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Bergson, H. (1912). An introduction to metaphysics. T. E. Hulme, Trans. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's sons.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/05/2023, 09:36
Brainard, F. S. (1997). Reality and mystical experience. Unpublished PhD thesis, Temple University.    
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/09/2020, 15:05
"presence is not, itself a publicity [...] description is never the presence itself; it only refers to presence."  
"awareness applies not just to a capability or to a receptive 'knowing', but also to intention and action as well [...] awareness applies not just to sentient agencies but also to certain non-sentient ones (i.e., the maintenance of physical regularities by matter). In this schema, awareness is defined on the basis of its roles in the definitions for publicity and presence. In the case of publicity, it names that which originates and maintains publicity, regardless of any other considerations."  
"The term 'publicity', derived from the word 'public', already exists in epistemology and refers to that which is the same for a group of knowing subjects — that which is singular for a plurality of awarenesses."  
"a particular is a singular instantiation, thus an individual"  
"presence is defined as that which when conjoined to publicity yields a particular. It may also be defined as the process (verb) that renders publicity to be a particular [...] presence in this project also means the fact or condition of being manifest to or by awarenesses"  
"Humans presence those things particular to human beings — languages, political borders, artifacts, and so on. Animals presence what is particular to their own natures. So do plants. And matter presences material publicities. Presencing taken as a noun — as a presence — is thus a spatiotemporal site of publicity instantiation. Since in this schema, all publicity, even material regularities, originate with awarenesses, a presence may also be characterized as a site for the publicity producing activity of awarenesses."  
"'presence' is perhaps more accurately thought of as a verb than a noun. It is rather the process that manifests — 'presences' — properties."
Clowes, R. W., & Chrisley, R. (2012). Virtualist representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness, 4(2), 503–522.    
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/06/2023, 14:37
"presentational virtualism holds that that the content of our experiences is virtual and perception is, in an important sense, similar to hallucination because it is ultimately internal perceptual vehicles that we perceive rather than the external worldly objects they represent. In contrast, enactive representationalism sees us as being in deep contact with the world, but at the "price" of conceiving of our representational systems as partly composed by the world. We have seen that the former trades on di±culties with the metaphor of virtuality itself while the latter tends to commit us to problematic views: either the Grand Illusion or the idea that external world contributes to perceptual content independently of our sensory contact with it."  
"For Noë, perception is actional or enactive but is also in a certain sense projected. What we experience is not what is simply given in our occurrent sensorimotor contact but what is somehow generated in that contact. Perceptual content is generated because we are constantly in touch with the world."  
"How is sensory contact actualized in such a way that perceptual experience is generated?
      This actualization process happens, in all versions of Noë's theory, through acting. Put slightly differently, and in the terminology that Noë favors, perceptual content is given through occurrent deployment of our mastery of sensorimotor dependencies (originally contingencies [...]; that is, very roughly, the way that sensory information follows or frustrates our expectations that arises out of our mastery of sensorimotor flow. Perceptual presence on this analysis arises because of the mastery of dependencies we acquire as we move around and interact with objects. Perceptual presence for Noë is to be explained, like perceptual content itself, from our mastery of the laws of sensorimotor dependence." 		 
Enactive virtualism (after Noë description of perceptual presence): "when we perceive an object, we are only really (occurrently) sensorially in touch with a small part of what we perceive or see, but nevertheless the whole object is perceptually (but virtually) present to us."  
"the virtualist is asking us to simultaneously employ the VR metaphor and ignore an essential, ineliminable feature
of the source (the use of VR technology by a pre-existing subject) while doing so. For this reason the metaphor (at least in its presentational virtualist form) fails in its attempt to portray a coherent, alternative conception of mind and experience." 		 
"VR technology parasitizes the pre-existing, biologically endowed (in our case) sensory capacities of an autonomous subject to create an experience of a virtual world, a world whose virtuality is defined relative to the actuality of the world made available by the preexisting sensory system."  
"The key components of the sophisticated presentationalist view are crucially disanalogous with what is going on in the use of virtual reality technology. When we use such technology, we exercise the very same perceptual processes when we are wearing the VR gear as when we are not."  
"In its unelaborated form, presentational virtualism faces several traditional problems. First, the position is internalist to an extent that appears to put us radically out of touch with the world, in familiar ways. For those acquainted with the history of the philosophy of perception, it is hard to resist seeing this kind of virtualism as an old, discredited theory of perception — the indirect theory — in modern technological guise. On this picture, virtualism is advocating that: (1) when we are dreaming there is no further reality beyond the virtual, dreamed reality for our experiences to be of, so they are of the virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute that virtual world; and therefore, in the same way, (2) when we are not dreaming, our experiences are not of a further, external world to which we have no access, but are again of virtual objects, properties, etc., that constitute a virtual world (those created by the neural "interface", which is the same, after all as the "interface" in operation during dreaming) that we merely take to be an actual world."  
As an example of presentational virtualism: "But in dreams, our sense of presence assuming we have such     can only be explained by the "projections" of the brain. In essence, Revonsuo is arguing that, as presence can be experienced in the absence of dynamic world coupling, such coupling cannot be necessary for (the experience of) presence. His conclusion is that being-in-the-world, and the experience of presence even in normal configurations, is virtual."  
"Interfaces in standard VR can be viewed as modes of coupling with the (virtual) environment that transform an already existing sensed-embodiment. To put this another way, in the original context presence is assumed (perhaps as produced by unconscious neural mechanisms) and then, through an interactive interface, presence is "projected" into a virtual world."  
"Take the idea of telepresence, for instance, which was strange and new when described by Howard Rheingold back in 1991."
Grimshaw-Aagaard, M. (2024). Video game sound design and the fetish of realism. In W. Gibbons & M. Grimshaw-Aagaard (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Video Game Music and Sound. (pp. 861–874). New York: Oxford University Press.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 10/03/2024, 09:35
Hutcheon, P. D. (1972). Value theory: Towards conceptual clarification. The British Journal of Sociology, 23(2), 172–187.    
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/05/2021, 16:33
"American sociology has tended to develop in isolation from the humanities, and in the form of a highly specialized technique rather than as a broad, philosophically and historically sophisticated perspective for the study of man. This may have been due as much to the trend toward professionalization and kingdom building in academic life as to the widespread acceptance of the philosophical assumptions of Weberian neopositivism. The establishment of separate departments in universities no doubt encouraged competition among the social sciences for funds, students, and better means of sharpening data-manipulating techniques. It is easy to see how values, with their notorious resistance to precise measurement, might be assigned low priority in this situation."  
"The myth of the possibility of 'objectively' documenting reality, so unquestioningly accepted by sociologists anxious to achieve 'scientific' status, seems now to have spread to a majority of those involved in the humanities and the arts. The fetish of realism-too often manifested as a detailed portrayal of pathology in the name of the whole truth-is widely indulged in by the very 'creative' intellectuals who scorn the social scientists for their conformist scientism."
Janz, B. B. (2019). Virtual place and virtualized place. In E. Champion (Ed), The Phenomenology of Real and Virtual Places. (pp. 60–75). London: Routledge.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 03/05/2026, 01:24
Mori, S., Ikeda, S., & Saito, H. (2017). A survey of diminished reality: Techniques for visually concealing, eliminating, and seeing through real objects. IPSJ Transactions on Computer Vision and Applications, 9.    
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 25/03/2020, 07:35
"methods for visually removing objects have been considered one DR methodology."  
Acknowledges the negative connotations of the word 'diminish.'  
Superficial mention in a few sentences at the end of the possibility of removing sound waves as a route to DR.  
Four methods for achieving DR:
  • Diminish degrading aspects of the image such as the colour saturation or sharpness
  • See-through replace part of the image with the background that would be seen were that image part not present
  • Replace replace part of the real image with a virtual image
  • Inpaint similar to see-through but the replacement image is generated from the surrounding parts.

 
Planck, M. (1932). Where is science going? The universe in the light of modern physics. J. Murphy, Trans. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.   
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 13/12/2022, 11:23
Prior, A. N. The notion of the present. Paper presented at The Study of Time, Oberwolfach.    
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 03/11/2025, 02:07
Prior makes the case that the natural sciences have expunged tenses and that their language is a tenseless one, without a conception of past, present, or future; rather events might be earlier or later than other events. "Whether the events are the case or merely have been or will be, is of no concern to the scientist, so he uses a language in which the the difference between being and having been abd being about to be is inexpressible."  
Prior deals with an objection the special theory of relativity might have to his conception of present and reality with the example of a pulsating celestial body where we know observed pulsations actually happened a long time ago:

"We have just observed one of these pulsations, and as the body is a very distant one, we know that the pulsation we are observing happened some time ago. We now consider the pulsation immediately after the one we are observing, and we ask whether this next pulsation, although we won't of course observe it for a while, is in fact going on right now, or is really still to come, or has occurred already. On the view of presentness which I have been suggesting, this is always a sensible question. At least if there are to be any further pulsation at all, then either the body is pulsating, or it is not the case but will be the case that it is pulsating or it is not the case but has been the case that it is pulsating. The difference between pulsating — really and actually pulsating — and merely having pulsated or being about to pulsate, is as clear and comprehensible a difference as any that we can think of, being but one facet of the great gulf that separates the real from the unreal, what is from what is not. Just this, however, is what the special theory of relativity appears to deny. If the distant body is having its nth pulsation as we perceive it having its n-1th — is pulsating, and not merely has been or will be pulsating — then the nth pulsation and the perception of the n-1th are simultaneous; not just simultaneous from such and such a point of view or in such and such a frame of reference, but simultaneous. And according to the special theory of relativity, such "absolute" simultaneity is in many cases just not to be had.

One possible reaction to this situation, which to my mind is perfectly respectable though it isn't very fashionable, is to insist that all that physics has shown to be true or likely is that in some cases we can never know, we can never physically find out, whether something is actually happening or merely has happened or will happen."

  
"the presentness of an event is just the event" and, regarding a lecture, "its pastness is its present pastness, so that although [the] lecture isn't now present and isn't real, isn't a fact, nevertheless its pastness, its having taken place, is a present fact, is a reality, and will be one as long as time shall last."  
For Prior, the present and the real are the same concept: "the present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular species of unreality, namely the past and the future."
Saint Augustine. (2002). The confessions of St Augustine. E. B. Pusey, Trans. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published 401).    
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/07/2020, 09:22
"What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past are. Nor is it properly said, "there be three times, past, present, and to come": yet perchance it might be properly said, "there be three times; a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future." For these three do exist in some sort, in the soul, but otherwhere do I not see them; present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation. If thus we be permitted to speak, I see three times, and I confess there are three."
Westerhoff, J. (2011). Reality: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.    
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 18/08/2024, 15:00
"The different information coming in from our senses, visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory sensations are processed in different regions of the brain. They have to travel different distances [...] and arrive at different times. The processing speed for different kinds of sensory information varies; visual stimuli take longer to process than other stimuli. (The difference is about 40 milliseconds. [...]) On the other hand, light travels much faster than sound. Putting together these different speeds means that sights and sounds from about 10 metres away are available to consciousness at about the same time; for everything closer or further away information about its sight or sound arrives at different times. In these cases, the apparent simultaneity of, for example, hearing a voice and seeing the speaker's lips move has to be constructed by our brain."  

Detailing a set of experiments by Libet helping to explain how our brain builds a consciousness of the present and the time delay involved.

  • Stimulating the brain directly, an electrical impulse must be applied for at least 500 milliseconds to produce a perception (see, for example Libet 1985). Shorter impulses had no effect neither did increasing the intensity (with shorter times). Sensation can be detected by the brain within 500msecs but the subject is not consciously aware of it (e.g. we can react 'instinctively').
  • Stimulate the skin then, 200 milliseconds after, stimulate the brain – the skin stimulation is not perceived but is masked by the brain stimulation. The brain edits past events to give an impression of the 'present'.
  • Stimulate the brain then, 200 milliseconds later, stimulate the skin. Brain stimulus is perceived after about 500msecs but the skin stimulus is perceived as being before the brain stimulus. A temporal reordering: "There is no guarantee that the order in which we perceive events actually corresponds to the order of their occurrence" (Westerhoff 2011, p.100).

 

Discussing Libet's (1985) experiment. While we prefer to believe that we have willed our hand to rise, our intention, there is a precursor in the subconscious, the readiness potential, that can be measured using EEG and that precedes the hand movement and the reported time at which subjects noted their intention to lift the hand. The conclusion is that intention (and thus free will?) is manufactured after the event. See also (Rosenberg 2018, p.99).
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