Sound Research WIKINDX
Sound Research WIKINDX |
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 Parameters |
| Casati, R., & Dokic, J. (2009). Some varieties of spatial hearing. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 97–110). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
  
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/02/2014, 11:15 | |
| "[a] principle of classification of metaphysical theories of sounds can be based on the alleged location each theory assigns to sounds" | |
| The Located Event Theory of Casati and Dokic: "sounds are located at their sources, and are identical with, or at least supervene on, the relevant physical processes in them" | |
| Nudds, M. (2009). Sounds and space. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 69–96). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/02/2014, 11:09 | |
| "sounds are patterns or structures of frequency components instantiated by sound waves" | |
| "[sound] is wholly instantiated wherever it is instantiated, including where we are" | |
| O'Callaghan, C. (2009). Sounds and events. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 26–49). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/08/2026, 07:50 | |
| "sounds are particular events of a certain kind. They are events in which a moving object disturbs a surrounding medium and sets it moving. The strikings and crashings are not the sounds, but are the causes of sounds. The waves in the medium are not the sounds themselves, but are the effects of sounds." | |
| "[T]here is the event of an object or substance setting a medium into periodic motion. This is sound." | |
| "Sounds are stationary relative to their sources" | |
| "Sounds are events that take place near their sources, not in the intervening space." | |
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O'Callaghan presents 3 theories of sound: 1. Sounds are properties of bodies. A view held from Locke onwards -- bodies and objects possess sounds when they vibrate at particular frequencies and amplitudes. 2. Classic acoustic theory. Sounds are waves produced by vibrating bodies -- thus, we do not immediately hear the property a body 'possesses' but only hear the sound as a compression wave through a medium. 3. Sounds are events. O'Callaghan arrives at the 'event view' of sound from Aristotle's writings: sound is a movement (as per Aristotle) but O'Callaghan interprets this as -- the movement need not be the medium but can be the event that causes the medium's disturbance/movement. Sound is 'the act of one thing moving another' (p.27). cf Aristotle (Arisotle 350 BCE). |
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| O'Shaughnessy, B. (2009). The location of a perceived sound. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 111–125). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/02/2014, 11:14 | |
| sound moves through space because it is the transferal of physical force; there is an "essential spatio-temporal dynamism of sound" | |
| Scruton, R. (2009). Sounds as secondary objects and pure events. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 50–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 07/02/2014, 13:10 | |
| "The physicalist view banishes to the margin those features of sound that make sound so important to us, not only epistemologically, but also socially, morally, and aesthetically. In particular, it does not recognize the 'pure event' as a distinct ontological category, and one that introduces unique possibilities of communication." | |
| "the 'acousmatic' experience of sound [where sounds are] emancipated from their causes" | |
| "pure events contain within themselves the principles whereby they can be ordered ... all without stepping into the order of things. | |
| Scruton uses examples and explanation of sound grouping/streaming (cf Bregman) to support his view of sounds as pure events because such auditory grouping needs no "bridges to the physical world" in the way that visual Gestalt figures do. | |
| Our natural inclination to describe sounds in terms of their source "is not essential to the identification of the sound" | |
| A pure event does not happen to any thing, it "cannot be reduced to changes undergone by reidentifiable particulars" | |
| With an Aristotelean conception of substance, an event is described by the objects taking part in it and the changes undergone by those objects as the event occurs. Thus, such a view of events is that they are "transformations undergone by particulars" | |
| For Scruton, sounds are secondary objects because they are "a real part of the objective world" and not a mere "subjective impression" | |
| A secondary object is "an object all of whose properties are ways in which it feels" | |
| "we do not attribute the secondary qualities of sounds to the bodies that emit them, nor to events that occur in those bodies" | |
| Sounds are "secondary objects and pure events" | |
| Secondary qualities are the way things feel -- not primary qualities that are physical and can be objectively measured. Secondary qualities allow us to discriminate between phenomena such as sounds. | |
| Scruton supports his view that sounds are separate from the objects that emit them with examples such as radio and recording -- acousmatic sound. In such a case, sounds can be grouped (streamed) together coherently without reference to their physical origin. | |
| To Scruton, sound's independence from the physical world leads to a coherence (grouping, streaming) that is a 'virtual causality'. It bears no relation to the process by which sounds are formed. |