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Sound Research WIKINDX |
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Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell. Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (31/01/2019, 12:49) Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (11/12/2023, 12:24) |
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| Resource type: Book Peer reviewed ID no. (ISBN etc.): 978-0-6311-9770-6 BibTeX citation key: Heidegger1962 Email resource to friend View all bibliographic details  |
Categories: General Keywords: Being, Other-presence, Presence Creators: Heidegger, Macquarrie, Robinson Publisher: Blackwell (Oxford) |
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| Notes |
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First English edition of the 7th edition of the work (published in German originally in 1927).
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| Quotes |
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p.29
"Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naïvely, the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
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p.47
"Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time–the 'Present'."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
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p.84
"For the environment is a structure which even biology as a positive science can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ. Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived of as a structure of Dasein."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Environment Presence |
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p.87
"knowing is not present-at-hand. In any case, it is not externally ascertainable as, let us say, bodily properties are."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Embodied cognition Presence |
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p.139
"We use the expression "deseverance" in a signification which is both active and transitive. It stands for a constitutive state of Dasein's Being—a state with regard to which removing something in the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factical mode. "De-severing amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bring it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
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p.140
"With the radio, for example, Dasein has so expanded its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the 'world'—a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
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p.141
"Seeing and hearing are distance-senses [...] not because they are far-reaching, but because it is in them that Dasein as deseverent dwells."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
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p.166
"by 'Reality' we understand a Being with the character of Dasein."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence Reality |
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p.176
"Only something which is in the the state-of-mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that which is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openess to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind.""
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Fear Presence |
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p.177
"Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself to having entities within-the-world "matter" to it in such a way which its moods have outlined in advance."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence Affect |
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p.193
"Hence only Dasein can can be meaningful or meaningless. That is to say, its own Being and the entities disclosed within its Being can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-understanding [...] all entities whose kind of Being is of a character other than Dasein's must be conceived of as unmeaning, essentially devoid of any meaning at all [...] And only that which is unmeaning can be absurd."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence Meaning Absurdity |
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p.206
"We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself—hearing. If we have not heard 'aright', it is not by accident that we say we have not 'understood'. Hearing is constitutive for discourse."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Hearing Discourse |
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p.207
"It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing, which is existentially primary, that anything like hearkening becomes possible. Hearkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined 'in the first instance' as "hearing" in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perception of sounds. Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Discourse Hearing Hearkening |
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p.207
"It requires a very artificial and complicated frame-of-mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside 'sensations'; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a 'world'. Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Discourse Hearing Hearkening |
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p.217
"Ambiguity not only affects the way we avail ourselves of what is accessible for use and enjoyment, and the way we manage it; ambiguity has already established itself in the understanding as a potentialy-for-Being, and in the way Dasein projects itself and presents itself with possibilities."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence Ambiguity |
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p.233
"As we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest 'how one is'. In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'. [...] "as Dasien falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence Uncanny Fear |
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p.387
"Corresponding to the the inauthentic future (awaiting), there is a special way of Being-alongside the things wtih which one concerns oneself. This was of Being-alongside is the Present—the "waiting-towards" [...] To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a Present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the Situation. In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest, concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That Present which is held in authentic temporality and thus which is authentic itself, we call the "moment of vision".
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Ambiguity Presence |
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pp.387–388, Paragraph 388
The moment of vision is a phenomenon which in principle can not be clarified in terms of the "now" [dem Jetzt]. The "now" is a temporal phenomenon which belongs to time as within-time-ness"; the "now" 'in which' something arises, passes away, or is present-at-hand. 'In the moment of vision' nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us to encounter for the first time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
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p.388
"In contradiction to the moment of vision as the authentic Present, we call the inauthentic Present "making present". Formally understood, every Present is one which makes present. When we use the expression "making present" without adding anything further, we always have in mind the inauthentic kind, which is irresolute and does not have the character of a moment of vision. Making-present will become clear only in the light of the temporal Interpretation of falling into the 'world' of one's concern; such falling has its existential meaning in making present. But in so far as the potentiality-for-Being which is projected by inauthentic understanding is projected in terms of things with which one can be concerned, this means that such understanding temporalizes itself in terms of making present. The moment of vision, however, temporalizes itself in quite the opposite manner—in terms of the authentic future."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
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p.421
"The ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, makes it intelligible that space is independent of time; but on the other hand, this same temporality also makes intelligible Dasein's 'dependence' on space—a 'dependence' which manifests itself in the well-known phenomenon that both Dasein's interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and through by 'spatial representations'.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence Space Time |
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p.441
"And because, further, the ordinary understanding of Being understands 'Being' as presence-at-hand without further differentiation, the Being of the world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present-at-hand which comes along, has presence, and then disappears."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
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p.443
"With the inconsistency of the they-self Dasein makes present its 'today'. In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. The "they" evades choice. Blind for possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the 'actual' that is left over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that is present-at-hand. Lost in the making present of the "today", it understands the 'past' in terms of the 'Present'."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence |
| Paraphrases |
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pp.215–216
Heidegger spends a few lines discussing the primacy of vision or 'seeing.' He follows Augustine and Aristotle in equating the verb 'to see' with 'to understand' and cognition – 'I see what you mean,' for example. He quotes Aristotle: "The care for seeing is essential to man's Being" (215) – "cognition was conceived [by the ancient Greeks] in terms of 'the desire to see'."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords: Presence Vision Hearing |