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Terzidis, K., Fabrocini, F., & Lee, H. (2023). Unintentional intentionality: Art and design in the age of artificial intelligence. AI & SOCIETY, 38(4), 1715–1724. Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (5/4/26, 2:37 AM) Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (5/5/26, 3:21 AM) |
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| Resource type: Journal Article Language: en: English Peer reviewed Published DOI: 10.1007/s00146-021-01378-8 ID no. (ISBN etc.): 1435-5655 BibTeX citation key: Terzidis2023 Email resource to friend View all bibliographic details  |
Categories: General Keywords: Artificial creativity, Artificial Intelligence, Creativity, Intentionality Creators: Fabrocini, Lee, Terzidis Collection: AI & SOCIETY |
Views: 19/19
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| Abstract |
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This paper presents an emerging aspect of intentionality through recent Artificial Intelligence (AI) developments in art and design. Our main thesis is that, if we focus just on the outcome of the artistic process, the intentionality of the artist does not have any relevance. Intention is measured as a result of actions regardless of whether they are human-based or not as long as there is an esthetical value intersubjectively acknowledged. In other words, what matters is the `intentio' embedded in the work of art (the output) rather than the `intendere' (the process). By considering the former aspect, intentionality becomes free of human intervention, therefore 'unintentional'. This thesis is supported through a range of examples related to AI in general and AI art in particular. However, in the case of a self-driving vehicle, the macro-goal of the system is fixed by humans, even though the AI system itself will take care of decomposing the macro-goal into a set of micro-goals and take the corresponding decisions. In the case of art, the system does not need to have any exterior goal to the extent that art is pure freedom of expression, as many philosophers have acknowledged. In this sense, the decisions of any AI system generating art or design are independent of humans and must be judged only on the ground of the final outcome. A work of art will be judged `artistic' to the extent that humans will recognize an artistic intent in the work itself. In particular, the introduction of random processes makes an AI-generated artwork fully independent of human creativity.
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard |
| Notes |
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Note that the authors use intentionality as intention, that is, conscious intent to do something as opposed to what Merleau-Ponty, basing his work on Husserl's protention and retention, calls intentionalities comprising an intentional arc. The "intentional arc creates the unity of the senses with intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and motricity" (Merleau-Ponty 2014/1945, p.137); this is to do with embodiment and so is not a conscious intent. To confound further, the authors use intent and intention as synonyms for intentionality (in their use of intentionality). Merleau-Ponty, M. (2014). Phenomenology of perception. D. A. Landes, Trans. New York: Routledge. (Original work published 1945).
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p. 1716
"our main thesis will be that, if we focus just on the outcome, the intentionality of the artist does not have any relevance. Intention could be measured as a result of actions regardless of where they came from, whether they are human-based or not, as long as there is an intellectual accomplishment. In other words, what matters is the ‘intentio’ behind the work of art rather than the ‘intendere’. A work of art will be judged ‘artistic’ to the extent that we recognize an artistic intent in the work itself."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
(5/4/26, 2:50 AM)
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p. 1717
"it could be always possible to reply that the human intervention is hidden behind the technology itself. It comes from the creator of the technology. However, it is not difficult to find out a number of examples in which technology goes beyond the intentions of its designers. Frequently we believe that humans are in control of the software, while actually the software is in control of humans. Technology generates rules rather than following rules. We are ruled by technology rather than ruling technology. The state of technological innovation is comparable to a massive social experiment in which technology is left ungoverned."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
(5/4/26, 2:57 AM)
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p. 1717
"Any technology discloses possibilities and precludes possibilities. It is ‘pharmakon’ and poison at the same time, as Socrates denounced about the technics of writing. Humans are inventors and victims of their own creatures."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
(5/4/26, 3:00 AM)
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p. 1718
"the output of a software program, particularly in the age of AI, is far from being deterministically characterized and that the stochasticity of the process plays a fundamental role in creating surprising and unexpected outcomes when it is applied to the artistic field. Yet, as soon as we enter into the artistic field, we should learn to honor the error as a hidden intention [...] to the extent that it is exactly here that the ‘unintentional intentionality’ of the machine shows itself and goes beyond the limits of the human intentionality."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
(5/4/26, 3:03 AM)
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p. 1720
"intention can be distinguished between the action verb ('to intend') versus the resulting noun ('the intent'). In such a context, the notion of intention does not have to be associated with its source but rather with the outcome itself."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
(5/4/26, 3:13 AM)
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p. 1722
"However, in Ancient Greek, the word intention is πρόθεσις, which implies a situation, not an action. In other words, intention is a state of being. It exists regardless of human presence, action, or participation. For example, if there is a hole in the ground and somebody falls into it, there are two viewpoints as far as intention is concerned: the person who acted and therefore fell in the hole as opposed to the hole who made the person fall into it [regarding the situation] intentionality becomes free of human intervention, therefore 'unintentional' [as regards the action]."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
(5/4/26, 3:26 AM)
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p. 1723
"In contrast to assigning intention when there is none, in the name of preserving human presence, intention can be defined as a universal act. Instead of exclusively limiting intention to the human realm, a more general definition can be used. Intention could be measured as a result of actions regardless of where they came from, whether they are human-based or not, as long as there is a human accomplishment. This possibility of a redefined definition of ‘intention’ opens up a more intricate relationship between humans and computers than has been previously possible."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
(5/4/26, 3:32 AM)
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p. 1723
"Until now, intention is constructed through one of two strategies: either (a) by declaration, when the human can articulate convincingly why they did something, or (b) by assignment, when the human cannot. Presently, an alternative definition of intention may be formulated that may escape these dialectically opposed strategies. Intention can also be assigned to an autonomous computational scheme. This refined futuristic definition does not eradicate differences but incorporates new practices. Computers are not human and therefore cannot be equal, but they can behave in a similar way to humans. Rather than investing in arrested conflicts, this definition might be better exploited by alternative new AI developments. For the first time perhaps, intention might be aligned with neither humans alone nor computers alone but both."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard
(5/4/26, 3:33 AM)
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