Sound Research WIKINDX
Sound Research WIKINDX |
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 Parameters |
| Brainard, F. S. (1997). Reality and mystical experience. Unpublished PhD thesis, Temple University. |
  
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/09/2020, 15:05 | |
| "'presence' is perhaps more accurately thought of as a verb than a noun. It is rather the process that manifests — 'presences' — properties." | |
| "Humans presence those things particular to human beings — languages, political borders, artifacts, and so on. Animals presence what is particular to their own natures. So do plants. And matter presences material publicities. Presencing taken as a noun — as a presence — is thus a spatiotemporal site of publicity instantiation. Since in this schema, all publicity, even material regularities, originate with awarenesses, a presence may also be characterized as a site for the publicity producing activity of awarenesses." | |
| "presence is defined as that which when conjoined to publicity yields a particular. It may also be defined as the process (verb) that renders publicity to be a particular [...] presence in this project also means the fact or condition of being manifest to or by awarenesses" | |
| "a particular is a singular instantiation, thus an individual" | |
| "The term 'publicity', derived from the word 'public', already exists in epistemology and refers to that which is the same for a group of knowing subjects — that which is singular for a plurality of awarenesses." | |
| "awareness applies not just to a capability or to a receptive 'knowing', but also to intention and action as well [...] awareness applies not just to sentient agencies but also to certain non-sentient ones (i.e., the maintenance of physical regularities by matter). In this schema, awareness is defined on the basis of its roles in the definitions for publicity and presence. In the case of publicity, it names that which originates and maintains publicity, regardless of any other considerations." | |
| "presence is not, itself a publicity [...] description is never the presence itself; it only refers to presence." | |
| Brotons-Mas, J. R., & O'Mara, S. (2006). Neural processing of spatial information: What we know about place cells and what they can tell us about presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(5), 485–499. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 09/03/2018, 09:02 | |
| Calleja, G. (2014). Immersion in virtual worlds. In M. Grimshaw (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality. (pp. 222–236). New York: Oxford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:21 | |
| Calleja's main bone of contention with concepts such as immersion and presence is that they imply that the user of a virtual environment is "merely a subjective consciousness being poured into the containing vessel of the virtual environment." | |
| For incorporation to occur, the medium must "specifically acknowledge the player's presence and agency within the virtual world." | |
| "while high-fidelity systems are an important part of enhancing the intensity of an experience, they do not themselves create a sense of presence." | |
| Calleja favors the term incorporation over immersion or presence because the latter two "are defined by their discontinuity from the real physical world [whereas] incorporation occurs [when playing a computer game, for example] when the game world is present to the player while simultaneously the player is present, via an avatar, to the virtual environment." | |
| Cavazza, M., Lugrin, J.-L., & Buehner, M. (2007). Causal perception in virtual reality and its implications for presence factors. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 16(6), 623–642. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 09/03/2018, 11:04 | |
| van den Doel, K., & Pai, D. K. (1998). The sounds of physical shapes. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 7(4), 382–395. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 31/07/2018, 11:26 | |
| Gumbrecht, H. U. (2004). Production of presence: What meaning cannot convey. Stanford: Stanford University Press. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 08/11/2023, 06:46 | |
| "What this book ultimately argues for is a relation to the things of the world that could oscillate between presence effects and meaning effects. Presence effects, however, exclusively appeal to the senses." | |
| Gumbrecht states: "What is "present" to us (very much in the sense of the Latin form prae-esse) is in front of us, in reach of and tangible for our bodies." | |
| "Cartesian cogito made the ontology of human existence depend exclusively on the movements of the human mind." | |
| "For the assumption that the phenomena have their inherent meanings woud not yet change on the threshold between medieval and early modern culture (interpretation would not be understood, broadly, as an attribution rather than as an identification of meaning until the nineteenth century)." | |
| Argues that, because presence-cultures have the body as a self-referent, "space, that is, that dimension that constitutes itself around bodies, must be the primordial dimension in which the relationship between different humans and the things of the world are being negotiated. Time, in contrast, is the primordial dimension for any meaning culture, because there seems to be an unavoidable relationship between consciousness and temporality [...] Above all, however, time is the primordial dimension of any meaning culture, because it takes time to carry out those transformative actions through which meaning cultures define the relationship between humans and the world." | |
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Gumbrecht gives an example of medieval (in this case Catholic) conception of presence in the Eucharist: Christ's body and blood are present in the bread and the wine, they "become tangible as substances in the "forms" of bread and wine" (p.28).
Such thinking derives from the Aristotelian concept of the sign. Whereas today's semiotics views a sign as comprised of signifier and signified (i.e. material surface and a depth that is meaning), this concept comprises a substance ("that which is present because it demands a space" (p.29)) and a form ("that through which the substance becomes perceptible" (p.29)). "There is no "immaterial" meaning detached from a "material signifier"" (p.29). Thus, bread and wine were easily conceived of as the forms making the substance (of Christ) present and perceptible. Protestant theology changed this into the concept of an "evocation of Christ's body and blood as "meanings"" (p.29). That is, the bread and wine were not actually body and blood but rather meant or signified the body and blood. Gumbrecht connects this change in the concept of signs to the emergence of historicity – "in modern understanding, signs at least potentially leave the substances that they evoke at a temporal and spatial distance" (p.30). |
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| Equates his concept of presence with Heidegger's concept of Being. | |
| Harvey, M. A., & Sanchez-Vives, M. V. (2005). The binding problem in presence research. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 14(5), 616–621. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/09/2020, 14:51 | |
| Explaining why virtual environments are capable of facilitating presence despite lacking sensory modalities, it is not absence of one modality or another but rather incongruity between them that will break presence. The brain can fill in missing sensory data. In a virtual world displaying a rose, "it should be less disruptive for the rose to have no smell than the wrong smell." | |
| Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 21/04/2026, 08:40 | |
| The moment of vision is a phenomenon which in principle can not be clarified in terms of the "now" [dem Jetzt]. The "now" is a temporal phenomenon which belongs to time as within-time-ness"; the "now" 'in which' something arises, passes away, or is present-at-hand. 'In the moment of vision' nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the moment of vision permits us to encounter for the first time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand." | |
| "We use the expression "deseverance" in a signification which is both active and transitive. It stands for a constitutive state of Dasein's Being—a state with regard to which removing something in the sense of putting it away is only a determinate factical mode. "De-severing amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bring it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is." | |
| "Seeing and hearing are distance-senses [...] not because they are far-reaching, but because it is in them that Dasein as deseverent dwells." | |
| "by 'Reality' we understand a Being with the character of Dasein." | |
| "Only something which is in the the state-of-mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that which is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openess to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind."" | |
| "Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself to having entities within-the-world "matter" to it in such a way which its moods have outlined in advance." | |
| "Hence only Dasein can can be meaningful or meaningless. That is to say, its own Being and the entities disclosed within its Being can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-understanding [...] all entities whose kind of Being is of a character other than Dasein's must be conceived of as unmeaning, essentially devoid of any meaning at all [...] And only that which is unmeaning can be absurd." | |
| "We can make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself—hearing. If we have not heard 'aright', it is not by accident that we say we have not 'understood'. Hearing is constitutive for discourse." | |
| "It is on the basis of this potentiality for hearing, which is existentially primary, that anything like hearkening becomes possible. Hearkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined 'in the first instance' as "hearing" in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perception of sounds. Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling." | |
| "It requires a very artificial and complicated frame-of-mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside 'sensations'; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a 'world'. Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood." | |
| "Ambiguity not only affects the way we avail ourselves of what is accessible for use and enjoyment, and the way we manage it; ambiguity has already established itself in the understanding as a potentialy-for-Being, and in the way Dasein projects itself and presents itself with possibilities." | |
| "As we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest 'how one is'. In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'. [...] "as Dasien falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses." | |
| "Corresponding to the the inauthentic future (awaiting), there is a special way of Being-alongside the things wtih which one concerns oneself. This was of Being-alongside is the Present—the "waiting-towards" [...] To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a Present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the Situation. In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest, concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That Present which is held in authentic temporality and thus which is authentic itself, we call the "moment of vision". | |
| "With the radio, for example, Dasein has so expanded its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the 'world'—a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized." | |
| "In contradiction to the moment of vision as the authentic Present, we call the inauthentic Present "making present". Formally understood, every Present is one which makes present. When we use the expression "making present" without adding anything further, we always have in mind the inauthentic kind, which is irresolute and does not have the character of a moment of vision. Making-present will become clear only in the light of the temporal Interpretation of falling into the 'world' of one's concern; such falling has its existential meaning in making present. But in so far as the potentiality-for-Being which is projected by inauthentic understanding is projected in terms of things with which one can be concerned, this means that such understanding temporalizes itself in terms of making present. The moment of vision, however, temporalizes itself in quite the opposite manner—in terms of the authentic future." | |
| "The ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, makes it intelligible that space is independent of time; but on the other hand, this same temporality also makes intelligible Dasein's 'dependence' on space—a 'dependence' which manifests itself in the well-known phenomenon that both Dasein's interpretation of itself and the whole stock of significations which belong to language in general are dominated through and through by 'spatial representations'. | |
| "And because, further, the ordinary understanding of Being understands 'Being' as presence-at-hand without further differentiation, the Being of the world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present-at-hand which comes along, has presence, and then disappears." | |
| "With the inconsistency of the they-self Dasein makes present its 'today'. In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. The "they" evades choice. Blind for possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the 'actual' that is left over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that is present-at-hand. Lost in the making present of the "today", it understands the 'past' in terms of the 'Present'." | |
| "Scientific research accomplishes, roughly and naïvely, the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter." | |
| "Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time–the 'Present'." | |
| "knowing is not present-at-hand. In any case, it is not externally ascertainable as, let us say, bodily properties are." | |
| "For the environment is a structure which even biology as a positive science can never find and can never define, but must presuppose and constantly employ. Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived of as a structure of Dasein." | |
| Heidegger spends a few lines discussing the primacy of vision or 'seeing.' He follows Augustine and Aristotle in equating the verb 'to see' with 'to understand' and cognition – 'I see what you mean,' for example. He quotes Aristotle: "The care for seeing is essential to man's Being" (215) – "cognition was conceived [by the ancient Greeks] in terms of 'the desire to see'" (215). | |
| Klatzky, R. L., Pai, D. K., & Krotkov, E. P. (2000). Perception of material from contact sounds. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 9(4), 399–410. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 23/08/2018, 11:58 | |
| Loomis, J. M. (1992). Distal attribution and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 113–119. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 11/09/2018, 17:19 | |
| "presence and distal attribution beyond the limits of some extending device (probe, teleoperator, virtual display) are not fundamentally different phenomena. Rather, they differ only that true presence occurs when the sensory data support only the interpretation of being somewhere other than where the sense organs are located; whereas, distal attribution to a remote location occurs when the sensory data represent both the remote location and that device or linkage that connects the observer with that remote location." | |
| Externalization or distal attribution: "that most of our perceptual experience, though originating with stimulation of our sense organs, is referred to external space beyond the limits of our sensory organs." | |
| "for vision and audition [...] the resulting perceptions are always mediate, never direct, for the central nervous system constructs what is perceived." | |
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Acknowledging that the operator of a teleoperation system experiences sensory information from remote/simulated environment and physical environment and that this often conflicts, Loomis makes use of Polyani's notions of subsidiary awareness and focal awareness. Where sensory stimulation from the remote environment is insufficient for true presence, the operator experiences a subsidiary awareness of the physical environment and/or teleoperation system he/she is actually in/using despite a focal awareness of the remote environment.
True telepresence is not possible as it is not possible to present the operator with precisely the same sensory stimulation they would receive were they to be actually in the remote environment. |
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| In arguing that distal attribution re telepresence is most clearly felt when the operators have become skilled with the equipment, Loomis suggests that with regard to a lawful relationship between efference and afference, the operator must be able to model this relationship. This 'linkage' becomes transparent with experience and this leads to the externalization of the distal environment. | |
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There is a phenomenal world that can be divided into 'self' and 'nonself' – the physical self is closely tied to the phenomenal self but not necessarily (e.g. phantom limbs).
Distal attribution is the process of identifying sensory experience with a phenomenally external space or the nonself. This identification (and thus distal attribution) results when afference (sensory input) is "lawfully related" to efference (motorsensory actions) – e.g. I do something and the sensory feedback I get accords with that action. Loomis hypothesizes that "attribution to self occurs when afference and efference are completely unrelated or independent." |
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| Penn, D. C., & Povinelli, D. J. (2007). On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 362(1480), 731–744. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 02/03/2025, 10:11 | |
| Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515–526. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 02/03/2025, 05:31 | |
| Reiner, M., & Hecht, D. (2009). Behavioral indications of object-presence in haptic virtual environments. Cyberpsychology & Behavior, 12(2), 183–186. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 04/09/2020, 14:46 | |
| Ribbens, W., & Malliet, S. (2010). Perceived digital game realism: A quantitative exploration of its structure. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 19(6), 585–600. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 17/10/2018, 13:57 | |
| "whether a media text is perceived as realistic [...] is important because research suggests that user perceptions can be better predictors of behavioral outcomes than the features of the medium itself" | |
| "rule-based characteristics of an electronic game count as better contributors to its overall reality impression than its audiovisual characteristics. The three most important factors [...] were simulational realism, freedom of choice, and character involvement. Graphical aspects such as perceptual pervasiveness or narrative aspects such as authenticity accounted for a substantially smaller amount of the explained variance." | |
| Has a different take on authenticity than might be expected – one that is subjective rather than objective (i.e. the shotgun in Terminator is not objectively authentic but might be subjectively perceived as authentic). | |
| Towner, S. (2010). Concept of mind in non-human primates. Bioscience Horizons: The International Journal of Student Research, 3(1), 96–104. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 02/03/2025, 05:29 | |
| Turner, P., & Turner, S. (2006). Place, sense of place, and presence. Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(2), 204–217. |
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| Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard 09/03/2018, 08:50 |