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Lerchner, A. (2026). The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI Can Simulate But Not Instantiate Consciousness. PhilPapers. Added by: alexb44 (5/8/26, 7:15 AM) Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (5/8/26, 8:40 AM) |
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| Resource type: Journal Article Language: en: English Published BibTeX citation key: Lerchner2026 Email resource to friend View all bibliographic details  |
Categories: AI/Machine Learning Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Consciousness Creators: Lerchner Collection: PhilPapers |
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| Abstract |
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The current AI debate is dominated by two opposing views: biological naturalism, which argues that consciousness requires specific biological substrates, and functionalism, which suggests that consciousness arises from information processing regardless of the substrate. This paper identifies a third, more fundamental perspective: the Abstraction Fallacy. This fallacy occurs when we mistake our mathematical or algorithmic descriptions of a system for the system's intrinsic physical nature. By examining the map-territory relationship, I argue that computation is not an intrinsic property of any physical system but a mapmaker-dependent description. Consequently, while AI can simulate any observable cognitive behavior to an arbitrary degree of precision, it cannot instantiate consciousness because it lacks the intrinsic physical constitution required for experience. This distinction between simulation and instantiation resolves several long-standing paradoxes in the philosophy of mind and provides a clear framework for understanding the limitations of artificial consciousness.
Added by: alexb44 Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard |