Sound Research WIKINDX |
Leddington, J. In defense of sounds as properties. [Draft on Academia.com] Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard (03/06/2014, 20:19) |
Resource type: Unpublished Work BibTeX citation key: Leddington Email resource to friend View all bibliographic details |
Categories: General Keywords: Definition of sound Creators: Leddington |
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Abstract |
According to Locke, sounds are neither objects nor events, but “sensible qualities” (Locke 1975: II, viii, 14). Philosophical tradition follows suit: sounds are not particulars, but properties; not bits of worldly furniture, rather features of (some) such furniture. Call this the Property View of Sounds. Recently, the Property View has fallen out of favor, and a number of arguments against it have appeared in the literature. Happily for traditionalists, these arguments fail. Or so I will argue.
This essay has five parts. In the first part, I recommend a widely-overlooked but intuitively plausible version of the Property View. In parts two through four, I show that this version is immune to the main objections recently leveled at the Property View. Still, the question remains: are sounds properties or particulars? Part five presents three points in favor of the former. |
Notes |
Author on Academia.com:
https://bucknell.academia.edu/JasonLeddington |