Sound Research WIKINDX
Sound Research WIKINDX |
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O'Callaghan, C. (2007). Sounds: A philosophical theory. Oxford University Press, USA. Added by: alexb44 (6/23/25, 11:46 AM) Last edited by: alexb44 (6/23/25, 11:56 AM) |
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| Resource type: Book ID no. (ISBN etc.): 0199215928; 9780199215928 BibTeX citation key: OaposCallaghan2007 Email resource to friend View all bibliographic details  |
Categories: General Keywords: Philosophy, Sound Creators: O'Callaghan Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA |
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| Abstract |
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Vision dominates philosophical thinking about perception, and theorizing about experience in cognitive science has traditionally focused on a visual model. In a radical departure from established practice, Casey O'Callaghan provides a systematic treatment of sound and sound experience, and shows how thinking about audition and appreciating the relationships between multiple sense modalities can enrich our understanding of perception and the mind.Sounds proposes a novel theory of sounds and auditory perception. Against the widely accepted philosophical view that sounds are among the secondary or sensible qualities, O'Callaghan argues that, on any perceptually plausible account, sounds are events. But this does not imply that sounds are waves that propagate through a medium, such as air or water. Rather, sounds are events that take place in one's environment at or near the objects and happenings that bring them about. This account captures the way in which sounds essentially are creatures
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| Notes |
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A philosophical account of the nature of sounds and auditory perception, arguing that sounds are events
Added by: alexb44 Last edited by: alexb44 |
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p.17
"Sounds, I claim, are particular individuals that possess the audible qualities of pitch, timbre, and loudness, possibly along with other inaudible properties."
Establishes the author's primary metaphysical claim, rejecting the traditional view that sounds are simply qualities or properties, similar to colors. Instead, sounds are distinct entities in their own right, and that qualities like pitch and loudness are attributes that these sound entities have. Added by: alexb44Keywords: Philosophy Sound |
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p.30
"Sounds, however, do not seem to travel. Sounds ordinarily seem to have stable distal locations relative to their sources. This feature of auditory experience impacts the metaphysical theory of sounds."
Phenomenological argument for the author's theory. Our experience of hearing is of sounds being stationary at their source (e.g., a bell across the room), which conflicts with the scientific view that sounds are waves constantly traveling through the medium. This experiential fact suggests that the sound itself is not the traveling wave Added by: alexb44Keywords: Philosophy Sound |
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pp.54–55
"Since objects that vibrate in a vacuum are inaudible, since there is no standard that determines the medium-independent audible qualities of a sound, and since a vacuum contains no medium, the best thing to say about a tuning fork in a vacuum is that it simply has no audible qualities. We are justified in concluding, therefore, not just that a necessary condition on sound perception is missing, but that a condition necessary for the existence of a sound is missing in a vacuum."
Presents the conclusion of the "argument from vacuums." Since the audible qualities of a sound depend on the medium in which it occurs, and a vacuum lacks a medium, the author argues that a sound cannot exist in a vacuum. This supports his view that a sound is an interaction involving a medium, not just a property of a vibrating object. Added by: alexb44Keywords: Philosophy Sound |
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p.179
"Perceptual experience therefore has a dimension of content that cannot be captured by a composite of modality-specific—proper or unimodal—snapshot-like contents." (p. 179, argument starts p. 174)
Summarizes a broader conclusion of the book about the nature of perception. By examining "cross-modal illusions" (where one sense, like sight, affects another, like hearing), the author argues against the idea that our senses work in isolation. He suggests that perception has a unified or "multimodal" aspect, where what we experience cannot be broken down into separate, independent inputs from each sense. Added by: alexb44Keywords: Philosophy Sound |