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Bradley, A. (2008). Derrida's Of Grammatology: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.    
Added by: alexb44   Last edited by: alexb44 03/11/2026, 02:27
western metaphysics through writing

"Derrida argues that ‘grammatology’ offers us an insight into a much bigger set of philosophical assumptions, namely, the ‘metaphysics of presence [la métaphysique de la présence]’ (p. 49/71). What exactly does this forbidding term mean? It is generally understood that ‘metaphysics’ is the name for a specific branch of philosophy that seeks to locate an ultimate ground, essence or foundation of reality that lies beyond the physical or empirical world: the classic example of such a position would be Plato’s idealism which argues that our world is merely the imitation of a pre-existing world of permanent, unchanging Ideas or Forms. However, Derrida has a much more ambitious understanding of ‘metaphysics’ that encompasses the entire history of western philosophy from Plato to the present day. For Derrida, the western philosophical tradition in its entirety can be described as ‘metaphysical’ in the sense that it all seeks to establish an essential foundation for reality and, in his view, that foundation is something called ‘presence’. If western philosophy has developed in many different directions over the last 2,500 years, what all these movements have in common is an attempt to posit a full or pure ‘presence’ as the supreme value by which all reality can be judged. From the spatial presence of something we can see, hear or touch, through the temporal presence of the ‘here and now’ in which we live, up to and including the absence of some presence that has been lost (such as an Edenic state of nature) or which may be achieved in the future (such as the return of God), western thought consistently comes to the same conclusion: what is most real, true or important is what is most present. In Derrida’s view, the ‘metaphysics of presence’ historically operates by erecting a series of binary oppositions between concepts, values or terms where, in each case, one concept is identified as the bearer of presence itself whereas the other is identified with the falling away, or loss of, that presence: Introduction 7 the transcendental is privileged as more ‘present’ than the empirical, the ideal is championed over the material, the soul over the body, the masculine over the feminine and so on ad infinitum"

 
everything goes through a "delay". nothing is ever simply there

"whatever we perceive or experience as fully ‘present’ – the sound of my own voice, the wooden desk that I can touch in front of me, the thoughts that are running through my head while I read or write, even the ‘here and now’ of space and time in which I exist – is actually shot through with an infinite, and almost imperceptible, number of differences, delays or spaces. Quite simply, Derrida argues that every apparently pure, stable or self-identical presence is nothing more than an effect generated by a prior series of differences: nothing is ever purely or simply ‘there’."

 
everything stands in contrast

"Derrida shows that the supposedly primary, dominant or superior value implicitly relies on the supposedly secondary, different or inferior value in order to achieve the presence that it should achieve all by itself: the masculine depends upon the feminine in order to define its own identity in the first place. What form does this process take in the Grammatology?"

 
logo-centrism

"For Derrida, Of Grammatology takes the form of an extended analysis of the metaphysical opposition between speech and writing. It focuses on what the philosopher takes to be a defining form of what we have called the metaphysical search for ‘presence’: logocentrism (p. 3/11). According to the etymology of the term, ‘logocentrism’ 8 Derrida’s Of Grammatology signifies the philosophical attempt to find what the Ancient Greeks called the logos: a term which can be literally translated as ‘word’ but also carries within it the larger sense of ‘logic’, ‘reason’ or ‘meaning’."

 
agree. everything is both ethnocentric and anthropocentric

"logocentrism might even be described as the most ‘original and powerful ethnocentrism’, he writes in the ‘Exergue’, because it violently privileges and imposes the values of western culture over all others (p. 3/12)."

 
writing is language

"Derrida challenges the logocentric attempt to champion speech over writing by arguing that all language – whether spoken or written – might be described as ‘writing’: writing is another name for language itself."

 
we cannot go beyond the metaphysical limitations of our writing/language

"Derrida does not propose that we can ever simply overcome logocentric or metaphysical assumptions. We cannot simply establish some new, more accurate theory or system of knowledge to replace the metaphysics of presence ( Positions, p. 12). If Derrida’s work is a thoroughgoing interrogation of metaphysics, the fact remains that he is deeply sceptical of any attempt to get ‘beyond’ it for the very simple reason that we have no way of thinking, talking or writing that is not dominated by the metaphysical tradition: ‘[w]e have no language – no syntax and no lexicon – which is foreign to this history’ he writes in a contemporaneous essay.3 To reject metaphysics tout court, in other words, is to reject language and thought itself."

 
the movements of deconstruction

"‘The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures’ ( Grammatology, p. 24/39)."

 
As Stiegler experienced in prison. No text can be read the same way twice

"For Derrida, all language – whether spoken or written – exists in an irreducible state of mediation: we cannot simply return to the animating intentions, consciousness or ‘presence’ of the user, speaker or author. From the moment we begin to speak or write, in other words, we set in motion a complex linguistic machine that has a ‘life’ quite independent of our own: what we call Of Grammatology is a cog in that mechanism. If we cannot return to the true, original or intended meaning of Derrida’s text, this means that there can be no end to the process of reading, analysing and interpreting it: the meaning of the text does not lie behind us in some distant past, in other words, but in front of us, in the future, as something that is yet to be decided. In all these senses, I think the task of reading Derrida’s Of Grammatology can only be an endless one, but let us at least begin." Chapter 1: Historical Context

 
anti-metaphysical philisophy as ground for derrida. but cannot ever go beyond it

"If the essential metaphysical question still remained the same – what is? – the answer changed from ‘the ideal’, ‘substance’ or ‘god’ to the ‘thinking or knowing subject’. For the seventeenth-century rationalist philosopher Descartes, the ego cogito or thinking subject provided the only firm foundation upon which knowledge could be grounded and this position is pursued and refined in different ways by such figures as Kant and Husserl.2 The last decades of the nineteenth century, however, saw the emergence of a new, more radical critique of metaphysics in the work of such seminal figures as Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. This so-called ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ is what lays the groundwork for Derrida’s own attempt to question the grounding assumptions of western metaphysics ( Writing and Difference, p. 280). In Derrida’s own view, deconstruction is heavily indebted to this larger tradition of ‘anti-metaphysical philosophy’ but, as we will see, his philosophy remains deeply sceptical about the possibility of ever simply getting ‘beyond’ metaphysics."

 
Marx - consciousness comes from life, it is everything we do. labour, work...

"Karl Marx sees all our Historical Context 17 metaphysical ideas about reality as nothing more than imaginary expressions of the processes of life, nature and history. Quite simply, our view of reality is upside-down: we must understand consciousness from the perspective of life, rather than life from the perspective of consciousness.3 According to Marx’s philosophy of historical materialism, what defines ‘life’ in this case is not biology but history: being alive is not something we are so much as something we do, the way in which we work or labour, how we organise our existence socially, materially and economically ( German Ideology, p. 48)."

 
ascetic ideal. truth is what we make ir, according to Nietszche

"Friedrich Nietzsche famously sees the production of metaphysical belief systems as an attempt to repress the dynamic processes of life itself: the ‘other’ world of metaphysics is the product of this world rather than its cause or foundation. Proposing 18 Derrida’s Of Grammatology what he calls a ‘genealogy’ of metaphysics, Nietzsche shows how apparently timeless, unconditioned values arise out of the very history they are supposed to explain in the first place. Quite simply, we must see concepts like ‘truth’, ‘being’ or ‘consciousness’ less as descriptions of ‘what is’ and more as misleading linguistic abstractions of a flux of historical, physiological and affective forces. For Nietzsche, metaphysics is the product of what he calls an ‘ascetic ideal’ that leads human beings to renounce ‘this world, our world’ in favour of ‘ another world’.6 Yet, it is impossible to reach this other world because it never existed in the first place and so humanity falls back into ‘ ressentiment’: a sense of permanent guilt that finds its apex in the Christian view of human existence as ‘fallen’. What lies beneath the metaphysical ‘will to truth’ of the ascetic ideal is the ‘will to power’: the capacity to liberate ourselves from the pursuit of the timeless other world of ‘truth’, and affirm our place within, and as a product of, the endlessly creative becoming of this world."

 
the consciouss is a combination of a bunch of subconsciouss stuff all at once - Stiegler also believes this?

"Sigmund Freud’s pyschoanalysis intensifies this critique of the rational thinking or knowing subject which had become the last refuge of metaphysics in modernity: psychoanalysis ‘put[s] consciousness into question in its assured certainty of itself ’ Derrida writes ( Margins, p. 17). To Freud’s way of thinking, what we call the rational or self-conscious ‘I’ is the meeting point of a range of different, competing and often unconscious forces, desires or principles: ‘consciousness may be, not the most universal attribute of human processes, but only a particular fraction of them’.8 What is ground-breaking about psychoanalysis for Derrida is precisely this insight into how apparently simple, identical and present points of origin – such as the consciousness of the subject – are actually the product of an originary and unthought network of differences: ‘The putting into question of the authority of consciousness is first and always differential’ ( Margins, p. 18)."

 
metaphysics of the unconsciuss a new source of truth

"The psychoanalytic system may well call into question the self-presence of consciousness but it does so at the cost of turning the unconscious into a ‘hidden, virtual, or potential self-presence’. This means that Freud risks establishing a metaphysics of the unconscious whereby our drives and instincts become a new metaphysical basis for truth (pp. 20–1)."

 
metaphysics inescapable

"The crucial thing to grasp about Derrida’s readings of the history of philosophy, in other words, is that he is neither seeking to score points off metaphysics itself (as if anyone who believed in it were stupid or erroneous), nor to establish some new anti-metaphysical system (which would somehow avoid, or correct, the errors of its predecessor), so much as articulating this larger, and more complex, dilemma. There is an unavoidable sense in which every attempt to overcome metaphysics cannot help but repeat the language, discourse and assumptions of metaphysics, Derrida argues, because there is quite simply no other vocabulary available to us ( Positions, p. 12). This is why Derrida admits right from the outset of his work that his own critique of metaphysics must necessarily work within the very system of ideas it wishes to contest even, at the risk of simply replicating it ( Grammatology, p. 24/39)."

 
on dasein

"The Being of entities “is” not itself an entity’.10 To introduce the thesis of his seminal work Being and Time, Heidegger argues that the basic question ‘What is Being?’ has been largely forgotten by western philosophy because the latter focuses exclusively on beings or entities ( Being and Time, p. 2). Heidegger seeks to recuperate the meaning of Being itself by focusing on a particular kind of being and the one he chooses is human being or, as he famously calls it, Dasein (‘there-being’). For Heidegger, what defines Dasein is that it is not a being or entity that exists in time (like a rock or an animal) so much as a being who exists as time, whose being is essentially temporal: we are quite literally nothing other than the accumulation of our past experiences, on the one hand, and what we have the potential to ‘project’ out of those experiences into the future, on the other."

 
writing empty vessel

"For Derrida, both traditions par-ticipate in the championing of speech as the true bearer of presence and the repression or marginalisation of writing as a base or empty vessel that is the logocentric gesture par excellence."

 
consciousness always intentional

"It focuses on the essence of these particular ‘intuitions’, in other words, what your experience of them says about the way in which consciousness works more generally. According to Husserl, the defining characteristic of consciousness is that it is intentional, by which he means that it is always directed towards objects. To put it simply: consciousness is not an empty box into which objects are subsequently placed, but always the consciousness of some object."

 
husserl summary

"For Husserl, intentionality contains two, intrinsically linked, sides: the noesis, or intentional act of consciousness that is directed towards an object, and the object, or noema, towards which that act is directed. If this argument goes some way towards breaking down the subject/object dualism that has plagued philosophy since Descartes, it is important to bear in mind that Husserl’s phenomenology remains at all times a theory of consciousness: what concerns him is purely that which presents itself to our conscious experience – a phenomenon – and he is careful not to make any presumptions about what may or may not lie behind that appearance. The intentional act can only be understood as what it is if Historical Context 25 we suspend or ‘bracket’ off – the key term Husserl uses here is ‘ epoché’ – all our everyday assumptions about the empirical existence of external objects (what he calls the ‘natural attitude’), together with any prior philosophical assumptions or prejudices we might have about essence, existence or substance. This ‘transcendental’ attempt to clarify the pure or essential structures of consciousness by rigorously suspending or ‘reducing’ any presumption of the existence of the empirical world is increasingly criticised by Husserl’s successors. In the view of later figures like Heidegger, Levinas and Ricoeur, Husserl’s focus on the purity of consciousness risks becoming too abstract and theoretical in approach: phenomenology must take account of the context – linguistic, existential, ethical – in which consciousness is embedded."

 
communication through spoken word is indicative, beause the other person doesnt experencing what we experiencing directly

"Second, though, Derrida observes that Husserl goes on to associate expression with speech and indication with writing: speech is expressive because it necessarily entails the presence of the speaker, whereas writing is indicative because the writer is absent and substituted by a graphic inscription or mark. Unfortunately, though, things are not quite this simple because, as Derrida shows, the boundary between expression and indication, speech and writing and, more generally, presence and absence, constantly needs to be re-drawn. Straightaway, Husserl is forced to concede that not all s peech is expressive: when we speak in order to communicate with someone else, our 26 Derrida’s Of Grammatology words merely indicate our inner experience for the other person because, of course, they are not directly experiencing what we are experiencing."

 
immediately present

"It is Husserl’s contention that objects are immediately present to consciousness in both the spatial and the temporal senses of the word. When I ‘intend’ a certain object, it is present here and now to my consciousness: ‘[f]or the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment in the blink of an eye [ im selben Augenblick]’ ( Logical Investigations, p. 280). Once again, however, Derrida uses an example from Husserl’s own phenomenology – in this case his lectures on internal time consciousness – to show that the present moment in which perception takes place is in fact anything but ‘present’. To clarify what might seem at face value to be a paradoxical argument, Derrida argues that what we perceive as the Historical Context 27 ‘now’ or present moment is in fact a synthesis or composite of memory and expectation, retention and protention. Derrida notes how Husserl himself shows us in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness that when we listen to a piece of music we retain the memory of the note just played, we hear the note currently being played, and anticipate the next note in the sequence, all at once. For Husserl, in other words, retention – the memory of what has just passed – is the ‘tail’ that always follows the ‘comet’ of primary impression.13 If perception of the present is thus shot through with absence – what has just past and what is about to come – then Husserl’s theory of consciousness is once again shown to be always and already conditioned by the kind of mediation that he brackets off as external or inessential to his phenomenology. Just as the space of consciousness is mediated by things that are not fully present – linguistic signs – so the time of consciousness is structured by what is temporally absent: the past and the future. In this sense, Husserl’s metaphysics of ‘presence’ is once again forced to rely on the very thing it seeks to exclude: ‘This alterity is in fact the very condition for presence’ ( Speech and Phenomena, p. 65)."

 
Saussure. words have meaning only in context

"Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) was a linguist but is now commonly held to be the ‘father’ of the modern movement called structuralism. He focused his research less on particular units of language – what he calls ‘ parole’ or speech – so much as on the underlying system of language ( langue) in which those units exist. He famously argues that individual units of language acquire meaning from their relative position within the linguistic system as a whole: a word like ‘cat’, for example, has no meaning outside the system of the English language."

 
everything in context, contrast

"For Saussure and his followers, in other words, consciousness is always mediated through a prior network of signs, concepts, and values which enable us to make sense of our experience and, in this respect, at least, it would seem to confirm Derrida’s own critique of phenomenology. More generally, as we will see in Part 2, structuralism institutes a differential and relational theory of meaning that will be an enormous influence upon Derridaean deconstruction. Just as a single chess piece only makes sense in the context of the other pieces on the board, so no individual unit within a network has meaning in itself but rather achieves meaning in relation to all the other units within the system."

 
what structures the search for structuralism?

"Derrida begins this essay by effectively seeking to turn the tables on structuralism itself: what, he asks, structures the search for structures of language, culture and society? As we have already begun to see, his answer to this question is that structuralism is characterised by the attempt to identify a fixed point or centre at the heart of every structure ( Writing and Difference, p. 278)."

 
everything has a place except the center

"For Derrida, then, it becomes clear that structuralism is curiously self-exempting: everything has a structure – a relative place within the play of the system – except the centre of the structure itself where that play comes to a stop (p. 279)."

 
cant run from metaphysics. new directions simply ignire them, but not dealing with them is not sctually avoiding them

"Quite simply, structuralism’s attempt to just stop doing philosophy and begin again with something more ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ like anthropology, linguistics or history leaves its own deepest metaphysical assumptions unquestioned. If structuralism continually throws up new scientific methodologies – Saussure’s linguistics, Lévi-Strauss’s ethnography, Michel Foucault’s archaeology or Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology – in order to get around old metaphysical problems, Derrida argues that all these supposedly original approaches actually presuppose some of the most ancient philosophical oppositions imaginable: speech and writing, nature and culture, the transcendental and the empirical, and so on."

 
levi-strauss caught

"for all his scientific credentials – Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist anthropology remains ‘caught . . . within the metaphysics – logocentrism – which at the same time [he] claims rather precipitately to have “gone beyond” ’ ( Grammatology, p. 99/148): Lévi-Strauss, like Husserl before him, takes a more or less arbitrary decision that truth will equal presence which, in turn, will be equated with speech."

 
bought by repressing writing, mediation, difference

"For Derrida, in other words, what Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism teaches us is that even the most rigorous disciplines outside the province of philosophy remain caught within the foundational incoherence of the metaphysics of presence because, once again, their sponsorship of truth, presence and speech is bought and paid for by the repression of mediation, difference, writing. In this way, Derrida’s critique of metaphysics inevitably takes us beyond the domain of structuralism as well as phenomenology."

 
there is a rich historicity in even "primordial" terms like Being - they stand on a tradition

"Derrida’s critique of metaphysics is in many ways an attempt to reveal what we might call the radical historicity of the present. As he consistently argues, what appear to be timeless or natural ideas – ‘being’, ‘truth’ etc. – are actually anything but. Yet, this argument also applies to the philosophical idea of ‘history’ itself, our very understanding of what history is and how it works."

 
duh. history is written by victors, as interpreted by them, as they would like the future to see them. it is understood by the future as something understood through the lens of the future, a future full of historicity as it's been interpreted through our changing views over time

"If what we understand as ‘history’ depends upon a metaphysics of presence, Derrida’s aim is once again to show how that idea of history is itself a historical construction: it cannot be taken as truth. Finally, then, Derrida’s critique of the philosophical concept of ‘history’ seeks to do what he does to any other metaphysical idea, namely, to reveal the open-ended network of differences on which it resides: no historical moment, body of thought, epoch or tradition, is ever wholly at one with itself because it inevitably contains the traces of what precedes and follows it. In Derrida’s hands, what we might call the metaphysical concept of history – where a succession of present moments are strung together like pearls on a neck-lace – begins to unravel into a more complex, plural or differential set of relations between past, present and future: ‘there is not one single history, a general history, but rather histories’ (p. 58" Chapter 2: A Guide to the Text

 
everything is contaminated as writing - language IS writing

"Finally, and most importantly, Derrida will propose that the metaphysical or logocentric commitment to speech depends upon a foundational contradiction or tension: all language – both speech and writing – is characterised by the essential mediation that metaphysics historically assigns to ‘writing’ alone. If the guarantee of truth – speech – is already contaminated with ‘writing’, we will also begin to see that this has important implications for our concept of a pure and unmediated ‘presence’ itself: we cannot gain access to a presence – a ‘there’ – that exists wholly independently of linguistic mediation. For Derrida, as 42 Derrida’s Of Grammatology we will now see, the theory of the linguistic sign represents a privileged symptom of this entire problematic: it is the sign – more than anything else – that is the site of his questioning of logocentrism. What, then, is Derrida’s argument?"

 
deconstruction

"To introduce his own reading of logocentrism, Derrida somewhat mysteriously says that what is required is ‘not the demolition, but the de-sedimentation, the deconstruction’ of the logos’ (p. 10/21)."

 
deconstruction then aims to understand how the text came about - what made it so. in this sense anything spoken is equally spoken for a deeper reason. the natural condition of our feelings for instance depend on what is considered natural. if tech is natural, what tech? Turkle text would say otherwise, as would i... but even the current human condition is far from its initial natural state, as witnessed also by Ong... speech changed a lot over time, probably also during the time until literacy

"For Derrida, what deconstruction attempts to do is to articulate the – often hidden or repressed – conditions according to which it is possible for any structure to be constituted in the first place. In Derrida’s own words, deconstruction signifies the ‘undoing, decomposing and de-sedimenting of structures’ in order to ‘understand how an “ensemble” was constituted and to reconstruct it to this end’."

 
but yet the de-constructiion is done by someone, with their understanding of the text in question, so isnt it more like me + author

"It is also important to stress that ‘deconstruction’ is not a new theory, technique or methodology that we can simply apply to particular texts in the way that we might, for example, do a Marxist or a Freudian ‘reading’ of a novel. As we have already begun to see by looking at the way in which Derrida reads Husserl and Lévi-Strauss, deconstruction is not something we do to a text from the ‘outside’, so to speak, so much as something that we reveal about the way in which any text is internally constructed. If Derrida’s reading of the privileged texts of logocentrism has a purpose, it is not to establish some superior position of knowledge or authority so much as to tease out the immanent contradictions within the texts themselves: Husserl is criticised by none other than Husserl and Lévi-Strauss by no one but Lévi-Strauss."

 
but yet individuals possess differt readings? does this mean that while deconstruction is always already taking place, would it not stop to be so without humans? as such some agency in this equation must lie with us

"For Derrida, then, the process of reading is not a question of actively ‘deconstructing’ logocentrism so much as showing that the metaphysics of presence is already in a process of what we might call ‘self-deconstruction’ insofar as it has a ‘self ’ at all: it has no full or ‘present’ ground or foundation on which to base itself and so it exists in a permanent state of instability or contingency."

 
aristotle - any sign belongs to some mental idea

"It establishes an absolutely fundamental point about the sign that will endure all the way up to the present day: a sign is always a sign or re-presentation of some pre-existing idea or mental experience."

 
writi is a sign of a sign according to aristotle. derrida believes spoken words are no different

"If speech directly signifies the ideas or intentions of the person speaking, in other words, writing only has a second-hand relation to thought because it is nothing more than a sign of a sign. The written signifier is merely the sign of the spoken signifier, in other words, whereas the spoken signifier is the sign of the signified idea or thought"

 
whether the pure presence lies with god or with speaker, the sign remains theological

"If Saussure and other modern linguists obviously dispense with any belief in a creator god lying behind the sign, Derrida has little difficulty in showing that they still retain a residually theological investment in what he calls a ‘transcendental signified’ – an ultimate presence – which anchors all meaning in itself: the presence of God is merely replaced by the presence of the speaker, of his or her thoughts and feelings, and so on. In this sense, Derrida argues that the age of the sign is essentially theological: ‘the sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth’ (p. 14/25)."

 
all signs are characterised by the inescapable means of the metaphysical as a state of mediation

"However, we will see later on that all signs are characterised by this state of mediation – which makes it impossible for them to directly relate to a ‘present’ meaning or signified – and so what logocentrism attributes to ‘writing’ actually describes the state of language as such."

 
it is the becoming aware of this condition that allows closing of thebook - but deconstruction is still infinite. stage of destruction,name is deceptive

"For Derrida, as we will see in the next section, every signifier can be seen as a mere ‘a signifier of a signifier’ – to quote the famous logocentric dismissal of writing – as opposed to something that relates directly to a present signified: what we call ‘writing’ is another name 50 Derrida’s Of Grammatology for the original condition of language as a whole (p. 7/16). Finally, then, it becomes clear that what enables us to ‘close the book’ on logocentrism is this recognition of the inescapably mediated status of all signs: we cannot gain access to a full or present signified, meaning or logos. The ‘death’ of the civilisation of the book, then, signifies the growing awareness that writing cannot be traced back to a pure or unmediated presence, in the way that we can trace the words of a book back to the author who wrote them. This new concept of writing, and indeed language as a whole, has been emerging for a long time, Derrida argues, but it is now beginning to manifest itself in the form of a series of contemporary developments in post-war philosophy, science and thought (p. 6/15–16). Enter grammatology."

 
heidegger - language speaks man, insofar as it calls out from something within the dasein (things that constitute the world of dasein)

"On the contrary, language is a defining condition of everything that we understand as constituting the sphere of the human: consciousness, thought, expression, culture.6 Martin Heidegger, for instance, famously argues that it is language that ‘speaks’ man – rather than the other way around – in the sense that it names or calls into existence the things that constitute the world of Dasein.7 Now, this concept of language as something that does not merely describe the world, but actively constructs the way in which we experience it, is intensified by the structuralist revolution."

 
language puts things into focus for Saussure

"For Ferdinand de Saussure, linguistic signs give shape and clarity to what would otherwise be a shadowy flux of impressions in the same way that a pair of glasses gives definition to the sight of a myopic person: it is only because I have the sign of a ‘table’ – both the signifier and the idea or concept signified by it – that I am able to make sense of the real, actual object in front of me. If Saussure is concerned with how language mediates or constructs our experience of the real world, his structuralist successors go on to extend his principles from language to reality itself: our engagement with the real world itself – the world that supposedly lies beyond language – is structured according to models of signification drawn from Saussure’s linguistics."

 
as writing becomes increasingly primary, so will its effects on us be more pronounced. it has already had psychosocial effects. chatbots alter how we write, what does that mean for us? if knowledge becomes surface level, as it increasingly has in education over the past twenty years, then what knowledge mesns is re-written, and the consequences are massive

"For Derrida, however, this ‘linguistic’ turn is in the process of being superseded by what we might call a ‘scriptural’ turn. It is now writing, and not language in general, that has become the dominant means of explaining consciousness, culture, the psyche and so on: ‘[n]ow we tend to say “writing” for all that and more’ (p. 9/19)."

 
writing was ways already there, no origin. only in the Derridaean sense - writing signs of course different

"Derrida’s concept of an ‘originary writing’ is not an attempt to establish a new point of origin – as if it would be plausible to say that writing really did evolve before speech – but a way of calling into question the very idea of an origin, an absolute beginning, a pure historical, theological or philosophical point of ‘presence’ to which everything can be traced back."

 
writing makes science possible

"writing cannot be the object of a science, Derrida argues, because it is what makes scientific study possible in the first place. Why is this? For Derrida, as we saw in our discussion of Husserl, writing is the sole means by which we can record, preserve and transmit our thoughts and thus establish something as ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘objectivity’ in the first place: the written text is what enables the objects of geometry to transcend the mind of the 58 Derrida’s Of Grammatology first geometers, for instance, and become universal objects for everyone"

 
signifier snd signified linked together, like two sides of a piece of paper

"For Saussure, as we will see, the signifier and the signified – the physical mark and the concept it refers to – are inextricably linked to one another like two sides of the same sheet of paper:"

 
in this sense, llms do not possess language like that of humans, but something else.

"According to Saussure’s structure-based approach, language is not a nomenclature, that is, a series of names for pre-existing objects in the outside world. On the contrary, it is a system that acquires meaning through its own internal structure and relations."

 
its arbitrary. no natural reason a cat is called a cat

"To introduce another important point, however, Saussure argues that the relation between any given signifier and signified is arbitrary. It is motivated by tradition or convention, in other words, rather than by any perceived ‘natural resemblance’ between sound and concept. If I use the sound ‘cat’ to refer to the concept of a cat, it is not because there is any natural relation between this particular signifier and signified but rather because it is accepted that the two go together within the conventions of the English language: the convention is very different in the French and Italian languages, for instance, where other signifiers (‘chat’ or ‘gatto’) relate to the signified."

 
saussure. any signs acquires meaning through difference

"Finally, and most importantly, however, Saussure also argues that any linguistic sign only acquires its meaning through its difference from other linguistic signs rather than through any ‘positive’ value it might possess in itself. The meaning of any sign is determined by its difference – both phonic and conceptual – from other signs within the system. This complex linguistic system – arbitrary, conventional and differential – is the basis for our experience of the world outside language."

 
saussure worry about writing becoming primary. his worried might be misplaced, but there are other concerns, namely lack of sociality, etc.

"Intriguingly, he is especially worried that writing may displace speech from its position at the centre of language and reverse the natural order of the spoken and the written word. What concerns him is that the written word – because it seems to represent a more durable, lasting mode of signification than speech – will gradually come to be seen as representative of language as a whole. Now, this would be an absolute disaster, in his view, because writing mediates, or even breaks, what he sees as the ‘natural bond’ between sound and sense. If writing is taken to represent language as whole, Saussure predicts, all sorts of apocalyptic catastrophes will ensue. The spelling of a word will come to influence, and even modify, the way in which that word is said, he says, and even in his own time this is leading to terrible mispronunciations. This scenario will not strike many readers as particularly awful though – is mispronunciation really such a disaster"

 
signs contain traces of other signs, which me visible differences

"The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it. ( Course, pp. 117–18) What exactly is Saussure saying here? If any one sign has meaning, it is not because it possesses any content or substance in itself but because it differs – both phonically and conceptually – from other signs within the linguistic system. The sign ‘cat’ (regardless of whether we see it from the perspective of the sound or the concept) exists within a prior network of relations to other signs (‘hat’, ‘bat’ and so on). There is a paradoxical sense in which the idea of a singular or unique sign is, then, something of a contradiction-in-terms. This is because any apparently singular, ‘present’ and independent sign necessarily contains within it the traces of other signs within the system against which it is to be defined. In Derrida’s view, as we will A Guide to the Text 67 see in a moment, this theory has radical implications for the logocentric theory of the sign."

 
language as a species of writing

"The fact is that every signifier might best be described as a ‘signifier of a signifier’ because, according to Saussure’s own theory, every sign works by referring to other signs within the system rather than to some positive content of its own. There is an important sense, then, in which the lowly position of writing – inferior, derivative, always at one step removed from the main action – accurately describes the position of language as a whole. This means that writing is not so much ‘comparable’ to language as the other way around: language might even be described as a species of writing (p. 52/75)."

 
arche-writing

"Derrida’s contention is that the position historically attributed to ‘writing’ in western culture actually describes the condition of all language whatsoever: what is called ‘writing’ names the framework ‘common to all systems of signification’ (p. 46/68) whether they be spoken, written, drawn, electronically recorded or transmitted. Indeed, he goes to great pains to distinguish this ‘originary’ concept of writing from what he calls the ‘vulgar’ or conventional idea of writing as a set of empirical marks, letters or inscriptions (p. 46/68)."

 
originary trace

"To put it simply, what Derrida calls the originary trace represents his most systematic attempt to articulate this central point in the Grammatology: mediation goes all the way down."

 
originary trace as linked to saussure

"To recall Saussure’s argument, linguistic signs are not constituted by any intrinsic phonic or conceptual substance – a particular sound or idea that is inherent to that sign itself – but by their difference from other signs in the system. If every sign in the system obtains its identity through its difference from all the other signs, then this means every sign is intrinsically marked by what it is not. Every sign must retain the traces of the other signs against which it is to be defined, in other words, in order to have any meaning at all."

 
the pure trace is differance

"‘ the (pure) trace’ he declares, is différance [ la trace (pure) et la différance]’ (p. 62/92)."

 
on Differance

"says this: ‘[w]e shall designate by the term différance the movement by which any language, or any code, any system of reference in general, becomes “historically” constituted as a fabric of differences’ (p. 141)."

 
originsry trace shows that signs first refer to other signs, meaning no such thing as a pure thought or concept

"However, what the originary trace shows us is that every sign first refers to other signs, as opposed to some ‘present’ concept that is not itself a sign. We can see, then, that the originary trace throws the whole logocentric concept of the sign into crisis by proposing that we never arrive at a simple or unmediated meaning: nothing is unmediated. For Derrida, every signifier relates to other signifiers that surround it in space and time and so we can never reach a pure thought or concept – a signified – that exists in and of itself independently of all signifiers: what is supposedly beyond language is plunged back into language. If we take a very simple example of this, it becomes much clearer: every time we look up a word in the dictionary – ‘love’, for example – what we find is not the meaning of that word but merely other words that act as synonyms for it (‘love’ means ‘adoration’ or ‘desire’) or even antonyms (‘love’ means the opposite of ‘hate’)."

 
thought is differance, then

"In Derrida’s account, all thought remains caught with the network of spatial and temporal differentiation that is the ‘trace’: ‘ We think only in signs’ (p. 50/73, English in original)."

 
originary trace paradoxical

"According to the same logic, the trace is neither sensible nor intelligible. It is not something that can be recognised by our senses (like a sound or smell), in other words, nor something that can be conceived within our minds (like an idea or concept). On the one hand, we cannot see or hear it because, it is nothing but the difference between spoken or written marks. On the other, we cannot quite think it either 74 Derrida’s Of Grammatology because, once again, the difference between ideas or concepts cannot, strictly speaking, itself be a concept (p. 62/92–3)."

 
interior requires traces of exterior - husserl

"In Derrida’s readings of Husserl, for example, we saw how the supposed purity of our interior consciousness requires the traces of the ‘external’ world (communication, indication, writing) in order to relate to itself in the first place: what is apparently ‘outside’ is already ‘inside’ (p. 44/65)."

 
originary trace already there

"For Derrida, the trace cannot be traced to any point of simple spatial or temporal presence – whether a present that is now past or one that is yet to come – because it is the underlying differential condition of any ‘presence’ whatsoever. In Derrida’s own paradoxical phrase, the originary trace can never be ‘there’ because it is ‘always-already-there [ toujours déjà-lá]’: it both recedes into an infinite past and projects itself into an infinite future (p. 66/97)."

 
trace is origin of meaning

"the logic of metaphysics? In simple terms, the trace is prior to every metaphysical concept because it is the movement of différance – of differing and deferring – that allows them to appear as concepts in the first place: ‘[ t] he trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general’ (pp. 62/95)."

 
exceeds "what is?"

"Quite simply, the whole point of the trace is that it is an orginary condition of mediation, synthesis or complexity rather than a present being, thing or entity: ‘[t]he trace is nothing, it is not an entity, it exceeds the question What is?’ (p. 75/110)."

 
no pure origin

"To declare that ‘everything begins with the trace’, then, is not an attempt to posit some new, even more fundamental point of origin, in other words, but to assert that there is no pure, simple or present origin in the first place (p. 65/95). For Derrida, that is to say, any origin is always multiple: what claims to be a singular point of origin must always define itself against something that it is not, dividing itself in at least two, multiplying itself like a cell through a process of infinite differing/deferring"

 
nothing is ever purely present or absent

"What should be opposed and hierarchised terms presuppose one another. To Derrida’s eyes, any value that metaphysics posits as ‘present’ – speech, nature, consciousness – is thus always already spreading or dispersing outwards into a network of traces, differences and mediations: nothing is ever purely present or absent."

 
desire for presence both possible and impossible

"In what is now a A Guide to the Text 77 famous argumentative move, Derrida contends that the originary trace thus places every metaphysics of presence in a curious double-bind: it is both what makes the desire for presence possible in the first place and what makes the fulfilment of that desire impossible."

 
languagee always already a writing

"Now, Lévi-Strauss himself portrays writing as something that arrives to violate a place or moment of pure presence from ‘outside’, but what Derrida is once again going to show is that this foreign body is already intrinsic to language itself: we must articulate the ‘originary violence of a language which is always already a writing’ (p. 106/156)."

 
fall within nature

"all language – whether it be the ‘speech’ of the Nambikwara or the ‘writing’ of Lévi-Strauss himself – is already a species of a more originary and generalised ‘writing’ and this compels him to re-think the Rousseauean mythology of a fall from a prelapsarian utopia. In Derrida’s words, we are not dealing with a fall from nature into culture, peace into violence or speech into writing so much as a fall within nature itself, which is thus revealed to be never quite ‘natural’ in the first place."

 
us and them

"As Derrida argues, what seems like an innocent anecdote actually belongs to an eighteenth-century A Guide to the Text 85 tradition of confessional writing whereby autobiography is the basis for a philosophical reflection upon the relation between nature and society, between an ‘ideal’ society and ‘real’ society or, to put it more bluntly, between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (pp. 113–14/166)."

 
reverse ethnocentrism

"For Derrida, the larger Rousseauean agenda of this narrative is also clear: Lévi-Strauss is not so much seeking to discover the way of life of any particular people but the ideal basis of human society as a whole (p. 115/169–70). In fact, Lévi-Strauss’s anthropology might be suspected of a kind of reverse ethnocentrism: what begins as an almost Marxian critique of attempts to impose western culture on other peoples as if it were a universal standard ends up setting up a thoroughly romanticised version of non-western culture as the ideal by which all humanity is to be judged."

 
peter is different to tom. saussure differential theory of language

"According to Saussure’s differential theory of language – which, as we have seen, heavily influences Lévi-Strauss’s anthropology – a proper name can only be proper if it exists in a relation to other proper names: ‘Peter’ is only meaningful because it is different from ‘Mary’. Now, the upshot of this position is that no name can ever be ‘proper’ in and of itself – in the sense that it refers solely, directly and uniquely, to what it names – and this leads Derrida to speak of the ‘death’ of absolutely proper naming (p. 109/164). To Derrida’s eyes, in other words, it thus becomes possible to speak of an ‘originary’ violence at work in the act of naming because the very structure of language itself violates the supposed propriety, the supposedly unique status, of the proper name: ‘Anterior to the possibility of violence in the current and derivative sense’ he argues, we find ‘the violence of the arche-writing, the violence of difference, of classification, and of 88 Derrida’s Of Grammatology the system of appellations’ (p. 110/162). For"

 
law

"To put it in a word, then, Derrida argues that the second level of violence is the institution of law. However, once again this seems a somewhat strange move to make: law is commonly seen as that which puts an end to violence, that which restores or protects a state of peace, so why see it as representing a new form of violence? Quite simply, the answer is that what we call the ‘law’ can only meet violence with violence. The institution of law by the Nambikwara cannot actually restore an original state of peace in which all proper names are respected, for no such state ever existed, so all it can do is more or less violently suppress the violence of language itself under the guise of ‘justice’ ‘morality’ or ‘society’. This apparent attempt to preserve the so-called ‘proper’ names by forbidding their disclosure is, Derrida argues, thus actually what makes those names proper in the first place. For Derrida, then, it is the identification of, and prohibition against, something called ‘impropriety’ that produces the illusion of a pre-existing state of ‘propriety’. In other words, the institution of law manufactures the very state of original ‘propriety’ it claims to protect: ‘the so-called proper, substitute of the deferred proper, perceived by the social and moral consciousness as the proper’ (p. 112/165)."

 
the violence of writing

"For Derrida, this story reveals that the violence of writing – the network of differences, relations and mediation which interrupts every pure, unique or self-identical meaning – is at work within Nambikwara society long before the advent of writing in the accepted, empirical sense of that term: what Lévi-Strauss persists in calling ‘peace’ is already a state of violence. In the next part of the chapter, Derrida pursues this insight into a reading of another pivotal scene in Tristes tropiques called the ‘writing lesson’."

 
therecis already differance or archewriting which opens up speech

"For Derrida, in other words, an ‘originary’ writing appears well before writing in the narrow sense: it is ‘already in the différance or the arche- writing that opens speech itself ’ (p. 128/186)."

 
levi strauss

"If the epoch of writing is characterised by anything, it is less the advancement of knowledge than the extension of power, domination and segregation through political, economic and administrative elites: the historic function of writing has been to reinforce the power of the few rather than to bring knowledge to the many."

 
grammatology is study of writing

"grammatology, properly understood, is the study of what writing is, when and how it originated, and the ways in which it differs from other forms of communication like speech. For Derrida, the study of writing goes as far back as Plato but, strictly speaking, the science of ‘grammatology’ itself is a more modern one"

 
scientific knowledge contingent on writing... duh

"However, we have already seen in the last chapter that, if anything, the exact opposite is the case. For Derrida, scientific knowledge is contingent upon the invention of writing: any objective or universal truth that remains the same for everyone, everywhere throughout space and time is only possible on the basis of it being preserved, recorded and transmitted through writing."

 
concentrated power contingent on writing

"Derrida agrees that this claim may well be historically incontestable: the invention of writing undoubtedly makes possible both the concentration of power in the hands of a small elite and the delegation, deferment or stockpiling of power. Arguably, Lévi-Strauss has not gone far enough in asserting the relation between writing and power: Derrida would say that even the most primitive agricultural societies begin to possess a kind of arche-writing from the moment they begin to organise themselves in a economic way by deferring immediate consumption of their harvests, putting produce into reserve for the next season and so on (p. 130/190). Moreover, Derrida questions what he sees as an uncritical tendency in Lévi-Strauss’s work to simply equate the establishment of political hierarchies with political exploitation and domination: ‘[p]olitical power [for Lévi-Strauss – AB] can only be the custodian of an unjust power’ (p. 131/191)."

 
peace contains traces of violence. we cannot escape meta physics

"Derrida’s attempt to posit an originary violence within the primitivist utopia occupied by the Nambikwara is not to deny the violence that western colonialism has wreaked upon them, nor to imply a moral equivalence between coloniser and colonised, but it is a way of calling into question the possibility of any pure or absolute moral good: whatever we call ‘peace’, however desirable or justifiable it may be, always contains the traces of violence."

 
no ethics without originary trace, differance through an other

"‘There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, and consequently, without absence, disimulation, detour, différance, writing’ (p. 140/202)."

 
rousseau. speech natural, writing barrier. writing substitutes thinking

"Rousseau argues that the spoken word naturally expresses our present thoughts whereas the written word erects an unnecessary material barrier between thought and expression. For Rousseau, predictably, writing starts to become dangerous when it does not merely mediate thought but comes to substitute for it: what begins as merely a representation of something ends up becoming confused with the thing itself"

 
Saussuere. confusing signified and signifier

"Now, we have already seen that this is a recurring fear in the history of logocentrism: Saussure, for instance, is just as fearful of a modern, decadent, culture where the signifier is becoming confused with the signified, the representation with the real presence (p. 42/62–3)."

 
fallibikity of speech, rousseau

"In Derrida’s account, then, Rousseau’s theory accomplishes almost the exact opposite of its apparent intention: what is revealed is less the destructive impact of writing than the fallibility of speech."

 
progress is also a result of differance

"This creates a paradoxical situation within Rousseau’s thought whereby his philosophy of education comes into conflict with his political critique of civil society. In other words, the very thing that makes human progress possible – the supplement – is also the beginning of humanity’s fall into the corruption of civil society (p. 147/211)."

 
natural supplement

"In Derrida’s paradoxical terminology, then, we can begin to speak of a ‘natural’ supplement in the same way that we have spoken of an arche-writing or an ‘originary’ trace: ‘the supplement comes naturally to put itself in Nature’s place’ (p. 149/214"

 
makes sense in a society of isolation... people accept the image of what they want, which today is that of the screen

"Quite simply, Derrida argues that Rousseau’s masturbation begins to assume a role that is greater than that of a mere ‘supplement’ to nature: what should be an inferior substitute for a more complete and satisfying form of sexual experience actually becomes the only means of experiencing satisfaction completely and directly. If Rousseau prefers to give up sex for masturbation, Derrida contends that it is because auto-eroticism appears to enable the philosopher to ‘make present’ a string of absent love objects in imaginary or symbolic form: Rousseau’s memories, desires and wishes about the various women in his life can be instantly activated, and satisfied, in auto-erotic fantasy in a way that could never happen in real life. For Derrida, in other words, it is clear that what we generally take to be the sign of the futility of onanism – the fact that it never involves anyone from the world outside the subject – is rather the guarantee of its total fulfilment (p. 154/221)."

 
follow on from previous. it is all cinema, illusions, a lack of real protentions, desires replaced by drives. very much what Stiegler is getting at

"Yet, it remains the case that Rousseau is still sexually frustrated despite this retreat into the world of pure auto-affection. As Derrida goes on to argue, the reason for this is that the immediate ‘present’ delivered to him in the form of auto-erotic fantasy is, of course, nothing but an illusion: Rousseau realises that the signs that substitute for the absence of real women in the philosopher’s sex life remain just signs (p. 154/221). So, upon Derrida’s reading, Rousseau’s auto-erotic experience epitomises what he calls the logic of the supplement: what arrives on the scene to add to, or enrich, a supposedly pure presence also reveals – by virtue of its very necessity – that pure presence has never existed. If masturbatory fantasy is the only way of experiencing the pure pleasure that can never be delivered up by real life, this is another way of saying that there is no pure pleasure as such. In other words, the very thing that appears to give access to pure and immediate presence – the supplement – is also what ensures that presence will never be given as such: ‘something promises itself as it hides itself, gives itself as it moves itself away, and strictly speaking it cannot even be called presence’ (p. 154/222, translation modified"

 
it becomes an escape from the "natural". could llms be viewed in this way when it comes to writing? not just an alleged time saver, but a shield

"Finally, however, Derrida argues that masturbation plays one more unusual role within Rousseau’s life and text: what starts out as a dangerous supplement to the full presence of sex with women paradoxically ends up as a form of protection against a certain danger within this form of presence itself. It is revealing that Rousseau ultimately comes to see auto-eroticism less as a waste of natural energy and more as a means of safeguarding his hypersensitive nature against the dangerously unmitigated pleasure of sex with women: self-abuse turns out to be a form of self-preservation. According to his Confessions, the philosopher abstains from ‘cohabitation with women’ altogether in his middle age on the grounds that the intensity of the experience might damage his fragile health or even kill him.18 For Derrida, Rousseau’s recourse to masturbation as an act of protection against the perils of a real, live sexual encounter with another person once again reveals a certain frailty or insufficiency within pure, unmediated ‘presence’. What is supposedly ‘natural’ or ‘healthy’ is actually a form of sickness that we need to immunise ourselves against. Yet, why is pure presence equated with sickness, or even death, as opposed to life, fullness or plenitude? To embrace presence is to reject life itself. If we could ever really experience pure presence as such – something that was absolutely and unchangingly present in space and time – Derrida argues that this could only be because that thing was entirely lacking in duration, movement, difference, in short, life: this is why Rousseau himself recognises that ‘presence’ is merely another name for death (p. 155/223)."

 
reality is experienced by reducing the supplement

"‘reality’ can only be experienced at one remove through the auto-erotic supplement: ‘hetero-eroticism . . . can be lived . . . only through the ability to reserve within itself its own supplementary protection’ (p. 155/223)."

 
the supplement is originary

"Derrida’s proposition is that the supplement does not add to what was once a pure or complete presence but rather compensates for a ‘presence’ that never actually existed in the first place. To put it in a word, Derrida’s now very familiar argument is that the ‘supplement’ is originary: what A Guide to the Text 109 appears to be a pure or complete moment of presence once again depends for any identity it may possess on its relation to other elements that are not simply present. If such a pure, self-sufficient moment of presence – whether we call it nature, or speech, or sexuality – ever existed, there would no need to produce endless chains of supplements to compensate for its deficiencies."

 
psychoanalysis equally resides within language. what is the subconscious if not the subconscious or a description thereof?

"For Derrida, the problem with psychoanalysis and any other reading that seeks to refer to the world ‘beyond’ the text is that it flies in the face of what we have seen to be the inextricable relationship between the signifier and the signified: we can never gain access to a ‘transcendental signified’ – a mythical beyond – that exists in and of itself independently of all signifiers (p. 159/229). In other words, everything that psychoanalysis and other such methodologies presumes lies outside language – the unconscious, sexuality, history, the real world – cannot be divorced from language itself."

 
no outside text

"‘ there is no outside-text [ il n’y a pas de hors-texte]’ (p. 158/227, translation modified)."

 
no pure presence

"Derrida’s claim that ‘ il n’y a pas de hors-texte’ is neither an attempt to assert that language is the only reality nor to deny the existence of reality per se but rather to stress the impossibility of gaining access to any pure or immediate presence that exists wholly independently of the processes of difference and deferral: Rousseau was never purely or simply ‘there’ in the first place."

 
empiricism is philosophy's account of what non-philosophy should look like

"what philosophy derides as ‘empiricism’ is not actually non-philosophical at all because it only has meaning within the conceptual oppositions determined by metaphysics itself: the rational versus the empirical, the theoretical versus the practical and, more generally, the ‘philosophical’ versus the ‘non-philosophical’. If it seems that empiricism is somehow ‘outside’ metaphysics, in other words, it actually remains a metaphysical concept through and through: empiricism is philosophy’s own idea of what non-philosophy should look like"

 
no pure point of departure. we must start where we are

"For Derrida, his inability to offer an absolute justification for his own reading is neither a rejection of theory nor an embrace of practice but rather the upshot of his attempt to question the metaphysical desire for an absolute ground, origin or foundation on which to base all knowledge. In the absence of any true point of origin, we must begin ‘ wherever we are’ he writes, because the thought of the ‘originary’ trace has already taught us that it is ‘impossible to justify a point of departure absolutely’ (p. 162/233)."

 
the supplement

"For Derrida, then, we might say that the ‘supplement’ is exorbitant in every sense of the term. It is a kind of structural ‘blindspot [ tâche aveugle]’ that resists every attempt to explain it with reference to the categories of metaphysics (p. 163/234). Accordingly, we can see the supplement as neither an addition nor a substitute, neither good nor evil, neither passive nor active, neither a conscious theme in Rousseau’s text nor a manifestation of the unconscious of the author, neither within the enclosure of the text itself, nor ‘outside’ it in some, supposedly extra-textual, ‘real’ world."

 
rousseau - writing buy precision at a price

"writing buys a greater precision but only at the expense of the immediacy and expressiveness of speech."

 
the cold northeners

"Again, Rousseau draws an important distinction, but this time it is between languages of the north and south. On the one side, ‘southern’ languages are said to spring from passion: the warm climate, fertile soil and conditions in Southern Europe and Africa provide man with everything he needs to subsist so he only has to use language in order to express his desires. On the other, however, ‘northern’ languages are deemed to be the result of direct physical need: the cold climate, poor earth and meagre conditions in northern Europe mean that language developed first and foremost as a way of surviving. In Rousseau’s pithy summation, the first words of southern man were ‘love me’ ( aimez-moi) whereas the first words of northern man were ‘help me’ ( aidez-moi) (p. 279)."

 
lifeless harmony

"Rousseau makes an important distinction between two different modes of music: melody and harmony. If melody is the pure expression of our passions, the evolution of harmony introduces a fatal complexity, abstraction and artificiality into music. Just as the written word sacrifices the passion of speech for greater precision of expression, so harmony surrenders the pure and immediate expressiveness of melody in favour of elaborate but lifeless harmonic arrangements (pp. 295–8)."

 
why is the supplement necessary? because the pure origin never existed in the first place

"the originary presence of speech is supplemented by writing, nature by culture, interiority by exteriority, sex by masturbation and so on endlessly. For Rousseau himself, of course, each supplement is nothing more than a pure addition to an origin that is already fully present in itself: what is added is quite literally nothing – a spare part – because the origin itself does not need anything to complete it (p. 167/238). However, the obvious question that follows from here is – if the origin requires no supplement and the supplement adds nothing to the origin – then why does the supplement ever come into existence, why is it necessary?"

 
language and music

"On the contrary, it is the ‘major preoccupation’ of Rousseau’s text (p. 195/279) because the story of language is intimately bound up with the story of music: both begin as ways of giving voice to our passions. To put it in Rousseau’s own words: ‘passion rouses all of the [vocal] organs’ and so song and speech have ‘a common origin’ ( Discourses, p. 282). If language and music have the same origin, however, they also share the same fate: what begins as a simple expression of passion quickly degenerates into a cold, abstract and expres-sionless form."

 
rousseau why oh why harmony

"Upon Rousseau’s reading, then, the first form of music can only have been melody. It is melody, as a monophonic sequence of pure sounds, that is closest to the cry of passion that, for the philosopher, represents the origin of language: ‘melody expresses plaints, cries of suffering or of joy, threats, moans’ ( Discourses, p. 287). Inasmuch as it involves a complex interplay of sounds, harmony is obviously at one remove from this state of nature: ‘what have chords in common with our passions?’ he rhetorically demands (p. 287)."

 
rousseau - death of melody and music

"In Rousseau’s tragic account, contemporary music has lost all connection with the passions that originally gave it life and degenerated into pure harmony (p. 298)."

 
what is the lack that LLMs reveal?

"In Derrida’s account, of course, the answer is by now obvious: the supplement does not add to nature but reveal a lack – an originary difference – within the natural itself ( Grammatology, p. 214/308)."

 
rousseau - the supplement necessitates itself

"To put it in a nutshell, what Rousseau calls ‘nature’ is not complete in itself but is rather an originary deficiency – a non-identity, mediation or différance – that demands supplementation by imitation: [I]n every imitation, some sort of discourse must always complement the voice of nature. A musician who tries to render noise with noise errs; he knows neither the weaknesses nor the strengths of his art; he judges of it without taste or insight; teach him that he must render noise with song, that if he wished to make frogs croak he would have to make them sing; for it is not enough for him merely to imitate, he must do so in a way that both moves and pleases, otherwise his dreary imitation is as nought, and by failing to arouse anyone’s interest, it fails to make any impression. ( Discourse, p. 288) For Derrida, then, it is clear that everything Rousseau seeks to oppose to the pure and unmediated voice of nature – harmony, imitation, culture, society – exists in order to supply, correct, or compensate for, what increasingly looks like an inherent deficiency, which in the above passage is figured as a rawness, ugliness or noise, within that voice that calls for supplementation: what seems to belong outside nature is, as we have seen throughout this book, always already working within it in order to make it what it should be in the first place. What implications, then, does this ‘becoming-supplemental’ of nature itself hold for Rousseau’s theory of the origin of language?"

 
what rousseau means to say, what he cannot help to say

"Once again, what Derrida is trying to do here is to identify a point of A Guide to the Text 127 ‘exorbitancy’ in Rousseau’s text where the philosopher’s declared aims or intentions are overtaken or surprised by larger forces. For Derrida, it is this gap between what Rousseau declares and what he actually describes – what he means to say and what he cannot help but say – that is the site of his own reading."

 
no such thing as absolutely north and south

"Yet, Rousseau’s account of the origin of language tries to freeze this essential relativity and variability into a set of static, absolute differences. Every language is assigned an absolutely fixed position on the globe – either the North Pole or the South Pole – as if no position between these two extremities could possibly exist! For Derrida, in other words, Rousseau’s attempt to claim that the true origin of language lies in a so-called absolute South is at odds with what it describes: we cannot say that any language is absolutely ‘northern’ or ‘southern’ because languages have, at best, a relative position in the world. If Rousseau seeks to distinguish categorically between northern and southern languages, Derrida’s argument is that this distinction is rather a question of degree: we can speak of languages that are more ‘northern’ and less ‘southern’ – more passionate and less necessary – but we cannot make any absolute distinction between the two. In this sense, what Rousseau’s attempt to distinguish between north and south actually describes is not a polar opposition between two diametrically opposed kinds of language but a more subtle, less clear-cut distribution of forces within every single language: every language contains elements of both north and south, passion and need ( Grammatology, p. 217/310)."

 
language of need and passion

"Derrida goes to great lengths to show how the language of need is ‘forever related’ to the language of passion ‘persevering in it, submitting to it or controlling it’ (p. 223/319).22 In this sense, we must see the language of need as a supplement to the language of passion in the full sense of that term: what Rousseau calls the ‘North’ is not somewhere that exists at the furthest remove from the one true origin of language, in other words, but is rather the outworking of ‘another origin’ that compensates for what the first origin lacks (p. 224/319)."

 
language is always already articulate

"Derrida once again seeks to question this mythological account of a fall from a pure, self-present and undifferentiated state of nature into the atomised, divided and unequal world of modern, civic society. If Rousseau typically presents articulation as a degeneration or catastrophe that affects the original condition of language from without, as if the peoples of the northern hemisphere were not human beings at all but aliens from another planet, what his own account again reveals is that the apparent ‘supplement’ is essential to what it supplements. Just as melody is harmony, south is north, and passion is need, so we will discover that language is always already articulate from the very beginning (p. 229/325)."

 
all language is writing

"Derrida’s account, as we will see later on, this insight has important knock-on effects for Rousseau’s theory of writing as well because, for the latter, the defining quality of the written word is nothing other than this articulacy: the claim that all ‘language is articulate’ is thus another way of saying that ‘all language is writing’ (p. 229/326)."

 
language is born from writing - its own degeneration

"For Rousseau, the origin of human language does not lie in any particular organ, such as the larynx or vocal chords, so much as in the acquisition of the necessary signs, symbols or conventions that enable us to communicate ideas in the form of sounds: ‘[c]onventional language belongs to man alone’ ( Discourses, p. 252). If human beings must first acquire a repertoire of complex cultural conventions in order to express even our most basis passions – love, anger, pity and so on – then it becomes difficult to see how Rousseau can speak of a ‘natural’ language at all: the use of conventional language is, on the contrary, precisely what distinguishes human life from the natural world. The argument that the pure, inarticulate cry of nature is not yet language in any meaningful sense of the term leads us to the conclusion that what characterises language is nothing other than articulation. This capacity to articulate sound, to cut up the cry of nature up into what Saussure would call a series of phonic signifiers, is the basis of all human language whether northern or southern, passionate or necessary. So, in a paradoxical sense, then, what Rousseau presents as the ruination of language – the intervention of difference, spacing, supplementarity in the form of articulation – is actually its condition of possibility: ‘ language is born out of the process of its own degeneration’ Derrida writes ( Grammatology, p. 242/344)."

 
harmony supplants melody. rousseau

"As we know, Rousseau’s text understands the history of language as the progression, or rather regression, from one supplement for the origin to another: harmony supplements melody, articulation replaces accent, etc. To Derrida’s eyes, however, it is writing that is the supplement par excellence in the Essay: what happens when the written word comes on the scene is the final triumph of difference over presence, mediation over immediacy, coldness or death over the life and warmth of speech."

 
all language is written

"If all language is articulate from the very outset, however, and all articulation just as inevitably leads to writing, then it logically follows that all language might just as easily be called written: what the historical invention of the written word comes to replace is, paradoxically enough, not speech or expressiveness but a version of itself A Guide to the Text 135 (p. 315/443)."

 
meta physical language unavoidable

"We have no choice but to employ metaphysical language even if what we are attempting to articulate or designate – arche-writing, originary trace or supplementation – is impossible or nonsensical within those terms (p. 314/443)."

 
derrida isnt rejecting metaphysics, but rather accepting it and making it visible. argues for deconstruction as a possibility of dealing with it

"Derrida’s own words, deconstruction escapes the metaphysics of presence by nothing more than a ‘hairsbreadth’ ( une pointe) (p. 315/443), but arguably the major achievement of the Grammatology is to define, map and exist within this vital critical space."

 
grammatology is science of everything

"what Derrida calls ‘writing’ is not simply the condition of language because it also describes the field of consciousness, perception and our experience of ‘reality’ in general. In this sense, what is called ‘grammatology’ is not merely the science of writing but the science of everything: we cannot experience anything in an unmediated way."

 
ethics, levinas, originary trace

"Levinas’s way of thinking, we only begin to acquire our own sense of subjectivity through a feeling of being indebted or responsible to an ‘other [ autrui]’ that exceeds any idea we might have of it.27 For Derrida, it is clear that the logic of the originary trace has profound ethical implications in the manner proposed by Levinas: the structure of ‘the trace’, Derrida says in the Grammatology, is also the structure of the relation to ‘the other’ (p. 47/69). To understand the structure of the originary trace, in other words, is to be aware of the constancy of something or someone absolutely ‘other’ within the order of the ‘same’. Every apparently single, autonomous or self-identical element only acquires its identity by reference to some other element that differs from it in space and time. If we translate this logic into more explicitly ethical terms, we gain a radical new vision of our relation to the world around us, to other people and things, to other ways of living, being or thinking. In Derrida’s account, we do not pre-exist the other as if we all lived in our own private universes and only later decided to enter the outside world: our own identity, subjectivity or sense of self is originally and essentially constituted by a relation to a potentially infinite number of others."

 
but can also be seen less grandly as a means to analyse things

"For Bernard Stiegler, a contemporary philosopher of technology, Derrida’s critique of a real, natural or unmediated ‘presence’ in the name of an originary supplementarity makes possible a new and more radical understanding of the role played by technology in the formation of human life: what is traditionally seen as a mere tool or supplement to nature is in fact the condition of life, thought and our experience of time." Chapter 3: Study Aids

 
deconstruction as a positive process

"First of all, deconstruction is not a philosophical destruction or demolition but an affirmative process that seeks to reconstruct a given system or structure otherwise: it is the ‘undoing, decomposing and de-sedimenting of structures’ in order to ‘understand how an “ensemble” was constituted and to reconstruct it to this end’ (‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, p. 272)."

 
logocentrism historically favours speech. derrida shows its faults

"To Derrida’s eyes, however, what really defines logocentrism is that it always privileges speech ( phone) over writing ( gramme) as the means by which the presence of the logos is expressed: ‘the history of truth has always been . . . the debasement of writing and its repression outside “full” speech’ (p. 3/12). If logocentrism is so deeply ingrained within western thought and culture that we might think it merely describes ‘the way things are’, Derrida shows that it is in fact the product of a set of highly problematic assumptions about presence, speech and particularly writing."

 
metaphysics of presence - not binary oppositions, thoroughly determined by the originary trace, differances

"According to Derrida, the western philosophical tradition from Plato to the present day dogmatically posits a pure, full and unmediated presence as the supreme value. To Derrida’s way of thinking, this ‘presence’ Study Aids 149 can take many forms: the presence of the subject to itself in thought, sight or touch, the presence of something in space and/or time, even a presence which has now been lost or which may be gained in the future. For Derrida, the metaphysics of presence expresses itself through the institution of a series of binary oppositions and hierarchies whereby a superior term will be identified with pure presence and an inferior term with the mediation or loss of that presence: speech versus writing, nature versus culture, the masculine versus the feminine and so on. In the Grammatology, Derrida seeks to deconstruct these binary oppositions by articulating a logic of mediation, difference and deferral that makes them possible in the first place."

 
the supplement - the logic of differance. what should be fully present reveals its lacks

"The Supplement ( le supplément) This is a key term that appears in Derrida’s reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is one of the various ways throughout the Grammatology in which Derrida articulates the logic of difference, deferral and mediation that undercuts the metaphysics of presence. According to Derrida, the figure of the supplement performs two irreconcilable roles within Rousseau’s text. On the one hand, Rousseau continually presents it as an addition to something that is already full, present and sufficient in itself. On the other, Rousseau’s text consistently reveals that it is a substitute, or compensation for, something that is essentially lacking, insufficient in itself (p. 145/208). For Derrida, then, the logic of the supplement becomes a means of deconstructing Rousseau’s logocentric commitment to presence: what should be fully ‘present’ in itself is revealed to contain an essential lack or absence that always calls for supplementation in the first place. In Derrida’s account, we can thus speak of an ‘originary’ supplement in the same way that we would speak of an originary trace, writing or difference."

 
signs obtain meaning only through differance _Generated at: 2026-11-03-09-01-15_

"Derrida argues that every sign can only obtain meaning in itself by differing in space and time from other signs in the linguistic system. To Derrida’s eyes, this means that every sign must originally retain the traces of the other signs against which it is to be defined if it is to achieve any meaning at all. For Derrida, however, this ‘originary’ trace becomes the means for deconstructing not simply Saussure’s theory of the sign but the entire edifice of the metaphysics of presence: it re-describes ‘the entire field of being [ étant], which metaphysics has defined as the being-present [ étant-présent]’ (p. 47/69, translation modified). In Derrida’s account, every supposedly ‘present’ element originally and essentially contains the traces of other elements that are supposedly ‘absent’: nothing, there-fore, is ever wholly present or absent"

Derrida, J. (1997). Of grammatology. Corrected ed. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1967).    
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On what it means to read

"This poses the question of the usage of the word “supplement”: of Rousseau’s situation within the language [langue] and the logic that assures to this word or to this concept sufficiently surprising resources so that the presumed subject of the sentence should always say, using the “supplement,” more, less, or something other than what he would wish to say [voudrait dire]. This question is therefore not only of Rousseau’s writing but also of our reading. We should begin by taking rigorous account of this being held within [prise] or this surprise: the writer writes in a language [langue] and in a logic whose proper system, laws, and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely. He uses them only by letting himself, in a certain way and up to a point, be governed by the system. And the reading must always aim at a certain relationship, unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not command of the patterns of the language that he uses. This relationship is not a certain quantitative distribution of shadow and light, of weakness or of force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should produce.

What does produce mean here? Attempting to explain that, we would initiate a justification of our principles of reading. A justification, as we shall see, entirely negative, outlining by exclusion a space of reading that we will not fill here: a task of reading."

Kuchtová, A. (2024). The incalculability of the generated text. Philosophy & Technology, 37(1), 25.   
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Stiegler, B. (2010). The carnival of the new screen: From hegemony to isonomy. The YouTubereader, 40–59.    
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Writing was initially monopolised

"If it is true that the condition for the constitution of individuation as a diacritic is alphabetic writing—which analyzes, synthesizes and mnemonically reproduces the spoken, just as the audiovisual analyzes, synthesizes and techno-logically reproduces perceptions and sensual fantasies—there are also primary practices of non-reflexive, disindividuating writing: in its first stages of development, writing doesn’t produce any reflexivity. It has at this time essentially an instrumental and controlling accounting function and is reserved for a class of writers who monopolize the knowledge of it—the professionals of the profession at the time were ancestors to the Mandarins, as an inevitable consequence, considering the complexity of writing in ideograms."

 
Sophists abused the "time of available brains" - analogy to modern (2009) tech

"As is well known, the Sophists were accused of exploiting psychopower—the power over young souls, constituted by writing—for manipulating the minds of young Athenians. In a way, philosophy then accuses the Sophists of exploiting the “time of available brains” that can be harnessed and converted into a material good thanks to writing (the Sophist appears primarily as a merchant of illusions in Plato). Sophistico-literal psychopower is artisanal: its foundation is a psychotechnique, which means that the reader is also a writer. In the industrial analog psychopower based on psychotechnologies, the functions of broadcasting and reception are separated just like those of production and consumption, and the constitution of networks allows for massification, the exploitation and the commercialization of the time of consciousness, thereby becoming the time of the available brains without consciousness. The analysis of the Sophist period in Greek history, which is also the origin of philosophy—itself born in its combat against the misuse of writing—is key to the understanding of what is happening in the current discretization of analog media. For if there is a possible analogy between the inception of alphabetic writing as a discretization of the flux of utterances and that of digital media as the discretization of audiovisual temporal objects, it is to the extent that the audiovisual object, just like alphabetic writing, is a pharmakon."

 
We techno-logical beings individuate through symbolisation (grammatisation)

"So the techno-logical being that can be affected by grammatization—which is to be precise exactly a techno-logization of all signifying fluxes through which this being makes signs, and thus individuates itself through symbolization—is intrinsically and ineluctably pharmacological. It follows that what is true for writing is true for all mnemonic productions stemming from grammatization. Put differently, every epoch of grammatization—of which YouTube is one of the later cases, as it is contemporary with nanotechnologies and synthetic biology— constitutes a major turn in the cultural hegemony and the poisonous heteronomy imposed by the consumerist industrialization of culture. Thus, a pharmacological analysis is required to elaborate a therapeutic prescription—a system of care, i.e. a social and economic organization deriving from a political decision. But to the contrary, as anticipated by Antonio Gramsci, the cultural hegemony of consumerism consists of imposing heteronomy, while making believe that political decisions are no longer possible—“there is no alternative”—because politics has been absorbed by the market and the economy. This happens precisely through psychopower subordinating the time of available brains to the pure law of merchandise. But Gramsci’s concept is not sufficient for imagining either grammatization or its pharmacological dimension, or the therapeutics of which a new politics should consist."

 
Videos eat texts. LLMs eat everything.

"The question is then if the image practice is going to compete with that of texts—and with them, if the deep attention produced in reading will be replaced, according to the analyses by N. Katherine Hayles, with what she calls “hyper attention.” Younger people have a tendency, according to Hayles, “to use YouTube as a search engine, i.e. to view the content of the web only from the video angle, as if the textual contents no longer existed. For them, a large part of their experience of the web ends with the videos they find."

 
YouTube as pharmakon

"One must both rejoice and worry about such a state of affairs—in the sense that worrying is what makes one think, which consists in fighting against the reactivity that it can also set off. One should also rejoice because the image practices creating this new attractiveness transform the calamitous state of affairs to that of dissociation. One should, however, worry because this new pharmacology—completely ignored by political thought except when it tries to instrumentalize it “pornopolitically”—which calls for a politics of industrial development on a grand scale, based on new educational, cultural and scientific politics, as well as on the audiovisual media completely at their mercy, can lead to either the destruction of attention and the individuation resulting from this deep attention, which has been cultivated through the text since the beginning of the great civilizations—or to the production of a new kind of deep attention, closely connected to new attentional forms created by the development of hypomnemata resulting from the last stages of grammatization"

Tinnell, J. (2015). Grammatization: Bernard Stiegler's theory of writing and technology. Computers and Composition, 37, 132–146.    
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Culture cannot keep up with technology though they're indivisible since all social practices and institutions have a technological basis 

"Simply put, permanent innovation names a historical condition in which technical invention outpaces cultural adaptation (Stiegler, 1998, p. 15). This is not to suggest that technology and culture are divisible; for Stiegler, all social practices and institutions have a technological basis. Precisely because of this interdependence, the adoption of a new cultural technology precipitates the obsolescence, to greater and lesser degrees, of traditions that were developed in conjunction with the affordances of a becoming-obsolete technology. While this sort of technocultural evolution is evident throughout history, technical invention became infused with entirely unprecedented levels of resources and investments starting with the industrial revolution, during which economic incentives abounded to transform scientific knowledge from an academic pursuit into a lucrative industrial research and development enterprise (Stiegler, 1998, p. 40). As such, industrial technical invention has come to outpace conceptual innovation in other social systems such as law, government, and education"

Research turned ito a lucrative industrial research. This is still true with AI, perhaps more than ever, and it (mostly) hides under the guide of doing science that will help humanity as a whole. Importantly, regulation of AI as it is developing shows this very well - it cannot keep up at all.

 
The internet is our collective memory. We do not understand the influence of technics, yet have to make decisions with and about them constantly

"The computer revolution continues to intensify this rift as industrial activities turn toward the production of information technologies that archive, manage, and structure individual and collective memory [my emphasis]. The rapid evolution of global networks increasingly disorients and scrambles the traditions, conventions, and practices that have defined national institutions over previous centuries. Stiegler (1998) described this widespread sense of disorientation:

[W]e are experiencing the deep opacity of contemporary technics; we do not understand what is being played out in technics, nor what is being transformed therein, even though we unceasingly have to make decisions regarding technics. . [I]n day to day technical reality, we cannot spontaneously distinguish the long-term processes of transformation from spectacular but fleeting technical innovations. (p. 21)"

This is arguably even more dire with LLMs - their impact on our collective memory (touched on in a musing below) is inevitably going to be profound, and I think pernicious.

 

 
Why grammati[s]ation? 

"Focusing on grammatization can help digital rhetoricians “distinguish the long-term processes of transformation from spectacular but fleeting technical innovations” (Stiegler, 1998, p. 21), and, most importantly, help us to identify robust categories of production and analysis integral to a variety of contemporary rhetorical situations. Electracy and remediation, I will argue, have only circled around this latter task."

Goes on to show how remediation functions primarily as a genealogy of a given technology/medium, and therefore fail to account for what is actually new about new media.

 
Technology constitute our experience and therefore our means of human becoming.

"Stiegler postulated that to study emerging media and writing technologies was to attend to the constitutive forces that condition the possibilities of human becoming, which were always shifting from epoch to epoch, especially in permanent innovation societies. Accordingly, his realignment of techno-human relations put writing at the epicenter of contemporary and projected cultural and ontological transformations. Humans, as a species, were not born into the world already equipped with mature cognitive capacities; these capacities developed over time in a transductive relationship with Neolithic technics, and they are still developing today hand in glove through our collective play with contemporary technics. Informed by philosopher Gilbert Simondon, Stiegler routinely defined technics as organized inorganic matter.” The term refers both to the history of fabricated objects (e.g., flint, hammers, pencils, computers) and to the domain of techne: the techniques and practices involved in making (something with) technology. Technics are more than merely a part of the environment humans inhabit; technics constitute—not determine—our experience on every possible level, from retention to anticipation, and from cultural history to genetics."

The "organised inorganic matter" comes directly from Simondon - computers, and LLMs by extension - are the same as hammers in this sense.

Similar to postphenomenology of Ihde and Verbeek

 
Humans and tech co-evolve through grammatisation

"Stiegler (2010a) asserted that “the static oppositions of Western metaphysics must be replaced by dynamic compositions: one must think in terms, not of hierarchies or totalizing systems, but of processes.” (p. 69). Beyond the dialogic sense of co-evolution, Stiegler circumvented the persistent opposition between humanity and technology that proponents of technogenesis still employ.3 Instead, critical attention starts by studying the constitutive processes that underwrite so-called humans and technologies—before considering them as separate, already-constituted entities. These constitutive processes, in Stiegler’s lexicon, are called processes of grammatization."

Again very similar to postphenomenology, which states the exact same thing-tech form humans form tech. Seems also quite like Simondon's concept of individuation, but in slightly different terms. 

This is one issue I take with the extended mind thesis - Clark especially believes we are natural born cyborgs, but fails to account for what might be lost when we replace certain cognitive functions with technics - the technologies only appropriate, but if they assume the position of a cognitive function, then our cognitive function matches that of the technology regardless of whether it is the same or not.

...This I suppose is the essence of simulacrum?

 
Gramme are the fabric of human becoming, historical change, social organisation

"Stiegler, even more than Derrida, professed to see life in the world—human becoming, historical change, social organization—as the evolution and play of gramme (the Greek word for “written mark”). What atoms are to physicists, gramme are to Stiegler."

 

 
Flux -> discrete elements. These elements allows disruption, transformation, reconfiguring the flux

"[...] the shift from hand-tools to factory machines is a process of grammatization, and so is genetic engineering—cells and organs become replicated and revised like a kind of alphabet. In every case, a continuous flux (e.g., speech, the body, the genome) becomes broken down into a system of discrete elements (e.g., alphabetic characters, mechanical systems, recombinant DNA sequences). And, in every case, the latter’s emergence always disrupts, transforms, and reconfigures the former"

 
Writing gave way to technical memory

"Gradually, the introduction of alphabetic writing furnished the Greeks with a new form of tertiary retention (or technical memory), and hence a new medium for educational practices. The students of early manuscript cultures (an elite group, to be sure) could inscribe the word into relative permanence, and do it without emotional identification, regular recitation, or a harmonious and mimetic style (the essential technics of oral poetry). Sharing the burden of memory with alphabetic writing materials, they were able to move from acts of recitation to exercises in abstraction (Havelock, 1963). More generally, grammatization “is the production and discretization of structures;” the formalization of a new gramme accrues through metonymic invention, whereby a part becomes detached from the whole of a continuous flux (Stiegler, 2011, p. 173)."

 
Grammatisation can be used for all tech. 

"Stiegler stretched grammatological theory even further, adapting it into a basis for understanding all manner of technical systems beyond those traditionally regarded as writing or communication technologies. In our age of ubicomp, this move is incredibly pertinent. Increasingly, more everyday objects are becoming smart objects, everyday practices are becoming digitally supplemented, and technics in every domain are becoming mnemotechnics (i.e., systems capable of capturing, storing, and sharing information). From an expanded notion of writing, Stiegler prompted us to recognize the expansive array of contemporary artif(acts) that now operate as gramme."

I think there's a case to be made that in many cases it doesn't just supplement, but supplant. Meta glasses being able to 'find' hidden keys means we don't even need to keep track of our keys (if anybody has keys nowadays).. What does that mean for instance for physical organisation? Who cares if our glasses are always there to be our eyes?

 
Grammes relate also to embodiment. Proletarianisation occurs through grammatising the labourer's gesture (action).

"This suggestive dimension of Stiegler’s (2012a) thought stems from his belief in a general interplay of gramme and gestures: “To separate the question of language, alphabet, photograph, cinematograph, audio recording, and so on from all the questions of gestures is a very big error.” Words, images, sounds: these are not the only gramme. According to Stiegler, some of the most important processes of grammatization—historically and especially today—involve the becoming-gramme of territories, bodies, and even cells. In addition to writing by virtue of bodily gestures, our seemingly non-discursive bodily gestures—by virtue of machines—can produce writing of sorts, to the extent that such gestures are been broken down from the flow of muscular continuity, detached from our bodies and iterable in their absence. For instance, the gesture or action of hammering a nail can be performed by a discreet and replicatable machinic configuration, just as the letters of the alphabet can be arranged to record a speaker’s every word. In grammatizing the laborer’s gesture, industrialization precipitates proletarianization, or “the loss of know-how” on the part of laborers (Stiegler, 2010a, p. 71). "

One important aspect here (ignoring the pride the workman takes in his physical labour, which is also important), is that assessing the quality of knowledge work (writing) is very difficult because it is inherently ambiguous. It's quality lies also in what was learned in the process (similar to the workman, but with differences). In this sense, the hammer goes in regardless of whether it is done by the workman or the machine, but with knowledge work, though the outcomes might functionally produce a similar bit of text (big if), then they are still not the same.

 

... continues

"For Stiegler, industrialization thus constitutes a pivotal stage of grammatization, which becomes intensified by digitization as industrial resources and investments center on the programming of behavioral models engendered through the production and commoditization of audiovisual media. Whereas prior grammatization processes dealt primarily in the “sphere of language, of logos” throughout much of writing’s history, industrialization “came to invest [in] the sphere of bodies,” and the age of mass media turned mechanization toward “apparatus-dependent reproducibilities of the visible and the audible” (Stiegler, 2010a, p. 70). "

RLHF workers for AI companies are literally filming everything to be able to automate every single human function (also the very point of meta glasses and the goal of that horrendous company). Ironically for text-training, some of these workers were fired for using AI to do their job - AI verifying AI leads to model collapse. There might also be another link here. Though prolitarianisation focuses on the labourer's know-how, Albert Borgmann's device paradigm says that something else is lost (for the consumer) when we let machines take over tasks.

The question is more so one of automation - what do we lose when we automate certain tasks? Not merely in the actual quality of the work, which in some cases would be actual gains, but in terms of things like skills, quality of life, expertise and deep knowledge of institutions and projects...

 

 

 
Link to Borgmann's Device. 

"Today, runners wearing a Nike+ sensor generate a digital data visualization as they run; each stride produces an indexical trace recorded and stored on an online database. They run, and their running generates computing, writing, or data in real-time. In addition to more traditional mnemotechnics, grammatization now engulfs all manner of machines, which variously enable and delimit a general writing of particular gestures and embodied activities. Defining all writing technologies as pharmakon, Stiegler (2011) warned that hyperindustrial investment in digital machines was contributing to a general proletarianization of the consumer’s existence to an even more pervasive extent than the industrial investment of factory machines effected a proletarianization of the worker’s labor."

Very much in line with Borgmann's device paradigm - something is lost in the consumer's existence.

 

 
Technics change our becoming human, even if they only offer an appropriation of what they supplement/supplant.

"Ultimately, Stiegler’s grammatological analysis of (hyper)industrial activities suggests an altogether different account of technical evolution and techno-human relations than the familiar notion of augmentation, which models all technologies as prosthetic extension of innate human capabilities. Conceived as processes of grammatization, the organization of inorganic matter that technologies are results not from “an extension of man” but an appropriation, a writing, defined by its disjunction from the continuity of a flux or movement, human or otherwise. Once disjointed and inscribed autonomously as inorganic matter, the movement becomes a gramme and, therefore, unfolds by the logic of the supplement and the nuclear traits of (arche-)writing. Theories rooted in augmentation cannot account for the autonomous, iterability of technics and their originary, constitutive force within the development of cultural practices, social organization, and even the human body itself."

This to me is a core issue of LLMs. They essentially outsource (downright supplant) thinking, but they're not thinking, so a person heavily reliant on LLMs do their thinking in the exact same manner as an LLM. For instance, in the original extended mind thesis paper by Chalmers and Clark, they show that keeping a notebook works directly as supplanting memory for a patient who can't remember. But the function of this person's memory is then also 'reduced' (arguably - some would argue augmented in some instances) to whatever the technology offers.

Typing speeds up recording of thoughts, but by doing so limit the time for thinking, making it suitable for recording ideas in a flow to later be organised and reflected upon, but offers no advantages, and definitely some disadvantages, for doing work that requires a deep, slow understanding - for instance note taking, writing a paper... (digital storage, collaboration practices, etc. in this case are different from the writing practice itself)...

Above - "a writing" refers then to the reduction of the physical world to symbols? It changes the very fabric of society and humanity and therefore, as stated, cultural practice, social organisation, even the human body.

 
Supplements are originary to human becoming

"Supplements, such as writing technologies, are originary to human becoming; the exteriority of technics exceeds and conditions the interior life of the mind, “the already-there inhabits invention itself” (Stiegler, 2009, p. 42). "

 
Grammatisation allows the analysis of techne to see what actually disrupts established gramme.

"Amid permanent innovation, one can approach changes in techne from the standpoint of Stiegler’s episteme (i.e., grammatization), in order to identify which processes of change actually disrupt established gramme and, in so doing, contribute the emergence of new gramme. Such becomes the criteria by which to evaluate and describe the (lack of) significance that any given permutation bears for the history and future of writing and rhetoric. If an apparent technological innovation does not markedly disrupt the history of supplementarity, or extend its logic to new domains, then it will not likely hold significance for digital rhetoric moving forward"

 
Grammatisation uses historical view (genealogy) like remediation, but also looks ahead.

"Grammatization, however, works rigorously on both sides of this dichotomy, oscillating between precedent and novelty. Media evolution is conceived as a matter of metonymic invention, whereby some part becomes detached from a continuous whole. This part, now discrete and iterable apart from the whole, acts as a gramme, which is to say it embodies the technics of writing, manifesting the logic of supplementarity within new spheres of practice. "

Another description of grammatisation as media evolution. 

 
How grammatisation uses history

"By contrast, grammatological analogies, which juxtapose the history and technics of writing with the present state of digital media, refer to older media with the aim of pinpointing:

1) disruptive or unprecedented aspects of emerging technologies, and

2) urgent tasks for theorists and practitioners concerned withthe cultural development of such technologies.

Comparing different processes of grammatization becomes a generative ground for conceptual invention, not a means of legitimating a myth of origin (like with remediation)

 

 
Blame not the medium

"YouTube—or, more accurately, the process of grammatization we can ascertain from its emergence—shows that electronic and digital media have not hopelessly handed over culture to the culture industry. In short-circuiting processes of collective individuation, the consumerist model of the cultural industry is the threat to democracy—not audiovisual production in and of itself, which is ultimately a pharmakon (Stiegler, 2010b)"

As I understand this - - - blame not the actual medium, but the conditions around it, because the medium is a pharmakon, meaning it can be both remedy and poison. This seems more true than ever - stealth adds through AI influencers, and earlier regular influencers, would have little incentive (beyond trolling, I suppose) unless it could generate income for the person doing it.

 
The tech itself doesn't reveal it's full capabilities (good or bad).

"Stiegler (2010b) claimed that “in its first stages of development, writing doesn’t produce any reflexivity” (p. 44), as he pointed out that cuneiform was performed exclusively by an elite class of scribes whose primary tasks focused on accounting and administrative recordkeeping."

This is also what postpheonmenology posits, namely that tech cannot be seen outside of how it is actually used. It's capabilities reveal themselves over time to reflect the needs and values of those who use them, and that would include the conditions surrounding it - as such, no tech is inherently evil.This is a sort of psychic and collective individuation.

...but perhaps a tech (like LLMs) have no actual use-case in which they are good? 

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