Sound Research WIKINDX
Sound Research WIKINDX |
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Displaying 1 - 20 of 28 Parameters |
| Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (2005). The culture industry: Enlightenment as mass deception. Retrieved August 28, 2019, from https://www.marxists.or ... 44/culture-industry.htm |
  
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 29/08/2019, 15:09 | |
| "The blindness and dumbness of the data to which positivism reduces the world pass over into language itself" | |
| "Real life is becoming indistinguishable from the movies. The sound film, far surpassing the theatre of illusion, leaves no room for imagination or reflection on the part of the audience, who is unable to respond within the structure of the film, yet deviate from its precise detail without losing the thread of the story; hence the film forces its victims to equate it directly with reality." | |
| Byrne, R. M. J. (2007). The rational imagination: How people create alternatives to reality. Cambridge: The MIT Press. (Original work published 2005). |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/08/2011, 04:49 | |
| "Inventions of new instances of a category appear to be structured by existing conceptual knowledge." | |
| "One of the more surprising aspects of counterfactual imagination is that there are remarkable similiarities in what everyone imagines." | |
| The similarities in imaginative scenarios suggest "that there are "joints" in reality, junctures that attract everyone's attention." | |
| "people tend to change unusual events to make them more normal." | |
| "A counterfactual conditional [using the subjunctive mood] such as "if only he had been handsome, I would have married him" evokes two possibilities, an imaginary possibility in which the man is handsome and the speaker marries him, and a reality in which the man was not and she did not." | |
| "The negative counterfactual seems to propose that its antecedent is fake." The example Byrne uses is "if Oswald had not killed Kennedy then someone else would have." The presupposition, or antecedent, is that Oswald had killed Kennedy; the negative counterfactual proposes otherwise. | |
| "to think counterfactually is to think causally" (p.6). Byrne traces such thinking to Hume and Mill but counterfactual and causal thoughts are sometimes divergent. e.g. Taxi driver refuses ride to couple who then take their own car. Taxi driver drives safely over bridge; shortly after, as the couple drive over it, the bridge collapses and kills them. The cause of the bridge collapsing was not the taxi driver's refusal yet people still blame the driver for the deaths. "If only he had given the couple a ride!" | |
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Discussing the number of possibilities people imagine/infer when given a proposition. 1. Conjunction -- A went to stables and rode S. (1 possibility.) 2. Bicondition -- If, and only if, A went to stables, she rode S. (2 possibilities.) 3. Conditional -- If A went to stables, she rode S. (3 possibilities.) |
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| Campbell, D. T. (1974). Evolutionary epistemology. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed), The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Vol. XIV Book 1, (pp. 413–463). La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/11/2018, 12:15 | |
| "Perceived solidity is not illusory for its ordinary uses: what it diagnoses is one of the "surfaces" modern physics also describes. But when reified as exclusive, when creating expectations of opaqueness and impermeability to all types of probes, it becomes illusory." | |
| "Biological theories of evolution [...] are profoundly committed to an organism-environment dualism, which when extended into the evolution of sense organ, perceptual and learning functions, becomes a dualism of an organism's knowledge of the environment versus the environment itself." | |
| Chalmers, D. J. (2017). The virtual and the real. Disputatio, 9(46), 309–352. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 03/05/2026, 01:18 | |
| Chalmers, D. J. (2022). Reality+: Virtual worlds and the problems of philosophy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/06/2022, 05:55 | |
| Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 4(2), 503–522. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/06/2023, 14:37 | |
| "Take the idea of telepresence, for instance, which was strange and new when described by Howard Rheingold back in 1991." | |
| "Interfaces in standard VR can be viewed as modes of coupling with the (virtual) environment that transform an already existing sensed-embodiment. To put this another way, in the original context presence is assumed (perhaps as produced by unconscious neural mechanisms) and then, through an interactive interface, presence is "projected" into a virtual world." | |
| As an example of presentational virtualism: "But in dreams, our sense of presence assuming we have such can only be explained by the "projections" of the brain. In essence, Revonsuo is arguing that, as presence can be experienced in the absence of dynamic world coupling, such coupling cannot be necessary for (the experience of) presence. His conclusion is that being-in-the-world, and the experience of presence even in normal configurations, is virtual." | |
| "In its unelaborated form, presentational virtualism faces several traditional problems. First, the position is internalist to an extent that appears to put us radically out of touch with the world, in familiar ways. For those acquainted with the history of the philosophy of perception, it is hard to resist seeing this kind of virtualism as an old, discredited theory of perception — the indirect theory — in modern technological guise. On this picture, virtualism is advocating that: (1) when we are dreaming there is no further reality beyond the virtual, dreamed reality for our experiences to be of, so they are of the virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute that virtual world; and therefore, in the same way, (2) when we are not dreaming, our experiences are not of a further, external world to which we have no access, but are again of virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute a virtual world (those created by the neural "interface", which is the same, after all as the "interface" in operation during dreaming) that we merely take to be an actual world." | |
| "The key components of the sophisticated presentationalist view are crucially disanalogous with what is going on in the use of virtual reality technology. When we use such technology, we exercise the very same perceptual processes when we are wearing the VR gear as when we are not." | |
| "VR technology parasitizes the pre-existing, biologically endowed (in our case) sensory capacities of an autonomous subject to create an experience of a virtual world, a world whose virtuality is defined relative to the actuality of the world made available by the preexisting sensory system." | |
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"the virtualist is asking us to simultaneously employ the VR metaphor and ignore an essential, ineliminable feature of the source (the use of VR technology by a pre-existing subject) while doing so. For this reason the metaphor (at least in its presentational virtualist form) fails in its attempt to portray a coherent, alternative conception of mind and experience." |
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| Enactive virtualism (after Noë description of perceptual presence): "when we perceive an object, we are only really (occurrently) sensorially in touch with a small part of what we perceive or see, but nevertheless the whole object is perceptually (but virtually) present to us." | |
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"How is sensory contact actualized in such a way that perceptual experience is generated? This actualization process happens, in all versions of Noë's theory, through acting. Put slightly differently, and in the terminology that Noë favors, perceptual content is given through occurrent deployment of our mastery of sensorimotor dependencies (originally contingencies [...]; that is, very roughly, the way that sensory information follows or frustrates our expectations that arises out of our mastery of sensorimotor flow. Perceptual presence on this analysis arises because of the mastery of dependencies we acquire as we move around and interact with objects. Perceptual presence for Noë is to be explained, like perceptual content itself, from our mastery of the laws of sensorimotor dependence." |
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| "For Noë, perception is actional or enactive but is also in a certain sense projected. What we experience is not what is simply given in our occurrent sensorimotor contact but what is somehow generated in that contact. Perceptual content is generated because we are constantly in touch with the world." | |
| "presentational virtualism holds that that the content of our experiences is virtual and perception is, in an important sense, similar to hallucination because it is ultimately internal perceptual vehicles that we perceive rather than the external worldly objects they represent. In contrast, enactive representationalism sees us as being in deep contact with the world, but at the "price" of conceiving of our representational systems as partly composed by the world. We have seen that the former trades on di±culties with the metaphor of virtuality itself while the latter tends to commit us to problematic views: either the Grand Illusion or the idea that external world contributes to perceptual content independently of our sensory contact with it." | |
| Dick, P. K. (1978). How to build a universe that doesn't fall apart two days later. Retrieved January 6, 2008, from http://deoxy.org/pkd_how2build.htm |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/01/2008, 07:25 | |
| "Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away." | |
| Eliot, T. S. (1936). Burnt Norton. In Four Quartets. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 28/03/2020, 07:24 | |
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"human kind Cannot bear very much reality." |
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| Flach, J. M., & Holden, J. G. (1998). The reality of experience: Gibson's way. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(1), 90–95. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:21 | |
| Re Gibson, "action takes precedence. The experience depends more on what can be "done" than on the quality of visual or acoustic images." | |
| "in the design of experiences in virtual environments the constraints on action take precedence over the constraints on perception." | |
| "the reality of experience (i.e. presence or immersion)." | |
| Garner, T. A., & Grimshaw, M. (2014). Sonic virtuality: Understanding audio in a virtual world. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 364–377). New York: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/01/2014, 11:55 | |
| Garner, T. A. (2019). Bridging the other-real: Video game sound and the imagination. In M. Grimshaw-Aagaard, M. Walther-Hansen & M. Knakkergaard (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Sound and Imagination. Vol. 1, (pp. 789–808). New York: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 19/05/2021, 09:14 | |
| Gilbert, S. B. (2016). Perceived realism of virtual environments depends on authenticity. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 25(4), 322–324. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/05/2021, 09:53 | |
| "While the perception of a virtual environment (VE) is usually described in terms of its level of immersion and users’ sense of presence, the construct of authenticity might be more useful. The authenticity of a VE depends on whether the affordances and simulations chosen in its implementation support (1) users’ expectations based on their Bayesian priors for regularities in the real world and (2) the users’ intentions in the VE . . . the term ‘‘authenticity’’ refers to whether the virtual environment provides the experience expected by the user, both consciously and unconsciously." | |
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"A VE with higher immersion, so the argument goes, should lead to higher fidelity, and generate a greater sense of presence, the subjective experience felt by the user. But if I put you in a highly immersive environment and give you badly designed content to experience, will you perceive the VE as realistic and experience presence? Probably not. What’s missing from this dichotomy of immersion (objective, system-focused) and presence (subjective, user-focused) is a computational theory about the extent to which the VE reflects the expected regularities of world that it is attempting to represent—its authenticity. Authenticity draws on two streams of thought: expectations and motivations." |
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"Authenticity’s second stream of thought comes from art historians and archaeologists who think carefully about the past, and who often seek to establish whether artifacts found in the present are authentic. While establishing an artifact’s date and place of origin might be a matter of objective fact, Lovata (2007) argues that these facts are simply nominal authenticity, and that a richer, more complex sense of authenticity is context dependent, and depends on the motivations of the observer." |
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"I suggest that immersion is the system-based factor that influences presence, and that authenticity is the human-based factor that influences presence" |
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| Grimshaw-Aagaard, M. (2024). Video game sound design and the fetish of realism. In W. Gibbons & M. Grimshaw-Aagaard (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Video Game Music and Sound. (pp. 861–874). New York: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/03/2024, 09:35 | |
| Janz, B. B. (2019). Virtual place and virtualized place. In E. Champion (Ed), The Phenomenology of Real and Virtual Places. (pp. 60–75). London: Routledge. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 03/05/2026, 01:24 | |
| Knakkergaard, M. (2014). The music that’s not there. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 392–404). New York: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/01/2014, 12:09 | |
| Latour, B. The powers of fac similes: A turing test on science and literature. Retrieved July 14, 2006, from http://www.ensmp.fr/~la ... %20TURING.html#_ftnref6 |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 14/07/2006, 13:45 | |
| Law, C. Urban Terror! GameSpy, Retrieved June 2, 2006, from http://archive.gamespy. ... ghts/urbanterror_a.shtm |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 02/06/2006, 07:33 | |
| Bot Killer: "Ever since we were kids we all have imagined what it would be like to be on an elite team of Navy Seals, or a deadly group of angry terrorists. Now with the power of id Software's Quake III engine, Silicon Ice Development will be capable of making a more realistic environment than anything ever seen before in a total conversion. Our goal is to make a fast pace, action packed, brand spankin' new, totally realistic, gore-covered, super mod." | |
| GottaBeKD: ""Urbanites" will get lost in the reality of it all. From the beautiful present day locations to the frighteningly real models, there will be tons of things working together to give our players that action fix that they all need." | |
| WU: "Urban Terror is a total conversion that aims to achieve the realistic sense of suspense and action that real life situations would provide. Although its primary inspiration is realism, we are not forgetting the community we are developing for." | |
| Dokta8: "The science fiction theme of Quake is replaced by conventional weapons and urban landscapes. Gameplay is also enhanced to add more detail and realism to the gaming experience. By enhanced I mean that there will be more to winning a round than simply fragging opponents with a rocket launcher as weapons respond differently when you are running or crouching, and at long or short ranges. Skill and strategy plays an increasingly important part in Urban Terror." | |
| Lee, K. M. (2004). Why presence occurs: Evolutionary psychology, media equation, and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 13(4), 494–505. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/11/2018, 10:30 | |
| Asks "why humans usually do not notice the virtuality of incoming stimuli and feel presence with little mental effort." | |
| "Humans are psychologically compelled to believe in relatively stable cause-effect structures in the world, even though they are not a perfect reflection of reality." | |
| Discusses humans' natural tendency to accept incoming stimuli as sourced from reality first and only then to reject after assessment – a suggestion as to why users accept technologically mediated stimuli as real (thus presence). | |
| Discussing the reason why high fidelity of image is not necessary to presence – much of what we see is actually from peripheral vision and thus out of focus. | |
| Noting that, despite knowing that virtual objects and effects are not real, "people keep using their old brains" and so their first reaction is to treat virtuality as real. | |
| A lack of knowledge of cause-effect structures poses a survival threat. | |
| Lévy, P. (1998). Becoming virtual: Reality in the digital age. R. Bononno, Trans. London: Plenum Trade. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/06/2006, 13:19 | |
| Reminds us that the word 'virtual' (from the Latin virtus meaning strength or power but also virtue) is used by philosophers to signify something with "potential rather than actual existence." Points out that "the virtual should not be compared with the real but with the actual, for virtuality and actuality are merely two different ways of being." | |
| Mantovani, G., & Riva, G. (1999). "Real" presence: How different ontologies generate different criteria for presence, telepresence, and virtual presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 8(5), 540–550. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/02/2022, 18:21 | |
| In combining ecological perception with cultural psychology, the authors explain the resolution of everyday ambiguity: "Culture is the device that human societies use to reduce the ambiguity intrinsic to everyday situations: the space in which actors' interests and environmental affordances meet is defined and shaped by the mediation exerted by artifacts [...] Ambiguity of everyday situations does not disappear, but it is made tractable by the presence of the cultural tools and by the social negotiations of the meaning of situations that these tools make possible. This can happen to the extent to which an (at least partially) shared frame of reference exists among the participants." | |
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Disputing Schloerb's (1995) "definition of objective presence as success in completing a task" the authors point out that it is possible to be present in an environment attempting to repair an engine but being unable to fix it. (Perhaps lacking the knowledge or tools to do so.) |