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Santarcangelo, V., & Terrone, E. (2015). Sounds and other denizens of time. The Monist, 98(2), 168–180. 
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (1/8/24, 11:08 AM)   Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (1/9/24, 1:21 PM)
Resource type: Journal Article
Language: en: English
Peer reviewed
ID no. (ISBN etc.): 269662
BibTeX citation key: Santarcangelo2015
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Categories: General
Keywords: Definition of sound, Space
Creators: Santarcangelo, Terrone
Publisher: Oxford University Press (Oxford)
Collection: The Monist
Resources citing this (Bibliography: WIKINDX Master Bibliography)
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"On the basis of the No-Space world thought experiment put forward by Strawson in his Individuals, we attempt to clarify in what sense there may be individual entities that exist only in time and to what extent such entities may qualify as belonging to an objective reality. For Strawson it is sounds which are the individuals of the No-Space world, and on Strawson’s view sounds can belong to objective reality provided that they can be related to an auditory analogue of space. We argue that such an analogue of space can be specified in terms of a system of “master-sounds” that function as analogues of spatial bodies. We then extend our treatment of Strawson’s thought experiment to include parts of the social world that, just like sounds, may be taken to exist only in time. We conclude by proposing a characterization of poems, games of (blind) chess, obligations, debts, and certain other social entities as “No-Space artifacts” since they, too, can exist not only in our spatial world but also in the No-Space world sketched by Strawson."

Based on (Strawson 1971/1959). In contrast to several other recent writings on auditory philosophy that take Strawson's game seriously, the authors rightly point out that Strawson's chapter is merely a thought experiment devised to test our current conceptions of sound as having and requiring spatio-temporality. I cannot help wondering if other philosopher's imaginations through the ages might have been taken similarly seriously, and, if so, what the consequences have been for our world view . . .

Contrary to Locke's (1961) critique of Strawson, the authors here argue that Strawson's assumptions for the thought experiment are correct.

Locke, D. (1961). Strawson's auditory universe. The Philosophical Review, 70(4), 518–532.
Strawson, P. F. (1971). Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics. London: Methuen. (Original work published 1959).
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard  Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
p.169   "A purely temporal individual entity is such that we can establish when but not where it is. One can think of these individuals (for example, a sound) as having only temporal parts and temporal features in spite of their being dependent on more basic entities that have also spatial features (such as a body emitting the sound). But could such individuals exist entirely independently of any commitment to space? Strawson explores a positive answer to this question in chapter II of his Individuals, by means of a thought experiment concerning what he calls a No-Space world. In the first instance, this experiment aims at putting pressure on the Kantian thesis that space is a necessary condition for any “objective” experience, by which he means any experience of individual entities as existing independently of their being experienced. Strawson, however, adopts the Aristotelian view according to which our most basic schemes and categories provide us with crucial clues as to the basic structures of reality, and thus he conceives space and time as structures of reality and not just as forms of experience. Given our experience of the world, the world must be such that it makes this kind of experience possible. So, Strawson is here discussing the thesis that space is a necessary condition not only for any objective experience, but also for any objective reality."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Definition of sound Space
p.170   "It is worth noting that sounds are here just the means to the end of investigating an ontological claim about space and time. Strawson is not making an empirical claim in the philosophy of perception about the nature of hearing in human beings. Nor is he making an ontological claim addressing questions like: are sounds individuals? are they events? are they properties of sounding objects? Rather, he is building up a thought experiment aimed at testing the metaphysical claim according to which the notion of space is necessary for any conception of an objective reality."   Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
Keywords:   Definition of sound Space