Alder, K. (2004). The measure of all things: The seven-year odyssey and hidden error that transformed the world. London: Abacus.
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Bach, K. (1982). Semantic nonspecificity and mixed quantifiers. Linguistics and philosophy, 4(4), 593–605.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 20/11/2021, 10:10
Grimshaw-Aagaard, M. N. (2024). Ambiguity and vagueness in video game sound. In W. Gibbons & M. Grimshaw-Aagaard (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Video Game Music and Sound. (pp. 271–286). New York: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/03/2024, 09:38
Grimshaw-Aagaard, M. N. (2019). The necessity of vagueness and ambiguity to the imagining of sound. In M. Grimshaw-Aagaard, M. Walther-Hansen & M. Knakkergaard (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Sound and Imagination. Vol. 1, (pp. 105–113). United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/02/2023, 12:42
Sennett, A. (2011-2021). Ambiguity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 27, 2021, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ambiguity/.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/11/2021, 11:09
Sorensen, R. (1997-2018). Vagueness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 27, 2021, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness/.
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"Vagueness is standardly defined as the possession of borderline cases. For example, ‘tall’ is vague because a man who is 1.8 meters in height is neither clearly tall nor clearly non-tall. No amount of conceptual analysis or empirical investigation can settle whether a 1.8 meter man is tall. Borderline cases are inquiry resistant. . . . Inquiry resistance typically recurses. For, in addition to the unclarity of the borderline case, there is normally unclarity as to where the unclarity begins. . . . Consequently, ‘borderline case’ has borderline cases. This higher order vagueness seems to show that ‘vague’ is vague."
"Every natural language is both vague and ambiguous. However, both features seem eliminable. Indeed, both are eliminated in miniature languages such as checkers notation, computer programming languages, and mathematical descriptions. Moreover, it seems that both vagueness and ambiguity ought to be minimized. ‘Vague’ and ‘ambiguous’ are pejorative terms. And they deserve their bad reputations. Think of all the automotive misery that has been prefaced by
Driver: Do I turn left? Passenger: Right.
English can be lethal. Philosophers have long motivated appeals for an ideal language by pointing out how ambiguity creates the menace of equivocation:
No child should work. Every person is a child of someone. Therefore, no one should work.
Happily, we know how to criticize and correct all equivocations. Indeed, every natural language is self-disambiguating in the sense that each has all the resources needed to uniquely specify any reading one desires. Ambiguity is often the cause but rarely the object of philosophical rumination."
Timmermans, S., & Epstein, S. (2010). A world of standards but not a standard world: Toward a sociology of standards and standardization. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 69–89.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 30/11/2023, 09:23
Wells, H. G. (2009). First and last things: A confession of faith and a rule of life. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published 1908).
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/07/2024, 13:44
"...as you look at finer and subtler things, as you leave the practical purpose for which the method exists, the element of error increases. Every species is vague, every term goes cloudy at its edges; and so in my way of thinking, relentless logic is only another name for a stupidity—for a sort of intellectual pigheadedness. If you push a philosophical or metaphysical inquiry through a series of valid syllogisms—never committing any generally recognised fallacy—you nevertheless leave behind you at each step a certain rubbing and marginal loss of objective truth, and you get deflections that are difficult to trace at each phase in the process. Every species waggles about in its definition, every tool is a little loose in its handle, every scale has its individual error."
White, J. M. (2021). Standardising the city as an object of comparison: The promise, limits and perceived benefits of ISO 37120. Telematics and Informatics, 57, 101515.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 30/11/2023, 09:19
Wilson, A. Aesthesis and perceptronium: On the entanglement of sensation, cognition, and matter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/11/2021, 11:12
"The pre-Socratics, notably Parmenides, founded philosophy as an exercise in the mistrust of experience. The history of knowledge reads as a progressive questioning of previous assumptions about reality. From the depths of our organismic origins, evolution committed us to an unexamined naïve realism: as organism, we have to believe that this event follows that one; we have to trace effects to their causes in order to survive for any length of time in the environment, in order to escape our predators and obtains means of sustenance. But the philosophical attitude and the scientific reason that is its extension derive from a critique of these evolutionarily conditioned assumptions about reality."
"Knowledge has revealed itself to be formally irreducible to the simple events of empirical experience: from within the proposition, we cannot reach the outside to which it would seem to refer, but go infinitely from sign to sign, belief to belief, proposition to proposition."
Think of film and its discrete images melding into a continuous stream. Paraphrasing Leibniz and his ideas of the confused-distinct spectrum of knowledge (as opposed to the obscure-clear spectrum):
"It is the indistinction that produces the image we see as we experience a film. Thus, the property of confusion is essential to the experience itself; the distinct images, those little perceptions, need to synthesize and integrate into a unified perception in order for that experience to occur. Thus, the experience is instrincsically indistinct, because in order to be that experience, it must maintain its characteristic synthetic unity, which depends on the confusion of its parts" (22).
"An indistinct perception is therefore, in some sense, real: it exists independently of the agent's capacities in the specific sense that no effort of cognition will render it distinct without changing the character of the perception in question. . . . Those aspects of the world that escape the countability of individuality reveal the aesthetic underpinnings of individuality" (23).