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Casati, R., & Dokic, J. (2009). Some varieties of spatial hearing. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 97–110). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/02/2014, 11:15
"[a] principle of classification of metaphysical theories of sounds can be based on the alleged location each theory assigns to sounds"
The Located Event Theory of Casati and Dokic: "sounds are located at their sources, and are identical with, or at least supervene on, the relevant physical processes in them"
Nudds, M. (2009). Sounds and space. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 69–96). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/02/2014, 11:09
"sounds are patterns or structures of frequency components instantiated by sound waves"
"[sound] is wholly instantiated wherever it is instantiated, including where we are"
O'Callaghan, C. (2007). Sounds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 09/05/2013, 09:23
O'Callaghan, C. (2009). Sounds and events. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 26–49). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 27/08/2026, 07:50
"sounds are particular events of a certain kind. They are events in which a moving object disturbs a surrounding medium and sets it moving. The strikings and crashings are not the sounds, but are the causes of sounds. The waves in the medium are not the sounds themselves, but are the effects of sounds."
"Sounds are events that take place near their sources, not in the intervening space."
"Sounds are stationary relative to their sources"
"[T]here is the event of an object or substance setting a medium into periodic motion. This is sound."
O'Callaghan presents 3 theories of sound: 1. Sounds are properties of bodies. A view held from Locke onwards -- bodies and objects possess sounds when they vibrate at particular frequencies and amplitudes. 2. Classic acoustic theory. Sounds are waves produced by vibrating bodies -- thus, we do not immediately hear the property a body 'possesses' but only hear the sound as a compression wave through a medium. 3. Sounds are events. O'Callaghan arrives at the 'event view' of sound from Aristotle's writings: sound is a movement (as per Aristotle) but O'Callaghan interprets this as -- the movement need not be the medium but can be the event that causes the medium's disturbance/movement. Sound is 'the act of one thing moving another' (p.27). cf Aristotle (Arisotle 350 BCE).
O'Callaghan, C. (2009-2020). Auditory perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved October 3, 2023, from https://plato.stanford. ... es/perception-auditory/.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 12/02/2024, 12:47
"crossmodal illusions are not mere accidents. Instead, they are intelligible as the results of adaptive perceptual strategies. In ordinary circumstances, crossmodal processes serve to reduce or resolve apparent conflicts in information drawn from several senses. In doing so, they tend to make perception more reliable overall. Thus, crossmodal illusions differ from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is just a kind of accident. It results from mere quirks of processing, and it always involves illusion (or else is accidentally veridical). Crossmodal recalibrations, in contrast, are best understood as attempts “to maintain a perceptual experience consonant with a unitary event” (Welch and Warren 1980, 638)." Welch, R. B. and D. H. Warren, 1980, “Immediate perceptual response to intersensory discrepancy,” Psychological Bulletin, 88(3): 638–667.
"Listening to music and being receptive to its aesthetically relevant features requires not listening to violins, horns, or brushes on snare drums. It requires hearing sounds and grasping them in a way removed from their common sources. . . . Musical listening thus may be thought to provide a prima facie argument against the claim that in hearing sounds one typically hears sound sources such as the strumming of guitars and bowing of violins."
"we might attempt to determine whether any unified account exists that applies generally to all of the perceptual modalities. We can ask this question either at the level of quite specific claims, such as those concerning the objects of perception or the nature and structure of content. We can ask it about the relationships among perceiving, believing, and acting. Or we can ask it about the general theory of necessary and sufficient conditions for perceiving."
"Philosophical thinking about perception has focused predominantly on vision. The philosophical puzzle of perception and its proposed solutions have been shaped by a concern for visual experience and visual illusions. Questions and proposals about the nature of perceptual content have been framed and evaluated in visual terms, and detailed accounts of what we perceive frequently address just the visual case. Vision informs our understanding of perception’s epistemological role and of its role in guiding action. It is not a great exaggeration to say that much of the philosophy of perception translates roughly as philosophy of visual perception."
Argues that sound is not a private sensation but is an object of public perception: a falling tree does make a sound even if not heard; we can hear sounds in common (but not headaches).
It is a phenomenological claim that sound is distal because that is what we experience. Perhaps, though, it is the sound source we experience in this way, an event-like individual, information of which is carried on a sound wave to become the proximal sensation of sound.
O'Shaughnessy, B. (2009). The location of a perceived sound. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 111–125). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 01/02/2014, 11:14
sound moves through space because it is the transferal of physical force; there is an "essential spatio-temporal dynamism of sound"
Scruton, R. (2009). Sounds as secondary objects and pure events. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds.), Sounds & Perception. (pp. 50–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 07/02/2014, 13:10
"the 'acousmatic' experience of sound [where sounds are] emancipated from their causes"
"pure events contain within themselves the principles whereby they can be ordered ... all without stepping into the order of things.
Scruton uses examples and explanation of sound grouping/streaming (cf Bregman) to support his view of sounds as pure events because such auditory grouping needs no "bridges to the physical world" in the way that visual Gestalt figures do.
A secondary object is "an object all of whose properties are ways in which it feels"
Sounds are "secondary objects and pure events"
"we do not attribute the secondary qualities of sounds to the bodies that emit them, nor to events that occur in those bodies"
"The physicalist view banishes to the margin those features of sound that make sound so important to us, not only epistemologically, but also socially, morally, and aesthetically. In particular, it does not recognize the 'pure event' as a distinct ontological category, and one that introduces unique possibilities of communication."
For Scruton, sounds are secondary objects because they are "a real part of the objective world" and not a mere "subjective impression"
With an Aristotelean conception of substance, an event is described by the objects taking part in it and the changes undergone by those objects as the event occurs. Thus, such a view of events is that they are "transformations undergone by particulars"
A pure event does not happen to any thing, it "cannot be reduced to changes undergone by reidentifiable particulars"
Our natural inclination to describe sounds in terms of their source "is not essential to the identification of the sound"
To Scruton, sound's independence from the physical world leads to a coherence (grouping, streaming) that is a 'virtual causality'. It bears no relation to the process by which sounds are formed.
Scruton supports his view that sounds are separate from the objects that emit them with examples such as radio and recording -- acousmatic sound. In such a case, sounds can be grouped (streamed) together coherently without reference to their physical origin.
Secondary qualities are the way things feel -- not primary qualities that are physical and can be objectively measured. Secondary qualities allow us to discriminate between phenomena such as sounds.