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Brainard, F. S. (1997). Reality and mystical experience. Unpublished PhD thesis, Temple University.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/09/2020, 15:05
"'presence' is perhaps more accurately thought of as a verb than a noun. It is rather the process that manifests — 'presences' — properties."
"Humans presence those things particular to human beings — languages, political borders, artifacts, and so on. Animals presence what is particular to their own natures. So do plants. And matter presences material publicities. Presencing taken as a noun — as a presence — is thus a spatiotemporal site of publicity instantiation. Since in this schema, all publicity, even material regularities, originate with awarenesses, a presence may also be characterized as a site for the publicity producing activity of awarenesses."
"presence is defined as that which when conjoined to publicity yields a particular. It may also be defined as the process (verb) that renders publicity to be a particular [...] presence in this project also means the fact or condition of being manifest to or by awarenesses"
"a particular is a singular instantiation, thus an individual"
"The term 'publicity', derived from the word 'public', already exists in epistemology and refers to that which is the same for a group of knowing subjects — that which is singular for a plurality of awarenesses."
"awareness applies not just to a capability or to a receptive 'knowing', but also to intention and action as well [...] awareness applies not just to sentient agencies but also to certain non-sentient ones (i.e., the maintenance of physical regularities by matter). In this schema, awareness is defined on the basis of its roles in the definitions for publicity and presence. In the case of publicity, it names that which originates and maintains publicity, regardless of any other considerations."
"presence is not, itself a publicity [...] description is never the presence itself; it only refers to presence."
Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 4(2), 503–522.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/06/2023, 14:37
"Take the idea of telepresence, for instance, which was strange and new when described by Howard Rheingold back in 1991."
"Interfaces in standard VR can be viewed as modes of coupling with the (virtual) environment that transform an already existing sensed-embodiment. To put this another way, in the original context presence is assumed (perhaps as produced by unconscious neural mechanisms) and then, through an interactive interface, presence is "projected" into a virtual world."
As an example of presentational virtualism: "But in dreams, our sense of presence assuming we have such     can only be explained by the "projections" of the brain. In essence, Revonsuo is arguing that, as presence can be experienced in the absence of dynamic world coupling, such coupling cannot be necessary for (the experience of) presence. His conclusion is that being-in-the-world, and the experience of presence even in normal configurations, is virtual."
"In its unelaborated form, presentational virtualism faces several traditional problems. First, the position is internalist to an extent that appears to put us radically out of touch with the world, in familiar ways. For those acquainted with the history of the philosophy of perception, it is hard to resist seeing this kind of virtualism as an old, discredited theory of perception — the indirect theory — in modern technological guise. On this picture, virtualism is advocating that: (1) when we are dreaming there is no further reality beyond the virtual, dreamed reality for our experiences to be of, so they are of the virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute that virtual world; and therefore, in the same way, (2) when we are not dreaming, our experiences are not of a further, external world to which we have no access, but are again of virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute a virtual world (those created by the neural "interface", which is the same, after all as the "interface" in operation during dreaming) that we merely take to be an actual world."
"The key components of the sophisticated presentationalist view are crucially disanalogous with what is going on in the use of virtual reality technology. When we use such technology, we exercise the very same perceptual processes when we are wearing the VR gear as when we are not."
"VR technology parasitizes the pre-existing, biologically endowed (in our case) sensory capacities of an autonomous subject to create an experience of a virtual world, a world whose virtuality is defined relative to the actuality of the world made available by the preexisting sensory system."
"the virtualist is asking us to simultaneously employ the VR metaphor and ignore an essential, ineliminable feature
of the source (the use of VR technology by a pre-existing subject) while doing so. For this reason the metaphor (at least in its presentational virtualist form) fails in its attempt to portray a coherent, alternative conception of mind and experience."
Enactive virtualism (after Noë description of perceptual presence): "when we perceive an object, we are only really (occurrently) sensorially in touch with a small part of what we perceive or see, but nevertheless the whole object is perceptually (but virtually) present to us."
"How is sensory contact actualized in such a way that perceptual experience is generated?
      This actualization process happens, in all versions of Noë's theory, through acting. Put slightly differently, and in the terminology that Noë favors, perceptual content is given through occurrent deployment of our mastery of sensorimotor dependencies (originally contingencies [...]; that is, very roughly, the way that sensory information follows or frustrates our expectations that arises out of our mastery of sensorimotor flow. Perceptual presence on this analysis arises because of the mastery of dependencies we acquire as we move around and interact with objects. Perceptual presence for Noë is to be explained, like perceptual content itself, from our mastery of the laws of sensorimotor dependence."
"For Noë, perception is actional or enactive but is also in a certain sense projected. What we experience is not what is simply given in our occurrent sensorimotor contact but what is somehow generated in that contact. Perceptual content is generated because we are constantly in touch with the world."
"presentational virtualism holds that that the content of our experiences is virtual and perception is, in an important sense, similar to hallucination because it is ultimately internal perceptual vehicles that we perceive rather than the external worldly objects they represent. In contrast, enactive representationalism sees us as being in deep contact with the world, but at the "price" of conceiving of our representational systems as partly composed by the world. We have seen that the former trades on di±culties with the metaphor of virtuality itself while the latter tends to commit us to problematic views: either the Grand Illusion or the idea that external world contributes to perceptual content independently of our sensory contact with it."
Droumeva, M. (2011). An acoustic communication framework for game sound: Fidelity, verisimilitude, ecology. In M. Grimshaw (Ed.), Game sound technology and player interaction: concepts and developments (pp. 131–152). Hershey (PA): IGI.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 30/05/2021, 07:59
"Fidelity reflects the development of sound in games from a technological perspective while verisimilitude reflects the cultural emergence of authenticity, immersion and suspension of disbelief in cinema"
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/12/2023, 12:24
"by 'Reality' we understand a Being with the character of Dasein."
Hutcheon, P. D. (1972). Value theory: Towards conceptual clarification. The British Journal of Sociology, 23(2), 172–187.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/05/2021, 16:33
"The myth of the possibility of 'objectively' documenting reality, so unquestioningly accepted by sociologists anxious to achieve 'scientific' status, seems now to have spread to a majority of those involved in the humanities and the arts. The fetish of realism-too often manifested as a detailed portrayal of pathology in the name of the whole truth-is widely indulged in by the very 'creative' intellectuals who scorn the social scientists for their conformist scientism."
"American sociology has tended to develop in isolation from the humanities, and in the form of a highly specialized technique rather than as a broad, philosophically and historically sophisticated perspective for the study of man. This may have been due as much to the trend toward professionalization and kingdom building in academic life as to the widespread acceptance of the philosophical assumptions of Weberian neopositivism. The establishment of separate departments in universities no doubt encouraged competition among the social sciences for funds, students, and better means of sharpening data-manipulating techniques. It is easy to see how values, with their notorious resistance to precise measurement, might be assigned low priority in this situation."
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2014). Phenomenology of perception. D. A. Landes, Trans. New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1945).   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/01/2024, 07:05
"if, as Husserl suggests, I stand in wonder before the world and cease to be complicit with it . . . when I want to express myself . . . I enter back into the implicit, that is, into the equivocal and the play of the world. The absolute contact of myself with myself, or the identity of being and appearing, canno be posited, but merely lived prior to all affirmation."
"A truth against the background of absurdity, and an absurdity that the teleology of consciousness presumes to be able to convert into a truth, this is the originary phenomenon. To say that, in consciousness, appearance and reality are one, or to say that they are separated, is to render impossible the consciousness of anything, even its appearance."
Using the variability of size perception as the exemplar (size is not a quality of the thing because size varies according to distance to the perceiver, and because I can adjust the perception of size according to my knowledge of how close or how distant the thing is from me): "Reality is not one privileged appearance that would remain beneath the others; it is the framework of relations to which all appearances conform."
In a discussion of reality and perception of size: "The distance between me and the object is not a size that increases or decreases, but rather a tension that oscillates around a norm."
Discussing the phnomenon of the body and the phenomenon of the thing in an extended discussion of size and distance in the experience of reality: "if we want to describe these two phenomena, then we must say that my experience opens onto things and transcends itself in them because it always accomplishes itself within the framework of a certain arrangement with regard to the world that is the definition of my body. Sizes and forms only serve to "modalize" this overall hold upon the world. The thing is large if my gaze cannot encompass it, small if it does so easily, and medium sizes are distinguished from each other insofar as they, at an equal distance, more or less widen my gaze, or insofar as they, at unequal distances, widen it equally."
"We now discover the core of reality: a thing is a thing because, no matter what it says to us, it says it through the very organization of its sensible appearances. The "real" is this milieu where each moment is not only inseparable from the others, but in some sense synonymous with them, where the "appearances" signify each other in an absolute equivalence. The "real" is the insurmountable plenitude: it is impossible to describe fully the color of a carpet without saying that it is a carpet, or a woolen carpet, and without implying in this color a certain tactile value, a certain weight, and a certain resistance to sound. The thing is this manner of being in which the complete definition of of an attribute demands that of the entire subject, and where, consequently, its sense is indistinguishable from its total appearance."
"The perceived is and remains, despite all critical training, beneath the level of doubt and demonstration. The sun "rises" for the scientist just as much as it does for the uneducated person, and our scientific representations of the solar system remain merely so many rumors, like the lunar landscapes — we never believe in them in the sense in which we believe in the rising of the sun. The rising of the sun, and the perceived in general, is "real" — we immediately assign it to the world. Each perception, although always potentially "crossed out" and pushed over to the realm of illusions, only disappears in order to leave a place for another perception that corrects it. . .  To wonder if the world is real is to fail to understand what one is saying, since the world is not a sum of things that one could always cast into doubt, but precisely the inexhaustible reservoir from which all things are drawn."
Mori, S., Ikeda, S., & Saito, H. (2017). A survey of diminished reality: Techniques for visually concealing, eliminating, and seeing through real objects. IPSJ Transactions on Computer Vision and Applications, 9.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 25/03/2020, 08:35
"methods for visually removing objects have been considered one DR methodology."
Four methods for achieving DR:
  • Diminish degrading aspects of the image such as the colour saturation or sharpness
  • See-through replace part of the image with the background that would be seen were that image part not present
  • Replace replace part of the real image with a virtual image
  • Inpaint similar to see-through but the replacement image is generated from the surrounding parts.

 

Superficial mention in a few sentences at the end of the possibility of removing sound waves as a route to DR.
Acknowledges the negative connotations of the word 'diminish.'
Prior, A. N. (1972). The notion of the present. In J. T. Fraser, F. C. Haber & G. H. Müller (Eds), The Study of Time: Proceedings of the First Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time Oberwolfach (Black Forest) --- West Germany (pp. 320–323). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg.   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 16/03/2023, 16:10
For Prior, the present and the real are the same concept: "the present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular species of unreality, namely the past and the future."
"the presentness of an event is just the event" and, regarding a lecture, "its pastness is its present pastness, so that although [the] lecture isn't now present and isn't real, isn't a fact, nevertheless its pastness, its having taken place, is a present fact, is a reality, and will be one as long as time shall last."
Prior deals with an objection the special theory of relativity might have to his conception of present and reality with the example of a pulsating celestial body where we know observed pulsations actually happened a long time ago:

"We have just observed one of these pulsations, and as the body is a very distant one, we know that the pulsation we are observing happened some time ago. We now consider the pulsation immediately after the one we are observing, and we ask whether this next pulsation, although we won't of course observe it for a while, is in fact going on right now, or is really still to come, or has occurred already. On the view of presentness which I have been suggesting, this is always a sensible question. At least if there are to be any further pulsation at all, then either the body is pulsating, or it is not the case but will be the case that it is pulsating or it is not the case but has been the case that it is pulsating. The difference between pulsating — really and actually pulsating — and merely having pulsated or being about to pulsate, is as clear and comprehensible a difference as any that we can think of, being but one facet of the great gulf that separates the real from the unreal, what is from what is not. Just this, however, is what the special theory of relativity appears to deny. If the distant body is having its nth pulsation as we perceive it having its n-1th — is pulsating, and not merely has been or will be pulsating — then the nth pulsation and the perception of the n-1th are simultaneous; not just simultaneous from such and such a point of view or in such and such a frame of reference, but simultaneous. And according to the special theory of relativity, such "absolute" simultaneity is in many cases just not to be had.

One possible reaction to this situation, which to my mind is perfectly respectable though it isn't very fashionable, is to insist that all that physics has shown to be true or likely is that in some cases we can never know, we can never physically find out, whether something is actually happening or merely has happened or will happen."

Prior makes the case that the natural sciences have expunged tenses and that their language is a tenseless one, without a conception of past, present, or future; rather events might be earlier or later than other events. "Whether the events are the case or merely have been or will be, is of no concern to the scientist, so he uses a language in which the the difference between being and having been abd being about to be is inexpressible."
Saint Augustine. (2002). The confessions of St Augustine. E. B. Pusey, Trans. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published 401).   
Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/07/2020, 09:22
"What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past are. Nor is it properly said, "there be three times, past, present, and to come": yet perchance it might be properly said, "there be three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future." For these three do exist in some sort, in the soul, but otherwhere do I not see them; present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation. If thus we be permitted to speak, I see three times, and I confess there are three."
Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 20/07/2021, 11:22

Discussing Libet's (1985) experiment. While we prefer to believe that we have willed our hand to rise, our intention, there is a precursor in the subconscious, the readiness potential, that can be measured using EEG and that precedes the hand movement and the reported time at which subjects noted their intention to lift the hand. The conclusion is that intention (and thus free will?) is manufactured after the event. See also (Rosenberg 2018, p.99).



Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Rosenberg, A. (2018). How history gets things wrong: The neuroscience of our addiction to stories. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
"The different information coming in from our senses, visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory sensations are processed in different regions of the brain. They have to travel different distances [...] and arrive at different times. The processing speed for different kinds of sensory information varies; visual stimuli take longer to process than other stimuli. (The difference is about 40 milliseconds. [...]) On the other hand, light travels much faster than sound. Putting together these different speeds means that sights and sounds from about 10 metres away are available to consciousness at about the same time; for everything closer or further away information about its sight or sound arrives at different times. In these cases, the apparent simultaneity of, for example, hearing a voice and seeing the speaker's lips move has to be constructed by our brain."

Detailing a set of experiments by Libet helping to explain how our brain builds a consciousness of the present and the time delay involved.

  • Stimulating the brain directly, an electrical impulse must be applied for at least 500 milliseconds to produce a perception (see, for example Libet 1985). Shorter impulses had no effect neither did increasing the intensity (with shorter times). Sensation can be detected by the brain within 500msecs but the subject is not consciously aware of it (e.g. we can react 'instinctively').
  • Stimulate the skin then, 200 milliseconds after, stimulate the brain – the skin stimulation is not perceived but is masked by the brain stimulation. The brain edits past events to give an impression of the 'present'.
  • Stimulate the brain then, 200 milliseconds later, stimulate the skin. Brian stimulus is perceived after about 500msecs but the skin stimulus is perceived as being before the brain stimulus. A temporal reordering: "There is no guarantee that the order in which we perceive events actually corresponds to the order of their occurrence" (Westerhoff 2011, p.100).



Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8(4), 529–566.
Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, A. Aesthesis and perceptronium: On the entanglement of sensation, cognition, and matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/11/2021, 12:12
"The pre-Socratics, notably Parmenides, founded philosophy as an exercise in the mistrust of experience. The history of knowledge reads as a progressive questioning of previous assumptions about reality. From the depths of our organismic origins, evolution committed us to an unexamined naïve realism: as organism, we have to believe that this event follows that one; we have to trace effects to their causes in order to survive for any length of time in the environment, in order to escape our predators and obtains means of sustenance. But the philosophical attitude and the scientific reason that is its extension derive from a critique of these evolutionarily conditioned assumptions about reality."
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