Sound Research WIKINDX
Sound Research WIKINDX |
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 Parameters |
| Arnett, E. B., Baerwald, E. F., Mathews, F., Rodrigues, L., Rodríguez-Durán, A., & Rydell, J., et al. (2016). Impacts of wind energy development on bats: A global perspective. In C. C. Voigt & T. Kingston (Eds.), Bats in the Anthropocene: Conservation of Bats in a Changing World. (pp. 295–323). Cham: Springer International Publishing. |
 
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 06/05/2022, 14:48 | |
| Fenton, M. B., Portfors, C. V., Rautenbach, I. L., & Waterman, J. M. (1998). Compromises: Sound frequencies used in echolocation by aerial-feeding bats. Canadian Journal of Zoology, 76(6), 1174–1182. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 24/09/2023, 10:21 | |
| Gilmour, L. R. V., Holderied, M. W., Pickering, S. P. C., & Jones, G. (2021). Acoustic deterrents influence foraging activity, flight and echolocation behaviour of free-flying bats. Journal of Experimental Biology, 224(20), 1–11. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 03/05/2022, 15:26 | |
| Griffin, D. R. (2001). Return to the Magic Well: Echolocation Behavior of Bats and Responses of Insect Prey. BioScience, 51(7), 555–556. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 31/03/2023, 08:53 | |
| Griffin, D. R., & Galambos, R. (1941). The sensory basis of obstacle avoidance by flying bats. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 86(3), 481–506. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 31/03/2023, 09:17 | |
| Guest, E. E., Stamps, B. F., Durish, N. D., Hale, A. M., Hein, C. D., & Morton, B. P., et al. (2022). An updated review of hypotheses regarding bat attraction to wind turbines. Animals, 12(3). |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 20/09/2023, 13:57 | |
| Madsen, P. T., & Surlykke, A. (2013). Functional convergence in bat and toothed whale biosonars. Physiology, 28(5), 276–283. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 03/01/2021, 13:45 | |
| Mahler, Z. (2023). What is it like to be a (virtual) bat? |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 25/04/2026, 05:41 | |
| Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. |
 
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 05/05/2026, 04:38 | |
| "The fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own. It would be fine if someone were to develop concepts and a theory that enabled us to think about those things; but such an understanding may be permanently denied to us by the limits of our nature. And to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance." | |
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"We may call this the subjective character of experience [...] It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing."
Footnote for this quote: "Perhaps there could not actually be such robots. Perhaps anything complex enough to behave like a person would have experiences. But that, if true, is a fact which cannot be discovered merely by analyzing the concept of experience." |
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| "Members of radically different species may both understand the same physical events in objective terms, and this does not require that they understand the phenomenal forms in which those events appear to the senses of members of the other species. Thus it is a condition of their referring to a common reality that their more particular viewpoints are not part of the common reality that they both apprehend." | |
| "A Martian scientist with no understanding of visual perception could understand the rainbow, or lightning, or clouds as physical phenomena, though he would never be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud, or the place these things occupy in our phenomenal world. The objective nature of the things picked out by these concepts could be apprehended by him because, although the concepts themselves are connected with a particular point of view and a particular visual phenomenology, the things apprehended from that point of view are not: they are observable from the point of view but external to it; hence they can be comprehended from other points of view also, either by the same organisms or by others. Lightning has an objective character that is not exhausted by its visual appearance, and this can be investigated by a Martian without vision. To be precise, it has a more objective character than is revealed in its visual appearance. In speaking of the move from subjective to objective characterization, I wish to remain noncommittal about the existence of an end point, the completely objective intrinsic nature of the thing, which one might or might not be able to reach. It may be more accurate to think of objectivity as a direction in which the understanding can travel. And in understanding a phenomenon like lightning, it is legitimate to go as far away as one can from a strictly human viewpoint." | |
| "there would have been transfinite numbers even if everyone had been wiped out by the Black Death before Cantor discovered them" | |
| "But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine." | |
| "In a sense, the seeds of this objection to the reducibility of experience are already detectable in successful cases of reduction; for in discovering sound to be, in reality, a wave phenomenon in air or other media, we leave behind one viewpoint to take up another, and the auditory, human or animal viewpoint that we leave behind remains unreduced." | |
| "If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it: seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view." | |
| "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it." | |
| "the status of physicalism is similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher. We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might be true" | |
| "This explains the magical flavor of popular presentations of fundamental scientific discoveries, given out as propositions to which one must subscribe without really understanding them. For example, people are now told at an early age that all matter is really energy. But despite the fact that they know what "is" means, most of them never form a conception of what makes this claim true, because they lack the theoretical background." | |
| Footnote 10 has this: "[W]hen I look at the "Mona Lisa," my visual experience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone looking into my brain." | |
| "My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts [...] But one might also believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever—simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type." | |
| "Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task" | |
| "I have chosen bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience there at all. Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid (though it certainly could be raised with other species)." | |
| "Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it [...] the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism [...] fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism." | |
| Neuweiler, G. (1989). Foraging ecology and audition in echolocating bats. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 4(6), 160–166. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/11/2023, 11:09 | |
| Obrist, M. K., Fenton, B. M., Eger, J. L., & Schlegel, P. A. (1993). What Ears Do For Bats: A Comparative Study Of Pinna Sound Pressure Transformation In Chiroptera. Journal of Experimental Biology, 180(1), 119–152. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/11/2023, 11:10 | |
| Pierce, G. W., & Griffin, D. R. (1938). Experimental Determination of Supersonic Notes Emitted by Bats. Journal of Mammalogy, 19(4), 454–455. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 30/04/2023, 09:04 | |
| Surlykke, A., & Kalko, E. K. V. (2008). Echolocating bats cry out loud to detect their prey. PLOS One, 3(4). |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/11/2023, 13:13 | |
| Szewczak, J. M., & Arnett, E. (2006). Ultrasound emissions from wind turbines as a potential attractant to bats: A preliminary investigation. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/03/2022, 15:09 | |
| Thiagavel, J., Santana, S. E., & Ratcliffe, J. M. (2017). Body size predicts echolocation call peak frequency better than gape height in vespertilionid bats. Scientific Reports, 7(828), 1–6. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 28/02/2025, 01:44 | |
| von Uexküll, J. (1992). A stroll through the worlds of animals and men: A picture book of invisible worlds. Semiotica, 89(4), 319–391. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 02/03/2025, 03:25 | |
| "all that a subject perceives becomes his perceptual world and all that he does, his effector world. Perceptual and effector worlds together form a closed unit, the Umwelt." | |
| "According to information I have received concerning the sound perception of night moths, it makes no difference whether the sound to which the animals are adjusted be the sound manifestation of a bat or one produced by rubbing a glass stopper — the effect is always the same. Night moths which, owing to their light coloring, are easily visible, fly away upon perceiving a high tone, while species which have protective coloration alight in response to the same tone. The same sensory cue has the opposite effect in their case. It is striking how the two opposite kinds of action are governed by a plan. There can be no question of discrimination or purposiveness, since no moth or butterfly has ever seen the color of its own skin. The plan revealed in this instance appears even more admirable when we learn that the artful microscopic structure of the night moth's hearing organ exists solely for this one high tone of the bat. To all else, these moths are totally deaf." | |
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"A vineyard snail is placed on a rubber ball which, carried by water, slides under it without friction. The snail's shell is held in place by a bracket. Thus the snail, unhampered in its crawling movements, remains in the same place. If a small stick is then moved up to its foot, the snail will climb up on it. If the snail is given one to three taps with the stick each second, it will turn away, but if four or more taps are administered per second, it will begin to climb onto the stick. In the snail's world a rod that oscillates four times per second has become stationary. We may infer from this that the snail's receptor time moves at a tempo of three to four moments per second. As a result, all motor processes in the snail's world occur much faster than in ours."
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| "Behind all the worlds created by Him, there lies concealed, eternally beyond the reach of knowledge, the subject — Nature." | |
| "The blind man's world is a very limited one: it extends only as far as he can feel his way with his feet and cane." | |
| "I had taken a young, very intelligent and agile Negro with me from the heart of Africa to Dar-es-Salaam. The only thing which he lacked was a knowledge of European tools. When I bid him climb a short ladder, he asked me: 'How am I to do that, I see nothing but rods and holes?' As soon as another Negro had shown him how to climb the ladder, he could do it easily. From then on, the perceptually given 'rods and holes' held a climbing tone for him, and he recognized them everywhere as a ladder. The receptor image of rods and holes had been supplemented by the effector image of his own action; through this it had acquired a new meaning. The new meaning manifested itself as a new attribute, as a functional or effector tone." | |
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"the moment is identical for all sense modalities, since all sensations are accomplished by the same moment sign. The human ear does not discriminate eighteen air vibrations in one second, but hears them as one sound. It has been found that eighteen taps applied to the skin within one second are felt as even pressure." |
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| "Our time is made up of a series of moments, or briefest time units, within which the world shows no change. For the duration of a moment, the world stands still. Man's moment lasts 1/18 of a second. We shall see later that the length of a moment varies in different animals." | |
| "The individual cells of the perceptor organ, whatever their activity, remain as spatially separate units. The units of information which they separately convey would also remain isolated, if it were not possible for them to be fused into new units which are independent of the spatial characters of the receptor organ. This possibility does, in fact, exist. The receptor signs of a group of receptor cells are combined outside the receptor organ, indeed outside the animal, into units that become the properties of external objects. This projection of sensory impressions is a self-evident fact. All our human sensations, which represent our specific receptor signs, unite into perceptual cues (Merkmal) which constitute the attributes of external objects and serve as the real basis of our actions. The sensation 'blue' becomes the 'blueness' of the sky; the sensation 'green,' the 'greenness' of the lawn. These are the cues by which we recognize the objects: blue, the sky; green, the lawn." |
