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Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide. Articificial Intelligence, 149, 91–130.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/02/2011, 06:55
"...having disconnected the form of a symbol from its meaning, cognitivism rules out the possibility of context-sensitive processing, and so requires formal rules to govern the transformation from one cognitive state to another."
Anderson critiques the AI framework 'sense-model-plan-act' (SMPA) as being insufficiently dynamic and not taking account of relevance. SMPA depends upon modelling an explicit representation of the world. How can one model for every potential situation and how does one decide which situations are relevant enough to be modelled as representations for future use?
Cognitivism derives from the Cartesian world view (that sensing and acting in the world does not require thinking -- the mind is separate from the body and this is what separates man and animals; man is capable of higher-level reasoning and abstraction). Cognitivism -- thinking is a manipulation of abstract symbols according to explicit rules. Three elements to cognitivism: representation, formalism and transformation. Representation requires symbols pertaining to "specific features or states of affairs", but it is the form of the symbol (not its meaning) "that is the basis of its rule-based transformation."
Anderson notes some critiques of embodied cognition including its disregard for representation. He paraphrases David Kirsh's list of situations where representation is required in order to act (including future planning, use of conceptualization and creative activities that are "stimulus free"). Anderson suggests a hybrid model should be sought.
Bondebjerg, I. (2017). The creative mind: Cognition, society and culture. Palgrave Communications, 3(19).
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 07/09/2025, 03:51
Byrne, R. M. J. (2007). The rational imagination: How people create alternatives to reality. Cambridge: The MIT Press. (Original work published 2005).
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/08/2011, 04:49
"Inventions of new instances of a category appear to be structured by existing conceptual knowledge."
"The negative counterfactual seems to propose that its antecedent is fake." The example Byrne uses is "if Oswald had not killed Kennedy then someone else would have." The presupposition, or antecedent, is that Oswald had killed Kennedy; the negative counterfactual proposes otherwise.
"A counterfactual conditional [using the subjunctive mood] such as "if only he had been handsome, I would have married him" evokes two possibilities, an imaginary possibility in which the man is handsome and the speaker marries him, and a reality in which the man was not and she did not."
"One of the more surprising aspects of counterfactual imagination is that there are remarkable similiarities in what everyone imagines."
The similarities in imaginative scenarios suggest "that there are "joints" in reality, junctures that attract everyone's attention."
"people tend to change unusual events to make them more normal."
Discussing the number of possibilities people imagine/infer when given a proposition. 1. Conjunction -- A went to stables and rode S. (1 possibility.) 2. Bicondition -- If, and only if, A went to stables, she rode S. (2 possibilities.) 3. Conditional -- If A went to stables, she rode S. (3 possibilities.)
"to think counterfactually is to think causally" (p.6). Byrne traces such thinking to Hume and Mill but counterfactual and causal thoughts are sometimes divergent. e.g. Taxi driver refuses ride to couple who then take their own car. Taxi driver drives safely over bridge; shortly after, as the couple drive over it, the bridge collapses and kills them. The cause of the bridge collapsing was not the taxi driver's refusal yet people still blame the driver for the deaths. "If only he had given the couple a ride!"
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 25/10/2019, 20:48
Dean, R. T., & Bailes, F. (2007). 'Human understanding' in imagining and organising sound: Some implications of John Locke's essay for ecological, cognitive and embodied approaches to composition. Organized Sound, 12(1), 89–95.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 25/12/2014, 10:01
Dijkstra, K., & Post, L. (2015). Mechanisms of embodiment. Frontiers in Psychology, Volume 6 - 2015.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/02/2026, 01:31
Gallese, V. (2016). The multimodal nature of visual perception: Facts and speculations. Gestalt Theory, 38(2/3), 127–140.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 29/09/2020, 10:35
Garner, T. A. (2013). Game sound from behind the sofa: An exploration into the fear potential of sound & psychophysiological approaches to audio-centric, adaptive gameplay. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Aalborg, Denmark.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 13/05/2013, 08:37
Gee, J. P. (2008). Video games and embodiment. Games and Culture, 3(3-4).
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/02/2017, 12:36
Goertzel, B. (2012). Post-embodied AI. Futurologia, Retrieved May 16, 2026, from https://www.divenire.org/stampa.asp?id=57
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: alexb44 26/08/2026, 11:46
Grimshaw, M., & Garner, T. (2014). Embodied virtual acoustic ecologies of computer games. In K. E. Collins, B. Kapralos & H. Tessler (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Interactive Audio. (pp. 181–195). New York: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 16/05/2014, 10:08
Grimshaw-Aagaard, M., & Bie, A. 2026, March 23–28, The problem of embodied Artificial Intelligence. Unpublished paper presented at Society for Phenomenology and Media 2026 Conference, Nagoya.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: alexb44 02/09/2026, 02:04
Ihde, D. (2010). Embodied technics. Automatic Press / VIP.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 16/05/2026, 07:33
Technological mediation: "every change in our newly magnified world is also a change in our embodied experience"
Ihde uses the example of the telescope for postphenomenology: "The telescope [...] is taken into my now extended and mediated bodily experience: (Human-instrument) > World phenomena"
Ihde explains "old fashioned" phenomenology as "a whole body experience of my immediate environment."
"To recognize that directed, intentional human experience can embody a technology is a first step towards a postphenomenology in that a material artifact can be taken into first person experience"
Notes that a 45,000 BC "bear bone flute" was found in Slovenia. Probably a flute and probably Neanderthal, it had 4 holes tuned in the diatonic scale.
Repeats the myth that the English longbow overcame the French crossbow at Agincourt. Most historians as well as the contemporary commentators agree that the French crossbowmen were not brought into play during the battle.
Kilteni, K., Groten, R., & Slater, M. (2012). The sense of embodiment in virtual reality. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 21(4), 373–387.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 16/10/2018, 09:48
Definition of sense of embodiment: "SoE toward a body B is the sense that emerges when B’s properties are processed as if they were the properties of one’s own biological body."
Loomis, J. M. (1992). Distal attribution and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 113–119.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:19
"presence and distal attribution beyond the limits of some extending device (probe, teleoperator, virtual display) are not fundamentally different phenomena. Rather, they differ only that true presence occurs when the sensory data support only the interpretation of being somewhere other than where the sense organs are located; whereas, distal attribution to a remote location occurs when the sensory data represent both the remote location and that device or linkage that connects the observer with that remote location."
"for vision and audition [...] the resulting perceptions are always mediate, never direct, for the central nervous system constructs what is perceived."
Externalization or distal attribution: "that most of our perceptual experience, though originating with stimulation of our sense organs, is referred to external space beyond the limits of our sensory organs."
There is a phenomenal world that can be divided into 'self' and 'nonself' – the physical self is closely tied to the phenomenal self but not necessarily (e.g. phantom limbs). Distal attribution is the process of identifying sensory experience with a phenomenally external space or the nonself. This identification (and thus distal attribution) results when afference (sensory input) is "lawfully related" to efference (motorsensory actions) – e.g. I do something and the sensory feedback I get accords with that action. Loomis hypothesizes that "attribution to self occurs when afference and efference are completely unrelated or independent."
In arguing that distal attribution re telepresence is most clearly felt when the operators have become skilled with the equipment, Loomis suggests that with regard to a lawful relationship between efference and afference, the operator must be able to model this relationship. This 'linkage' becomes transparent with experience and this leads to the externalization of the distal environment.
Acknowledging that the operator of a teleoperation system experiences sensory information from remote/simulated environment and physical environment and that this often conflicts, Loomis makes use of Polyani's notions of subsidiary awareness and focal awareness. Where sensory stimulation from the remote environment is insufficient for true presence, the operator experiences a subsidiary awareness of the physical environment and/or teleoperation system he/she is actually in/using despite a focal awareness of the remote environment. True telepresence is not possible as it is not possible to present the operator with precisely the same sensory stimulation they would receive were they to be actually in the remote environment.
Mitchell, T. M., Shinkareva, S. V., Carlson, A., Chang, K.-M., Malave, V. L., & Mason, R. A., et al. (2008). Predicting human brain activity associated with the meanings of nouns. Science, 320(5880), 1191–1195.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/02/2011, 08:32
Niedenthal, P. M. (2007). Embodying emotion. Science, 316, 1002–1005.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 26/01/2011, 00:57
"Through the interconnections of the populations of neurons that were active during the original experience, a partial multimodal reenactment of the experience is produced. Critical for such an account, one reason that only parts of the original neural states are reactivated is that attention is selectively focused on the aspects of the experience that are the most salient and important for the individual. [...] Because emotions are salient and functional, this aspect of experience will certainly be preserved."
"...high-level cognitive processes (such as thought and language) use partial reactivations of states in sensory, motor, and affective systems to do their jobs [...] The brain captures modality-specific states during perception, action and interoception and then reinstates parts of the same states to represent knowledge when needed."
"...observational learning is supported by a reenactment of the emotional experience of the model in the observer."
"...shifting from processing in one modality to another involves temporal processing costs: Individuals take longer to judge the location of a visual stimulus after having just detected the location of an auditory one, for example, than if both stimuli arrive to the same modality."
Supporting theories of embodied cognition, "individuals simulate objects in the relevant modalities when they use them in thought and language."
There is a temporal cost to switching processing between the affective system and sensory modalities and there is evidence that "affective properties of concepts are simulated in the emotional system when the properties are the subject of active thought."
Three types of learning: conditioned (directly experienced); observational (vicarious experience); and instructed (described in language). Emotional processes supporting these types share important similarities lending support to theories of emotional model reenactment.
O'Callaghan, C. (2009). Sounds and events. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 26–49). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/08/2026, 07:50
"[T]here is the event of an object or substance setting a medium into periodic motion. This is sound."
"Sounds are stationary relative to their sources"
"Sounds are events that take place near their sources, not in the intervening space."
"sounds are particular events of a certain kind. They are events in which a moving object disturbs a surrounding medium and sets it moving. The strikings and crashings are not the sounds, but are the causes of sounds. The waves in the medium are not the sounds themselves, but are the effects of sounds."
O'Callaghan presents 3 theories of sound: 1. Sounds are properties of bodies. A view held from Locke onwards -- bodies and objects possess sounds when they vibrate at particular frequencies and amplitudes. 2. Classic acoustic theory. Sounds are waves produced by vibrating bodies -- thus, we do not immediately hear the property a body 'possesses' but only hear the sound as a compression wave through a medium. 3. Sounds are events. O'Callaghan arrives at the 'event view' of sound from Aristotle's writings: sound is a movement (as per Aristotle) but O'Callaghan interprets this as -- the movement need not be the medium but can be the event that causes the medium's disturbance/movement. Sound is 'the act of one thing moving another' (p.27). cf Aristotle (Arisotle 350 BCE).
Reybrouck, M. (2001). Musical imagery between sensory processing and ideomotor simulation. In R. I. Godøy & H. Jörgensen (Eds.), Musical Imagery. (pp. 117–136). Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 09/08/2017, 08:24
Sun, F., Chen, R., Ji, T., Luo, Y., Zhou, H., & Liu, H. (2024). A comprehensive survey on embodied intelligence: Advancements, challenges, and future perspectives. CAAI Artificial Intelligence Research, 3, 9150042.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: alexb44 26/08/2026, 10:12