Sound Research WIKINDX
Sound Research WIKINDX |
|
|
Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 Parameters |
| Calleja, G. (2014). Immersion in virtual worlds. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 222–236). New York: Oxford University Press. |
  
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:21 | |
| Calleja favors the term incorporation over immersion or presence because the latter two "are defined by their discontinuity from the real physical world [whereas] incorporation occurs [when playing a computer game, for example] when the game world is present to the player while simultaneously the player is present, via an avatar, to the virtual environment." | |
| Calleja's main bone of contention with concepts such as immersion and presence is that they imply that the user of a virtual environment is "merely a subjective consciousness being poured into the containing vessel of the virtual environment." | |
| For incorporation to occur, the medium must "specifically acknowledge the player's presence and agency within the virtual world." | |
| "while high-fidelity systems are an important part of enhancing the intensity of an experience, they do not themselves create a sense of presence." | |
| Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 4(2), 503–522. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/06/2023, 14:37 | |
| "Take the idea of telepresence, for instance, which was strange and new when described by Howard Rheingold back in 1991." | |
| "Interfaces in standard VR can be viewed as modes of coupling with the (virtual) environment that transform an already existing sensed-embodiment. To put this another way, in the original context presence is assumed (perhaps as produced by unconscious neural mechanisms) and then, through an interactive interface, presence is "projected" into a virtual world." | |
| As an example of presentational virtualism: "But in dreams, our sense of presence assuming we have such can only be explained by the "projections" of the brain. In essence, Revonsuo is arguing that, as presence can be experienced in the absence of dynamic world coupling, such coupling cannot be necessary for (the experience of) presence. His conclusion is that being-in-the-world, and the experience of presence even in normal configurations, is virtual." | |
| "In its unelaborated form, presentational virtualism faces several traditional problems. First, the position is internalist to an extent that appears to put us radically out of touch with the world, in familiar ways. For those acquainted with the history of the philosophy of perception, it is hard to resist seeing this kind of virtualism as an old, discredited theory of perception — the indirect theory — in modern technological guise. On this picture, virtualism is advocating that: (1) when we are dreaming there is no further reality beyond the virtual, dreamed reality for our experiences to be of, so they are of the virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute that virtual world; and therefore, in the same way, (2) when we are not dreaming, our experiences are not of a further, external world to which we have no access, but are again of virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute a virtual world (those created by the neural "interface", which is the same, after all as the "interface" in operation during dreaming) that we merely take to be an actual world." | |
| "The key components of the sophisticated presentationalist view are crucially disanalogous with what is going on in the use of virtual reality technology. When we use such technology, we exercise the very same perceptual processes when we are wearing the VR gear as when we are not." | |
| "VR technology parasitizes the pre-existing, biologically endowed (in our case) sensory capacities of an autonomous subject to create an experience of a virtual world, a world whose virtuality is defined relative to the actuality of the world made available by the preexisting sensory system." | |
|
"the virtualist is asking us to simultaneously employ the VR metaphor and ignore an essential, ineliminable feature of the source (the use of VR technology by a pre-existing subject) while doing so. For this reason the metaphor (at least in its presentational virtualist form) fails in its attempt to portray a coherent, alternative conception of mind and experience." |
|
| Enactive virtualism (after Noë description of perceptual presence): "when we perceive an object, we are only really (occurrently) sensorially in touch with a small part of what we perceive or see, but nevertheless the whole object is perceptually (but virtually) present to us." | |
|
"How is sensory contact actualized in such a way that perceptual experience is generated? This actualization process happens, in all versions of Noë's theory, through acting. Put slightly differently, and in the terminology that Noë favors, perceptual content is given through occurrent deployment of our mastery of sensorimotor dependencies (originally contingencies [...]; that is, very roughly, the way that sensory information follows or frustrates our expectations that arises out of our mastery of sensorimotor flow. Perceptual presence on this analysis arises because of the mastery of dependencies we acquire as we move around and interact with objects. Perceptual presence for Noë is to be explained, like perceptual content itself, from our mastery of the laws of sensorimotor dependence." |
|
| "For Noë, perception is actional or enactive but is also in a certain sense projected. What we experience is not what is simply given in our occurrent sensorimotor contact but what is somehow generated in that contact. Perceptual content is generated because we are constantly in touch with the world." | |
| "presentational virtualism holds that that the content of our experiences is virtual and perception is, in an important sense, similar to hallucination because it is ultimately internal perceptual vehicles that we perceive rather than the external worldly objects they represent. In contrast, enactive representationalism sees us as being in deep contact with the world, but at the "price" of conceiving of our representational systems as partly composed by the world. We have seen that the former trades on di±culties with the metaphor of virtuality itself while the latter tends to commit us to problematic views: either the Grand Illusion or the idea that external world contributes to perceptual content independently of our sensory contact with it." | |
| Diodato, R. (2022). Virtual reality and aesthetic experience. Philosophies, 7(29), 1–8. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/10/2023, 15:06 | |
| van Elferen, I. (2011). ¡un forastero! Issues of virtuality and diegesis in videogame music. Music and the Moving Image, 4(2), 30–39. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/07/2012, 11:28 | |
| Garbarini, F., & Adenzato, M. (2004). At the root of embodied cognition: Cognitive science meets neurophysiology. Brain and Cognition, 56(1), 100–106. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/05/2014, 09:13 | |
| Garner, T. A., & Grimshaw, M. (2014). Sonic virtuality: Understanding audio in a virtual world. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 364–377). New York: Oxford University Press. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/01/2014, 11:55 | |
| Garner, T., & Jordanous, A. 2016, June 27, Emergent perception and video games that listen: Applying sonic virtuality for creative and intelligent npc behaviours. Unpublished paper presented at The 2nd Computational Creativity and Games Workshop, Paris. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/01/2018, 16:08 | |
| Grimshaw, M. (2015). A brief argument for, and summary of, the concept of sonic virtuality. Danish Musicology Online - Special Issue on Sound and Music Production, 81–98. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/08/2025, 11:32 | |
| Grimshaw, M., & Garner, T. A. (2015). Sonic virtuality: Sound as emergent perception. New York: Oxford University Press. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 31/05/2015, 15:30 | |
| Heim, M. R. Surfing virtual reality wave 3. In J. Gackenbach (Ed), Boundaries of Self and Reality Online. Elsevier. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/04/2016, 08:50 | |
| Janz, B. B. (2019). Virtual place and virtualized place. In E. Champion (Ed), The Phenomenology of Real and Virtual Places. (pp. 60–75). London: Routledge. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 03/05/2026, 01:24 | |
| Knakkergaard, M. (2014). The music that’s not there. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 392–404). New York: Oxford University Press. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/01/2014, 12:09 | |
| Lehman-Wilzig, S. N. (2021). Virtuality and humanity: Virtual practice and its evolution from pre-history to the 21st century. Singapore: Springer Nature. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 03/05/2026, 01:39 | |
| Massumi, B. (2014). Envisioning the virtual. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 55–70). New York: Oxford University Press. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 15/11/2015, 11:38 | |
| Riva, G., & Waterworth, J. A. (2014). Being present in a virtual world. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 205–221). New York: Oxford University Press. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 09/02/2014, 10:36 | |
| Slater, M. (2009). Place illusion and plausibility can lead to realistic behaviour in immersive virtual environments. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 3549–3557. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/04/2016, 10:37 | |
| Virtual, adj. and n. (2013). In Oxford English Dictionary 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 13/02/2024, 07:24 | |
| Waterworth, J. A., & Waterworth, E. L. (2014). Distributed embodiment: Real presence in virtual bodies. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 589–601). New York: Oxford University Press. |
|
| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:16 | |
| "being present in an external environment has its roots in the animal feeling of something happening outside the self rather than from within. In other words, the sense of presence distinguishes self from nonself [...] Presence arises from active awareness of our embodiment in a present world around us." |