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Boden, M. A. (2016). AI: Its nature and future. First edition ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: alexb44 05/03/2025, 10:18 Last edited by: alexb44 21/09/2026, 02:54 |
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| Resource type: Book Published ID no. (ISBN etc.): 198777981 BibTeX citation key: Boden2016 Email resource to friend View all bibliographic details |
Categories: AI/Machine Learning Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, History of AI Creators: Boden Publisher: Oxford University Press (Oxford) |
Views: 9/247
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| Abstract |
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Margaret Boden considers the realistic and unrealistic expectations we have placed on AI, analyses its progress, and considers the value of its byproducts.
Added by: alexb44 Last edited by: alexb44 |
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Summary:
Boden argues AI (machines in general) reveal much about the mind. Believes hardware is not enough, emphasises the 'virtual machine' inside (essentially the software) is the main problem for AGI. Hybridism is necessary for AGI, so body + mind. Believes true AGI to be theoretically possible (but not with phenomenal consciousness), but practically impossible, as such she is an S-skeptic herself. She points out that especially language, creativity and emotion are difficult for AI, and these are necessary for AGI My thoughts: Boden is important for me because I disagree on many things with her, therefore she is a vital counter-point for me. Her views present the (so far) most reasonable and well-established takes I have come across on AI/machine creativity and intelligence. Implications for my research: Counter-point to several of my views, very useful to argue against. In her stressing the importance of language, emotion, creativity and phenomenonal consciousness, she paves the way for critical views from phenomenology. Her view that people romanticise human abilities can be easily flipped, and engineers wish more abilities upon the machines as well. Her example of MINDER (nursemaid robot) is an excellent example of modelling emotions by behaviour (pure functionalism), but in my view it has nothing to do with actual emotion. Added by: alexb44 Last edited by: alexb44 |
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Boden makes the case for virtual machines - the implied systems that run on the hardware. The hardware might be a bottleneck, but ultimately the system is most important.
A funny contrast to the promises of LLMs scaling laws that have gradually faded away. . .
Added by: alexb44
01/09/2026, 10:22
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The Frame Problem
AI does not have a human's sense of relevance, look at Boden's funny example: "My own favorite example is: If a man of twenty can pick ten pounds of blackberries in an hour, and a woman of eighteen can pick eight, how many will they gather if they go blackberrying together? For sure, “eighteen” isn’t a plausible answer. It could be much more (because they’re both showing off) or, more probably, much less. This example was even more telling fifty years ago, when I first encountered it. But why is that? Just what kinds of knowledge are involved here? And could an AGI overcome what appear to be the plain arithmetical facts?"
Added by: alexb44
01/09/2026, 10:25
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"Human-level AGI would involve distributed cognition"
While I understand the connection, it falls flat for me in the sense that there is no such thing as a sociocultural existence for AI agents, so there can be no distinction between them really... It seems to me to be a way of thinking about the problem rather than being an actual part of the problem, precisely because a hypothetical AGI would not have the limitations of humans, so once the system is in place, it would theoretically operate as one and would not actually need distributed cognition.
Added by: alexb44
01/09/2026, 10:43
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Deep Learning is not the end all be all.
"However (as remarked at the outset of this chapter), full AGI would do very much more. Difficult though it is to build a high-performing AI specialist, building an AI generalist is orders of magnitude harder. (Deep learning isn’t the answer: its aficionados admit that “new paradigms are needed” to combine it with complex reasoning—scholarly code for “we haven”t got a clue”.)" While some still believe LLMs to be the path to AGI, several researchers are leaving this path - LeCun, Sutton and Silver. . .
Added by: alexb44
01/09/2026, 10:47
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"Some areas of AI seem especially challenging: language, creativity, and emotion. If AI can’t model these, hopes of AGI are illusory"
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01/09/2026, 10:49
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AI can create things that can be deemed creative in Boden's terms:
"In particular, there are very few combinational systems. One might think it’s easy to model combinational creativity. After all, nothing could be simpler than making a computer produce unfamiliar associations of already stored ideas. The results will often be historically novel, and (statistically) surprising. But if they’re also to be valuable, they must be mutually relevant. That’s not straightforward, as we’ve seen. The jokegenerating programs mentioned in Chapter 2 use joke templates to help provide relevance. Similarly, symbolic AI’s case-based reasoning constructs analogies thanks to precoded structural similarities. So, their “combinational” creativity has a strong admixture of exploratory creativity as well." I still maintain that AI's inablity to judge its own output makes the claims of creativity dubious. Humans will often judge their own outputs inaccurately, but they judge them none-the-less, and I think that the framing problem is equally relevant here.
Added by: alexb44
01/09/2026, 10:54
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"AI has enabled human artists to develop a new art form: computergenerated (CG) art. This concerns architecture, graphics, music, choreography, and—less successfully (given NLP ’s difficulties with syntax and relevance)—literature. In CG art, the computer isn’t a mere tool, comparable to a new paintbrush, helping the artist to do things they might have done anyway. Rather, the work couldn’t have been done, or perhaps even imagined, without it."
This is a false equivalence, in my opinion. Before the paint brush came similar tools, which ultimately led to somebody imagining it in the first place. The very first imagining of what kind of a painting the paint brush would produce is probably very far from the refined concept of painting that we have today, but it could still all be traced further back. Perhaps to chalk on a cavewall, or to cutting in a tree - nevertheless these things paved the way, and at some point the very idea of imagining something as simple as a painting would've been equally unimaginable. What makes the claim to the 'uninmaginativeness' of computer-generated art stronger in this case is that the digital domain does not abide by physical rules, and as such our ability to imagine in the days of less advanced computers was significantly more limited. I can now readily imagine countless different types of CG visual art because we now have cognitive models that allow me to imagine it. Even then, this imaginativeness must have been gradual, but yet with someone having a rough imagination of what drawing on the computer might look like. Once realising a simple version of this, their ability to imagine these artworks gradually expand, so ultimately I see no difference between this example and of other tools. It is a tool all the same, and the argument of "more-than" in this case is not strong.
Added by: alexb44
01/09/2026, 11:02
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"MINDER indicates some ways in which emotions can control behavior, scheduling competing motives intelligently. A human nursemaid, no doubt, will experience [sic] various types of anxiety as her situation changes. But the point, here, is that emotions aren’t merely feelings. They involve functional, as well as phenomenal, consciousness (see Chapter 6). Specifically, they are computational mechanisms that enable us to schedule competing motives—and without which we couldn’t function. (So the emotionless Mr. Spock of Star Trek is an evolutionary impossibility.)
If we are ever to achieve AGI, emotions such as anxiety will have to be included—and used" While I agree, I think Boden's view here is too strongly suggesting that 'using' emotions as computational mechanisms can really be considered anything like real emotions, and would be severely limited in comparison. Ultimately all this is doing is mimicking the behaviour by introducing something more analogous to a decision tree than actual emotion, making it rather ambiguous. Shouldn't the goal of AGI be a little more lofty than this? Let's even assume we actually program an AGI capable of these computational modes of emotion - how are they regulated and balanced? Human emotions can be both productive and destructive, and that is often a claim to human inferiority as opposed to machines (although hypothetical ones), but humans would still be in charge of determining how they shold be distributed in various situations. Here the AI scientist will point to AGI's potential super ability to determine what is most suitable given literally any situation (which would suggest ASI, not just AGI), but that takes actual emotion to decide, and it isn't necessarilly a process of active reflection, but rather intuition that takes over, so we're back where we started.
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01/09/2026, 11:23
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"Anyone interested in AGI should note that those few AI scientists who have seriously considered the computational architecture of the mind as a whole accept hybridism unreservedly. They include Allen Newell and Anderson (whose SOAR and ACT * were discussed in Chapter 2), Stan Franklin (whose LIDA model of consciousness is outlined in Chapter 6), Minsky (with his “society” theory of mind25), and Aaron Sloman (whose simulation of anxiety is described in Chapter 3).
In short, the virtual machines implemented in our brains are both sequential and parallel. Human intelligence requires subtle cooperation between them. And human-level AGI, if it’s ever achieved, will do so too." Hybridism is an absolute necessity, and so the idea of any definition of AGI that assumes the mind as separate from the body is of no use. (Arxiv 2025 paper re. AGI definition assumes exactly this...) This further stresses the importance of embodiment or embodied intelligence, which is also what Sutton and Silver, and Lecun are gravitating towards (though without the proper reasoning to boot).
Added by: alexb44
01/09/2026, 11:26
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Female crickets - biological sensing vs robotic "registering".
Added by: alexb44
07/09/2026, 05:03
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Boden is positive about AI, but also realistic."Skepticism DefendedIn my judgement, the S-skeptics are right. The discussion of mind-as-virtual-machine in Chapter 6 implied that there is no obstacle in principle to human-level AI intelligence (possibly excepting phenomenal consciousness). The question here is whether this is likely in practice. Besides the intuitive implausibility of many post-Singularity predictions, and the near-absurdity (imho) of transhumanist philosophy, the S-skeptics have other arguments on their side. AI is less promising than many people assume. Chapters 2 through 5 mentioned countless things that current AI cannot do. Many require a human sense of relevance (and tacitly assume completion of the semantic web: see Chapter 2). Moreover, AI has focused on intellectual rationality while ignoring social/emotional intelligence—never mind wisdom. An AGI that could interact fully with our world would need those capacities, too. Add the prodigious richness of human minds, and the need for good psychological/computational theories about how they work, and the prospects for human-level AGI look dim. Even if it were practically feasible, it’s doubtful whether the necessary funding would materialize. Governments are currently putting enormous resources into brain emulation (see the following section), but the money required for building artificial human minds would be much greater still. Thanks to Moore’s Law, further AI advances can certainly be expected. But increases in computer power, and in data availability (given cloud storage, and 24/7 sensors throughout the Internet of Things), won’t guarantee human-like AI. That’s bad news for S-believers, because ASI needs AGI first. S-believers ignore the limitations of current AI. They simply don’t care, because they have a trump card: the notion that exponential technological advance is rewriting all the rule books. This licenses them to make predictions at will. They occasionally allow that “by-end-of-the-century” predictions may be unrealistic. However, they insist that “never” is a long time. Never is indeed a long time. So the S-skeptics, myself included, may be wrong. They have no knock-down argument— especially if they allow AGI’s possibility in principle (as I do). They may even be persuaded that the Singularity, albeit hugely delayed, will happen eventually. Nevertheless, careful consideration of state-of-the-art AI gives good reason to back the skeptics’ hypothesis (or their bet, if you prefer), rather than the wild speculations of the S-believers."
Added by: alexb44
11/09/2026, 03:31
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Boden is a skeptic as well. "In my judgement, the S-skeptics are right. The discussion of mind-as-virtual-machine in Chapter 6 implied that there is no obstacle in principle to human-level AI intelligence (possibly excepting phenomenal consciousness). The question here is whether this is likely in practice. Besides the intuitive implausibility of many post-Singularity predictions, and the near-absurdity (imho) of transhumanist philosophy, the S-skeptics have other arguments on their side."
Added by: alexb44
14/09/2026, 04:51
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AGI would require social/emotional intelligence and wisdom
"Moreover, AI has focused on intellectual rationality while ignoring social/emotional intelligence—never mind wisdom. An AGI that could interact fully with our world would need those capacities, too. Add the prodigious richness of human minds, and the need for good psychological/computational theories about how they work, and the prospects for human-level AGI look dim"
Added by: alexb44
14/09/2026, 04:51
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Hardware advances are not enough—the 'virtual machine' is still the main thing.
"it is the virtual machine that’s crucial here (see Chapters 1 and 6). Some virtual machines can be implemented only in hugely powerful hardware. So mega-transistored computer chips may well be necessary. But just what computations will they be performing? In other words, just what virtual machines will be implemented in them? To match human (or even mouse) intelligence, these will need to be informationally powerful, in ways that computational psychologists don’t yet fully understand. Let’s suppose—what is, I think, unlikely—that every neuron in a human brain will, eventually, be mapped. In itself, this won’t tell us what they are doing. (The tiny nematode worm C. elegans has only 302 neurons, whose connections are known precisely. But we can’t even identify the synapses as excitatory/inhibitory.)"
The nematode worm is fully mapped, but we don't understand the synapses fully. Even if we did, would it be a nematode worm? (as it relates to the physicalist view)
Added by: alexb44
14/09/2026, 04:53
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Virtual machines are required for every little thing "Even the mundane activity of eating with a knife and fork requires that many virtual machines be integrated—some dealing with physical objects (muscles, fingers, utensils, various kinds of sensors), others with intentions, plans, expectations, desires, social conventions, and preferences. To understand how that activity is possible, we need not only neuroscientific data about the brain, but also detailed computational theories about the psychological processes involved."
Assuming that all these things add up to an understanding of the task is still banking entirely on emergence of a mind through these little bits and pieces. There is still no intentionality (Merleau-Pontian), let alone Searly intentionality.
Added by: alexb44
14/09/2026, 04:56
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AI has no understanding of human relevance - it would require intentionality, once again.
"Like the fisherman in the fairy story, whose wish for his soldier-son to come home was granted by his being brought back in a coffin, we could be nastily surprised by powerful AI systems lacking our understanding of relevance."
Added by: alexb44
14/09/2026, 04:57
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| Musings |
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Do outcomes matter?
Functionalists care only about outcomes when it comes to robotics and AI. But it seems to me that most people care (or should care) for instance whether their partner or close family members remember their birthday. But even if they remember your birthday, it matters how they wish you a happy birthday. If someone who usually rings you up or comes around to celebrate only sends a text message, then you might be disappointed. The functional aspect of congratulating you on your birthday was accomplished, so why then is it not the same?
Added by: alexb44
07/09/2026, 05:07
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