective mental world exists independent of an objective physical world (the assumption behind cogito ergo sum). Nor does the categorization succumb to solipsism, which denies the existence of any objective reality and maintains only purely subjective reality, because it acknowledges the existence of actual objects independent of subjective reality [...] Real experience is the sensory experience of actual objects. Hallucination is the nonsensory experience of imaginary objects. Virtual experience is the sensory or nonsensory experience of virtual (either para-authentic or artificial) objects. Presence research is about virtual experience and has nothing to do with real experience of hallucination"
Lee, K. M. (2004). Why presence occurs: Evolutionary psychology, media equation, and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 13(4), 494–505.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/11/2018, 11:30
Asks "why humans usually do not notice the virtuality of incoming stimuli and feel presence with little mental effort."
"Humans are psychologically compelled to believe in relatively stable cause-effect structures in the world, even though they are not a perfect reflection of reality."
A lack of knowledge of cause-effect structures poses a survival threat.
Noting that, despite knowing that virtual objects and effects are not real, "people keep using their old brains" and so their first reaction is to treat virtuality as real.
Discussing the reason why high fidelity of image is not necessary to presence – much of what we see is actually from peripheral vision and thus out of focus.
Lessiter, J., Freeman, J., Keogh, E., & Davidoff, J. (2001). A cross-media presence questionnaire: The ITC-sense of presence inventory. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 10(3), 282–297.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:19

"Draper et al. (1998) define telepresence as “the perception of presence within a physically remote or simulated site,” which suggests, de facto, that presence is a valid construct in relation to experience of the real (physical) world. This is a contentious issue, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is our view that presence is a more useful concept when it is limited to the study of users’ experiences of mediated presentations. Real-world experience can be adequately described in terms of more traditional psychological constructs: such as attention, involvement, and arousal, to name but a few. There seems little to gain from describing people’s everyday experience in terms of presence [...] At the very least, though, real-world experience is useful to presence research insofar as it serves as a benchmark, or standard, against which to subjectively judge levels of presence in mediated environments."

Draper, J. V., Kaber, D. B., & Usher, J. M. (1998). Telepresence. Human Factors, 40, 354 –375.

Lévy, P. (1998). Becoming virtual: Reality in the digital age. R. Bononno, Trans. London: Plenum Trade.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/06/2006, 13:19
Reminds us that the word 'virtual' (from the Latin virtus meaning strength or power but also virtue) is used by philosophers to signify something with "potential rather than actual existence." Points out that "the virtual should not be compared with the real but with the actual, for virtuality and actuality are merely two different ways of being."
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