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Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist representation. 4(2), 503–522. 
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (6/19/22, 10:59 AM)   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (6/24/22, 10:06 AM)
Resource type: Journal Article
Peer reviewed
DOI: 10.1142/S179384301240029X
BibTeX citation key: Clowes2012
View all bibliographic details
Categories: General
Keywords: Presence, Realism, Reality, Reality/Virtuality/Actuality, Virtuality
Creators: Chrisley, Clowes
Publisher: World Scientific
Views: 6/6
Abstract
"This paper seeks to identify, clarify, and perhaps rehabilitate the virtual reality metaphor as applied to the goal of understanding consciousness. Some proponents of the metaphor apply it in a way that implies a representational view of experience of a particular, extreme form that is indirect, internal and inactive (what we call "presentational virtualism"). In opposition to this is an application of the metaphor that eschews representation, instead preferring to view experience as direct, external and enactive ("enactive virtualism"). This paper seeks to examine some of the strengths and weaknesses of these virtuality-based positions in order to assist the development of a related, but independent view of experience: virtualist representationalism. Like presentational virtualism, this third view is representational, but like enactive virtualism, it places action centre stage, and does not require, in accounting for the richness of visual experience, global representational "snapshots" corresponding to the entire visual field to be tokened at any one time."
  
Notes
Journal now known as Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness (2020 Vol. 7 Issue 1 onwards)
  
Quotes
p.504   "Take the idea of telepresence, for instance, which was strange and new when described by Howard Rheingold back in 1991."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality Telepresence
p.506   "Interfaces in standard VR can be viewed as modes of coupling with the (virtual) environment that transform an already existing sensed-embodiment. To put this another way, in the original context presence is assumed (perhaps as produced by unconscious neural mechanisms) and then, through an interactive interface, presence is "projected" into a virtual world."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.508   As an example of presentational virtualism: "But in dreams, our sense of presence assuming we have such     can only be explained by the "projections" of the brain. In essence, Revonsuo is arguing that, as presence can be experienced in the absence of dynamic world coupling, such coupling cannot be necessary for (the experience of) presence. His conclusion is that being-in-the-world, and the experience of presence even in normal configurations, is virtual."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.509   "In its unelaborated form, presentational virtualism faces several traditional problems. First, the position is internalist to an extent that appears to put us radically out of touch with the world, in familiar ways. For those acquainted with the history of the philosophy of perception, it is hard to resist seeing this kind of virtualism as an old, discredited theory of perception — the indirect theory — in modern technological guise. On this picture, virtualism is advocating that: (1) when we are dreaming there is no further reality beyond the virtual, dreamed reality for our experiences to be of, so they are of the virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute that virtual world; and therefore, in the same way, (2) when we are not dreaming, our experiences are not of a further, external world to which we have no access, but are again of virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute a virtual world (those created by the neural "interface", which is the same, after all as the "interface" in operation during dreaming) that we merely take to be an actual world."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.511   "The key components of the sophisticated presentationalist view are crucially disanalogous with what is going on in the use of virtual reality technology. When we use such technology, we exercise the very same perceptual processes when we are wearing the VR gear as when we are not."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.512   "VR technology parasitizes the pre-existing, biologically endowed (in our case) sensory capacities of an autonomous subject to create an experience of a virtual world, a world whose virtuality is defined relative to the actuality of the world made available by the preexisting sensory system."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.512   "the virtualist is asking us to simultaneously employ the VR metaphor and ignore an essential, ineliminable feature
of the source (the use of VR technology by a pre-existing subject) while doing so. For this reason the metaphor (at least in its presentational virtualist form) fails in its attempt to portray a coherent, alternative conception of mind and experience."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.513   Enactive virtualism (after Noë description of perceptual presence): "when we perceive an object, we are only really (occurrently) sensorially in touch with a small part of what we perceive or see, but nevertheless the whole object is perceptually (but virtually) present to us."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.514   "How is sensory contact actualized in such a way that perceptual experience is generated?
      This actualization process happens, in all versions of Noë's theory, through acting. Put slightly differently, and in the terminology that Noë favors, perceptual content is given through occurrent deployment of our mastery of sensorimotor dependencies (originally contingencies [...]; that is, very roughly, the way that sensory information follows or frustrates our expectations that arises out of our mastery of sensorimotor flow. Perceptual presence on this analysis arises because of the mastery of dependencies we acquire as we move around and interact with objects. Perceptual presence for Noë is to be explained, like perceptual content itself, from our mastery of the laws of sensorimotor dependence."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.514   "For Noë, perception is actional or enactive but is also in a certain sense projected. What we experience is not what is simply given in our occurrent sensorimotor contact but what is somehow generated in that contact. Perceptual content is generated because we are constantly in touch with the world."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
p.520   "presentational virtualism holds that that the content of our experiences is virtual and perception is, in an important sense, similar to hallucination because it is ultimately internal perceptual vehicles that we perceive rather than the external worldly objects they represent. In contrast, enactive representationalism sees us as being in deep contact with the world, but at the "price" of conceiving of our representational systems as partly composed by the world. We have seen that the former trades on di±culties with the metaphor of virtuality itself while the latter tends to commit us to problematic views: either the Grand Illusion or the idea that external world contributes to perceptual content independently of our sensory contact with it."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Presence Realism Reality Reality/Virtuality/Actuality Virtuality
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