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Grimshaw-Aagaard, M., & Bie, A. 2026, March 23–28, The problem of embodied Artificial Intelligence. Unpublished paper presented at Society for Phenomenology and Media 2026 Conference, Nagoya. 
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (2/19/26, 12:55 AM)   
Resource type: Conference Paper
Language: en: English
Peer reviewed
BibTeX citation key: GrimshawAagaard2026a
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Categories: AI/Machine Learning
Keywords: Artificial creativity, Artificial Intelligence, Embodied cognition
Creators: Bie, Grimshaw-Aagaard
Publisher: Chukyo University (Nagoya)
Collection: Society for Phenomenology and Media 2026 Conference
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Abstract
"In this polemic, we speculatively explore the phenomenology of Artificial Intelligence (AI), specifically Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), and claims for its embodiment. Pace the market-driven, techno-optimism espoused by the AI industry, we have taken a more cynical view in recent work, arguing that there is no such thing as being an AI, that AI can have no subjective consciousness as we are able to know it, and that the only experience an AI has can best be described as a received phenomenology drawn from a limited pool of generalised human knowledge about the world. In pursuing these themes further, we make a rigorous distinction between the "lived body" or body-as-subject (Leib) and the "constructed body” or body-as-object (Körper). We use this distinction to argue against current conceptions of embodiment within the AI field while suggesting ways forward to an AGI that is truly embodied in the strict phenomenological sense."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard  
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